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Abstract
Title: An Investigation into Recent Developments in the Regulatory Regime for
Financial Accounting in Ireland

Author: Mark James, BBus

In the last decade the Irish accounting regulatory regime has been radically
reformed from one consisting largely of private sector regulation to one where
public sector regulation has increased importance. This change has taken place
within a larger international context of the rise of the regulatory state, and a period
of greater convergence between regulatory activities internationally. While an
extensive body of research on this topic has accumulated in other countries,
particularly America, Irish research has generally been focussed on the role of the
accounting profession in this development. This study aims to build on the existing
literature by focusing on the evolving developments in the regulatory regime for
financial reporting and auditing of limited companies in Ireland, and its interaction
and response to the events driving international developments. This study examines
the extant literature on the concepts of public interest, economic individualism and
regulation. It describes and compares the historical developments in Ireland, Britain
and America, it scrutinises the Ddil and Seanad debates on the Companies Bill 2003,
and uses a detailed semi-structured interview conducted with a government minister
as its research methodologies.

Britain and America have had a broad influence on Ireland, for that reason they
were selected for the comparative study to explore parallels and differences in the
development of their regulatory regimes. This research found that unique aspects of
the Irish state, as a result of historical forces, have influenced the course of
regulatory developments in accounting in Ireland. It also found that an
unprecedented combination of public interest focus, economic and political context,
accounting lobby, financial scandal, and international regulatory convergence,
drove through significant recent change in the Irish accounting regulatory regime.
This paper suggests that these recent developments are indicative of a greater
confidence and independence in Irish regulatory affairs.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction to this Research

1.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces this dissertation by providing the background to the study
and reveals how a review of the extant literature led to the identification of a
research gap and subsequently the research objective. The research objective is
outlined, the questions that will be addressed in the study to achieve that objective
and the methods used to answer those questions are stated. The chapter then explains
the limitations of the study and how they can be minimised. Finally, the structure of
this study is explicated, outlining the focus of each of the chapters that follow which
form the attempt to answer the research questions presented in this introduction.

1.2 Background to the Study
Cahill (1999) identified two serious weaknesses in the Irish accounting regulatory
regime at the turn of the century, namely: "the lack of a monitoring or enforcement
mechanism" (p.l78) for existing regulation and the absence of a "standing
rulemaking body in the areas of accounting and auditing" (p. 178). In the meantime
these weaknesses have been addressed by the establishment of the Office of the
Director of Corporate Enforcement and of the Irish Auditing and Accounting
Supervisory Authority (lAASA) respectively. As a result, the Irish regulatory regime
has moved from one which consisted largely of private sector regulation to one
where public sector regulation has become increasingly important. This is a
significant shift and worthy of investigations.

1.3 Gcips in the Literature
Carnegie and Napier (2002) call for an exploration of comparative international
history in Irish accounting research. The usefulness of a comparative study in Irish

accounting has increased in light of the continued revelations of accounting fraud,
exacerbated by the current recessionary environment. Walker (2006) states that:

"Accounting historians have found that modern day accounting and
auditing scandals offer opportunities to reveal that previous
catastrophes indicate the enduring nature of the issues confronting the
profession and lessons from former disasters are seldom learned" (p.
107).
This call provides the motivation for this study to examine the comparative history
of accounting regulation to discover what it reveals about recent developments in
Ireland.

I here are currently a limited number of detailed studies into the regulatory changes
in accounting in Ireland. Cahill (1999) discussed the state of Irish aecounting
regulation at the end of the 20^*^ century within a broad but limited historical context.
However, Cahill’s work was published prior to the changes that have occurred in the
past decade. O’Regan (2010a) focussing on the developments in recent decades
using a public interest framework was published after the commencement of this
research project.

This study will provide a comprehensive historical comparison of developments
combined with a detailed examination of the reeent changes. This will build on the
work of Cahill (1999) and O’Regan (2010a), to examine both the recent and
historical development of accounting and auditing regulation in Ireland.

1.4 Research Objective
The objective of this study is to:

"Identify the influences that have affected the recent regulatory
change in accounting in Ireland within the context of its historical
development ”
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This objective will be achieved by answering the following questions:

1. How have international developments, particularly in the UK and America,
influenced the development of the Irish accounting and auditing regulatory
regime?

2. What factors influenced the development of the Irish Companies’ Act 2003
and how?

1.5 Research Focus

This study will provide a comparative study of the history of regulation in Ireland
and an analysis of the influences on the development of the regulatory regime in
accountancy in Ireland.

Firstly, in answering the call by Carnegie and Napier (2002) for a comparative study
of the history of accounting regulation in Ireland, the researcher decided to use a
desk review of a broad array of secondary sources. In addition, the researcher
decided, in light of the significant amount of material to cover, that this comparative
study would be done in two stages. In the first stage, the history of accounting
regulation was analysed individually in Ireland and in each of the two comparative
countries chosen. The second stage brought these developments together to reveal
trends and unique aspects of the Irish development.

Secondly, the focus was determined by the review of the extant literature which
revealed that detailed studies of the tribunals and, in particular, the development of
the Review Group on Auditing Report that precipitated regulatory change in Irish
accounting, have already been conducted to a high standard. As such, this study will
focus the primary research on the period during which the Companies (Auditing and
Accounting) Bill 2003 was considered in the houses of the Oireachtas.
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1.6 Limitations of the Research
Due to the time and aceess limits available to the researcher, this research primarily
uses secondary sources. Originally, the researcher had intended to conduct a number
of structured interviews involving individuals with first-hand knowledge and
experience of the Companies (Auditing and Accounting) Bill 2003. Unfortunately it
was not possible to gain access to these individuals. The researcher compromises by
placing a greater emphasis on documentary evidence, and utilising a single extensive
semi-structured interview with a government minister to provide context.

In relation to the study of the Companies Bill 2003, the researcher had considered
widening the scope to include a detailed examination of the process and reports of
the various tribunals and the Review Group on Auditing. However, in light of the
already considerable scope of this study, the researcher deemed this to be beyond the
reasonable depth required for a research masters. As such, only the outcomes of
these events are included.

3'his study uses qualitative research methods, and its conclusions are thus influenced
and constrained by the perspective chosen. The researcher attempted to provide as
neutral a perspective as possible by including an extensive study of the theories
underlying regulation, and the political paradigms inherent to them.

1.7 Structure of the Study
An in-depth synthesis and comprehensive analysis of the extant literature relating to
this research is provided in chapters two, three, and four of this study. These provide
the theoretical foundation of this research. Chapter two undertakes a detailed
examination of the meaning of the public interest paradigm, taking into account a
myriad of academic and political perspectives of the term throughout several
centuries of reflection. The outcome of this chapter forms part of the basis of a
perspective in which the researcher analysed the use of public interest in regulatory
developments and its influence in chapters nine and ten.
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Chapter three examines the converse perspective to public interest in matters of
regulation, self interest, which was broadened to the more inclusive term, economic
individualism. This chapter examines economic individualism from a broad
perspective, placing particular emphasis on its political nature, and identifies its
influence on regulation.

Chapter four examines the nature of regulation. Like chapters two and three, this
chapter takes a broad and historically expansive perspective, taking into account the
views of significant academic and political practitioners over several centuries. This
provides a balanced and sufficiently complex perspective of the nature of regulation.
Along with chapters two and three, this chapter is later used as the theoretical basis
of chapters nine and ten in examining the political influences on accounting
regulation.

Chapters five, six, and seven examine the historical developments of accounting
regulation in Britain, America and Ireland respectively using secondary sources.
These chapters provide the historical study used as the basis of chapter nine, w'hich
uses a comparative framework to compare and contrast the developments in each
country and identify the unique aspects of the development of Irish accounting
regulation.

Chapter ten identifies the factors that influenced the recent regulatory changes in
Irish accounting, focussing primarily on the progression of the Companies (Auditing
and Accounting) Bill 2003. In addition, this chapter analyses how these factors
influenced the changes, in light of the unique aspects of the Irish situation revealed
in chapter nine.

Finally chapter eleven provides the conclusions of this study, by answering each of
the research questions. It concludes with suggestions for further research in this area.
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1.8 Conclusion
This chapter began by introducing the background to this study. It argued that there
is a need for a comprehensive study of comparative regulatory developments in
accounting in light of recent developments. It revealed that this dissertation
combines a comparative historical study using secondary sources with a detailed
examination of a recent legislative initiative in Ireland, the Companies (Auditing and
Accounting) Bill 2003, and an in-depth interview of a Government Minister to
answer the research questions.

The chapter also identified the limitations of this study, and the researcher's attempts
to mitigate these weaknesses. The chapter concluded with an outline of the structure
of the rest of this study, providing an overview of the aims of each of the chapters
that follow.

14

CHAPTER 2

Public Interest Theory

2.introduction
This chapter discussed the concept of‘public interest’ and examines its many diverse
definitions. As public interest is a complex idea that has remained without
consensus, this chapter reviews it from different perspectives. Theorists eontinue to
argue whether it is "a goal, a process, or a myth" (Held, 1970, p. 2). Therefore, any
discussion of the definition of public interest theory requires an assessment of the
various viewpoints using an appropriate taxonomy. One of the most popular
classifications, identified by Cochran (1974), is that of abolitionist, normative,
process, and eonsensualist. This is the eategorisation used in this chapter. This
chapter concludes with a discussion of the symbolic power of publie interest and its
role in public policy, within the context of publie interest.

2.2.Abolitionist Public Interest Theories

The abolitionist public interest theory has been debated since 1838 when the English
philosopher, Jeremy Bentham (1838), used the expression, "the interest of the
community" (p. 2) as a more descriptive phrase for public interest. Bentham (1838)
answered his own rhetorical question, regarding what those interests' may be, as
follows:

"The interest of the community then is... the sum of the interests of
the several members who compose it" (Bentham, 1838, p.2).

Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson (1950) dismiss the existence of a concept of
public interest, describing Bentham's view of the publie interest as "responsiveness
to one’s own values and attitudes" (Simon et al., 1950, p. 551). Schubert (1961)
defined the abolitionist public interest theory as a debunking of publie interest theory
as “too vague...and utopian to be beneficial’’ (p. 148). Lively and Reeve (1988) also
15

criticize Bentham’s view, summarising it as "an abstract term covering a mass of
individual interests" (p.200).

2.2.1

l oo Vague

Childs (1940) lamented that “no one knows what the public interest is’’ (p. 23). It is,
as Sorauf (1957) argues, a symbol that is “so broad as to be devoid of genuine
meaning” (p. 631). Expanding on Schubert’s (1961) description of public interest
theory as “too vague” (p.l48). Held (1970) describes it as a "vacuous, deceptive,
and generally useless term" (p. 1). More recently, Sarat and Scheingold (2004)
reflected these thoughts. They describe public interest as a "slippery concept"
arguing that it "generally does little or no analytic work” (Sarat and Scheingold,
2004, p,5). Bozeman (2007) concedes that it is undeniably “vague and ambiguous”
(p.84). Likewise, Box (2007) describes it as a "vague, indeterminate construct"
(p.585). This lack of intrinsic, practical, and concrete definition presents a dilemma
for its implementation.

2.2.2

Discarding the Myth of "Public Will '/ ’Piiblic Cood"

Long (1952) described the "will of the people" (p.809) conception of public interest
as a myth. Likewise, Sorauf (1957) refers to the "myth of the public interest" (p.638)
as theories that maintain "fables" (p.638) vis-a-vis the political process. Schubert
(1961) agrees, dismissing the public interest as a “childish myth” (p. 348). Schubert
(1961) defined abolitionists as realists who rejected the legitimacy of public interest,
stating that:

"The realists are skeptics and sophisticates who have put behind them
myths which postulate any independent substantive content for such
notions as ’the public whlT and 'the public interest. ’ For them, the
alternatives for official choice are concrete but ambiguous" (p.l36).
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Cochran (1974) confirmed this definition, describing abolitionists as:

"theorists who, for various reasons, deny that the concept of the public
interest has meaning or validity" (pp. 330-331).
Other writers agreed with this idea, stating that public interest lost currency among
these 'sophisticates’ (Sarat and Scheingold 2004; Feintuek 2004; Bozeman 2007).
Cochran (1974) cited the reason why abolitionists’ are dismissive of the public
interest concept as due to their denial of "community as a basis of political life ” (p.
331) and "the common good as defining the purpose ofpolitical society" (p. 331).

2.2.3

No Operational Sense

Many writers state that the concept of public interest could only have meaning in
political analysis if it can be "defined in operational terms" (Long, 1952, p.809).
Schubert (1961) argued that the concept "makes no operational sense" (p.224) and
stated that political scientists should focus on concepts that are open to scientific
examination. Similarly, Sorauf (1962) considered public interest to be a conceptual
muddle, and described the debate among the various perspectives as caught up in
"semantic chaos" (p. 186).

2.2.4

Politics of Interest

As Long (1952) did not find the concept of public interest to be operational, he
narrowed the scope of the concept:

"[Public interest] serves as a symbol to legitimize the acts of any group
that can successfully identify itself with it in the public mind" (p. 809).
Essentially, Long (1952) declared public interest as a "value symbol of our political
culture" (p.809). Cochran (1974) contends that contemporaneous theories of the
public interest in political science depend upon the postulations of the politics of
interest.
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Cochran (1973) defines the politics of interest as:
"the vision of politics as an arena into w'hich individual or group
interests enter in some fashion to be dealt with by certain processes and
transformed into outcomes, policies, or outputs" (p. 745).
In effect, modern political claims to the public interest are influenced by the relative
power of various interest groups- referred to as actors. The interests of the dominant
political actors are translated into policies via the political mechanism, which then
temporarily satisfies the interests of those actors (Cochran, 1974).

Cochran's (1973) determination of parallels between the assumptions inherent in
post-1950's social science theories of public interest, and that of the politics of
interest is informative. Cochran (1974) contends that theories of the public interest
that are solely dependent on the assumptions of the 'politics of interest,' are in fact
referring only to contliets of interest. It is for this reason that Cochran (1974)
dismisses the theories of public interest proffered by contemporary social science,
stating that they "cannot constitute credible theories of the public interest" (p.328).

As Sarat and Scheingold (2004) state:
"the public interest neither identifies any interest, nor can it point the way
toM’ardpolicy or reform" (p. 6).
Instead, the abolitionist's contend that individual choices are the preferred and best
way to determine policy (Sarat and Scheingold, 2004; Denhardt and Denhardt,
2011).

Schubert (1961) discerns that political realists are dismissive of concepts such as the
public will or public interest having any "independent substantive content" (p. 136).
Theories of individualism in politics, such as Arrow's impossibility theorem, were
developed at this time, dismissing the concept of 'public interest' (Amadae, 2003).
Keay (2000) argued that due to the complexity of public interest, many academics in
the legal sphere avoid defining the concept, preferring to leave it vague. In politics,
public interest gave way to interest group politics, which was unambiguous and
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quantifiable (Bozeman, 2007). In modern times, the increasing complexity of many
policy domains invalidated public interest as a guiding principle (ibid.).

2.3 Normative Public Interest Theories
In social science, normative models describe

ought to be” (Denhardt and

Denhardt, 2011, p.68). Normative theories of public interest therefore are idealistic
in nature (Weisbrod, 1978). Lippmann (1955) suggests that:

"the public interest may be presumed to be what men would choose if they
saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently"
(p. 42).
The normative conceptions of public interest have informed much of the use of
public interest in the political sphere, and reveal a great deal about its popularity
(Bozeman, 2007). It is widely believed that public interest play's a central role in
society and one of the fundamental reasons governments exist is to articulate and
fulfil the public interest (Cochran, 1974; Bozeman, 2007; Denhardt and Denhardt,
2011).

23.1

Concept of the "Common Good"

Normative public interest theories refer to the concept of the ‘common good’
(Cochran, 1974), and have been discussed since the early 1690’s. Locke (1690)
asserted the common good as the natural rights of the people. He argued that it is for
the common good that "societies are instituted” (p.l51), and therefore it is the
responsibility of the government to pursue the common good (Locke, 1690;
Dellaportas and Davenport, 2008). Thus the concept of public interest came from
these earlier notions of the common good (Dellaportas and Davenport, 2008).
However a difference between the two is evident from the literature. The common
good was easier to ascertain.
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Douglass (1980) states that:
"The common good consisted of a number of specific objectives
designed to promote the general human well-being of all people—
such as peace, order, prosperity, justice, and community" (p. 104).

In contrast, public interest is vague and much less focused than the common good,
because it does not "identify the public or the content of the public good"
(Dellaportas and Davenport, 2008, p.l083). Despite this difference, many academics
use the concepts synonymously. For instance. Herring (1936) argues that since law is
open to certain amount of interpretation, the public interest is required as a guiding
principle to reconcile competing interest groups. Herring (1936) justifies this by
stating that:

"the public interest is based not upon the welfare of one class hut
upon a compounding of many group interests" (p. vii).
This view conceives public interest as being impartial among individuals' private
interests. Effectively, the outcome of this conception of public interest in the context
of government operations is, as Schubert (1961) succinctly states:
"governmental decision-making processes become value-neutral
technical processes and the authority of public officials is the
authority of expertise"
1961, p. 31).
According to Banfield and Meyerson (1964) a decision is in the public interest "if it
serves the ends of the whole public rather than those of some sector of the public"
(p.322). The view of the founding fathers of the U.S on governance in the common
good is revealed by Madison (1787) as the:

"enlightened pursuit of broad public interests, general in form and
held in common across all segments of the community" (p. 57).
Several contemporary academics agree with Locke's contention of public interest as
the goal of government (Herring 1936; Appleby 1952; Moneypenny 1953; Redford
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1954; Cassinelli 1958; Flathman 1966; Denhardt and Denhardt 2011). Moneypenny
(1953) positioned public interest as a guiding principle for public servants, forcing
them to acknowledge both represented and unrepresented parties in their decisions.
Redford (1954) agreed with this, defining public interest as

"the best response to a situation in terms of all the interests and of
the concepts of value which are generally accepted in our society"
(p. 1108).
Appleby (1950) defines it as an "elevated aspiration and deepest devotion of which
human beings are capable" (pp. 34-35).

Therefore, normative public interest theories consider the pertinent norm as "the
general good of a whole community" (Cochran, 1974, p.330). Cochran (1974)
describes people as ‘social beings’ and, as such, they gather together to form
associations, such as communities, partnerships and interest groups (Cochran, 1974).
He assumed that they do this "for a better common life and not simply for private
benefits" (Cochran, 1974, p. 330). Cochran (1974) argues that the natural order of
humanity:
"requires and makes possible a political community that is more
than simply a convenient instrument for the satisfaction of individual
desires" (p. 329).
It is this base belief that underpins the normative view and won the agreement of
many other academics. Weisbrod (1978) wrote that all members of a given society
could not possibly share one interest, therefore public interest must be “based on
consensus among the 'preponderance ’ of the people" (p.26). Bozeman (2007) agrees
stating that:

"[The] common good is something that is in the interest of the
community as a whole, even if against the interest of some of the
individuals in the community" (p. 89).
Denhardt and Denhardt (2011) maintain that normative public interest theorist view
something that is good for the whole public as being of a "higher level" than
something that is good for only a section of the public (p.68). They argue that the
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public interest is not merely a compromise between disparate factions, but rather a
common understanding among these groups. They describe this understanding as a
"longer-range and broader sense of community and societal interests'\^. 66).

2.3.2

Value Laden

In the 1950’s and 1960’s value-laden adjectives such as “ethical” (Cassinelli, 1958)
and “moral” (Appleby, 1950, 1952; Flathman 1966) were used to describe the
normative public interest theory. Cassinelli (1958) argued that public interest is the
"ultimate ethical goal ofpolitical relationships" (p.48) and in 1962 he deseribes it as
the “highest ethical standard” (p.46). Flathman (1966) stated that the pursuit of the
public interest was vital to a morally acceptable public policy. Schubert (1961)
critieized normative theories for this reason. He critieizes their heavy use of value
terms, making reference to the "metaphysical glow" and "moral fervor" of normative
theories (p. 353). Modern academics such as Bozeman (2007) and Feintuck (2004)
agree with these judgments that normative theories are value-laden.

2.3.3

Determined by Llites

Lippmann (1955) contends that democratic interaction among individuals, who
naturally pursue their self-interest, inherently cannot lead to the public interest. The
individuals may be acting rationally, but not disinterestedly and benevolently
(Lippmann, 1955). Cassinelli (1958) agrees with this, stating that the public interest
can be unearthed by "examining the relevant individuals and determining what
interests they hold in common" (p.50). Cassinelli (1958) declines to specify what
such an examination would entail, but implies that the public interest must be
determined by elites rather that naturally oecur through market forces.

Downs' (1962) analysis goes further than this, stating that:

"The idealist school believes that the public interest consists of the
course of action that is best for society as a whole according to some
absolute standard of values, regardless of whether any citizens actually
desire this course of action" (p. 11).
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Downs (1962) argued that "public opinion need not understand the wisdom of the
policies arrived at" (p.ll). Weisbrod (1978) elucidates this further, stating that for
idealists, the public interest is an "ethical standard" that requires the "direction of
wise leaders" (P. 27). Douglass (1980) infers this to be "what is really good for the
whole people as interpreted by the people" (p.l 14).

2.3.4

Aiiibiguous and Irrelevant

Bozeman (2007) criticizes Lippmann’s definition of the normative public interest
theory, contending that it is a difficult concept due to its ambiguity and lack of
practical guidance. Earlier Flathman (1966) maintained that criticism of public
interest as ambiguous were not valid as it is a normative standard, and must be
assessed within the context of moral philosophy. Flathman (1966) justifies its
continued use, stating that:
"the problems associated with "public interest” are among the crucial
problems ofpolitics" 13).
Normative theories of public interest tend to be framed in ways that allow their
adherents to sidestep the criticisms of abolitionist theorists. For instance, in framing
the public interest as an ethical standard, Cassinelli (1962) simply dismisses the
criticisms surrounding its functionality as irrelevant. Cassinelli (1962) states that:

"Social scientists cannot ignore the fundamental issue of the final
political good: this is the principle lesson to be learned from examining
the concept of the public interest" (p. 47).
Cassinelli (1962) argues that normative public interest theories have functions that
are distinct to those of analytic models favoured by contemporary social scientists.
Denhardt and Denhardt (2011) state that the concept "defies measurement, and
involves both substance and process" (p. 67). Denhardt and Denhardt (2011) aecept
the ambiguity of public interest, but state that

"the difficulties and ambiguities... are more than outweighed by the richness
it brings to our understanding of citizenship, governance, and public service"
(p. 68).
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Normative theories cannot be abandoned simply because they are difficult to
understand (Flathman, 1966; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011).

2.4 Process Public Interest Theories
Smith (1960b) states that public interest is more appropriately related with a specific
process that reveals the correct course of action, rather than with "concrete politics"
(p. 159). Process public interest theorists accept the value of the concept, but
approach it from the perspective of policy implementation (Cochran, 1974).
Essentially, proponents of this view argue that the process of achieving public
interest is more important than defining what it is (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011).
Consequently, Cochran (1974) describes process public interest as theories that
"define the concept by reference to the politiccd processes through which policy is
made" (p. 331). Three subcategory conceptions of these theories are aggregative,
pluralist and procedural (Cochran, 1974; Bozeman, 2007).

2.1.1

Aggregative

fhe aggregative conception has its origins in Bentham utilitarianism, with Bentham
(1838) describing public interest as "the greatest happiness of the greatest number"
(p. 542). Bentham argues that individual interest underpins all political action
(Bozeman, 2007). Schattschneider (1952) agrees, describing public interest as:

"the aggregate oj common interests, including the common interest
in seeing that there is fair play among private interests" (p. 22).
He conceived both public and private interests as being mutually dependent. It is for
this reason that Schattschneider (1952) warns of the "serious misconception" of
viewing private interest as "selfish" and public interest as "unselfish" (p.22).
Therefore, public interest is viewed as the aggregate of private interests (Cochran,
1974).

In reference to Schubert's (1961) dismissal of public interest as not being operational
(see section 2.2.3), Lewin (1991) argues that "the democratic process itself can
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constitute a good substitute" (p. 16). In Lewin's (1991) view, the interaction between
private interests in the political sphere leads to a consideration of all viewpoints and
interests, thus the public interest is served. Bozeman (2007) disagrees, stating that:

"no voting scheme ensures the greatest good for the greatest number
nor does any decision process" (p. 94).
Furthermore, Bozeman (2007) criticizes the aggregate view as lacking a
comprehensible understanding of "the good" (p. 94). In Lewin's (1991) view, the
good is "what the elected representatives of the people declare it to be" (p. 16).
While this may indeed constitute an operational definition, Bozeman (2007) argues
that there is no reason to assume the individuals' interests will correspond with the
value placed upon them.

2.4.2

Pluralist

On the other hand, the pluralist conception considers public interest as a
consequence of the "clash of interests" (Cochran, 1974, p. 331). fhe pluralist view
was revealed in the 18th century by James Madison in a series of letters referred to
as ' fhe Federalist' (Goodin, 1996), and is considered the model of American politics
(Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011). Madison considered the term 'faction' as "personal
interest" (Goodin, 1996, p. 333), or interest group (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011).
Madison defined a faction as:

"a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community" (Bailey and
Kennedy, 2010, p. 193).
Madison's correspondence with fhomas Jefferson reveals his belief that, even within
a democracy, personal interests can dominate the public good (Ketcham, 1971).
Madison conveyed to Jefferson that even if the majority is satisfied to the detriment
of the minority, this cannot constitute public good {ibid.).
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Bozeman (2007) identifies this concern among pluralist theorists- that minority
interests could be ignored via the normative conception because of its potential for
totalitarianism. Political interaction by individual citizens is seen as impractical
(Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011). Smith (1960a) argues that groups within a society
often have contrasting interests, and that these interests can only be recognized via a
pluralist conception of public interest. Therefore, the pluralist conception accepts the
use of interest groups over individual actions as a necessary "vehicle for representing
and defending the interests of citizens" (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011, p. 71).
Individual interests are balanced in order to achieve the public interest {ibid.).

Smith (1960b) agrees, stating that in order to avoid the possibility of totalitarianism,
public interest must be based on the decision-making process and interest groups.
Cochran (1974) states that the process relies on the interaction between interest
groups to not only achieve the public interest, but to ensure its validity as it lacks
“the elites” of the normative conception.

It has been criticized for its concessionary nature, as Sorauf (1957) states:

"the public interest as a compromise is no longer an interest that
men strive for, no longer a guide to policymaking, but a post hoc
label for the product of their strivings" (p. 630).
A number of academics agree with this assessment that it merely depicts the public
interest at face value (Schubert 1961; Bozeman 2007). For example, Schubert (1961)
perceives this conception as simply being a slogan, symbolic of the "compromise
resulting from a particular accommodation or adjustment of group interaction"
(p.202).

2.4.3

Procedural

The procedural conception of public interest considers it as a "democratic process of
interest reconciliation or as fair procedure" (Cochran, 1974, p.331). The procedural
concept can be seen as an attempt to resolve the criticisms of the abolitionists by
theorists who reject the normative view but are reluctant to dismiss the public
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interest completely (Cochran 1974; Bozeman 2007). One of the earliest supporters of
the procedural perspective was Herring (1936) who argued that "the purpose of the
democratic state is the free reconciliation of group interests" (p. 9). Although
Herring (1936) later tempers this by stating that special interest groups should be
prevented from gaining undue influence, it is clear that the procedural view is the
free market approach to policy. Indeed, Lowi (1979) later alludes to this by stating
that the procedural concept has a similar function to Adam Smith's invisible hand
concept of private interests interacting.

According to Cochran (1974), procedural theorists avoid altogether the pitfalls of
associating the public interest with any specific outcomes by claiming that the
"process itself is the public interest" (p. 342). Sorauf (1957) describes this process as
"the process of compromise and accommodation... characteristic of democratic
politics" (p. 623). Benn and Peters (1959) argue that the public interest is a
procedural process and, therefore, an aspect of the policy process. Benn and Peters
(1959) argue that a policy is in the public interest if it is formulated through a fair
and impartial process.

This view is criticized by Flathman (1966), who argues that disinterestedness cannot
constitute public interest, since an outcome that is bad for all citizens would qualify
as public interest under that criterion. However, Bozeman (2007) contends that more
sensible forms of procedural public interest have been popular among political
scientists. This is because realists, who have embraced factors such as group conflict
and interest group politics, find the procedural concept a suitable framework for
those factors (Bozeman, 2007). Lowi (1979) describes the procedural concept as "a
vulgarized version of the pluralist model of modern political science" (p. 51). This is
justified by reference to two important factors: under the procedural concept
"organized interests are homogeneous... [and] emerge in every sector" (Lowi, 1979,
p.51).
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2.5 Consensualist Public Interest Theories
Consensualist theories of public interest focus on interests greater in scope than
individual or special interests, but do not necessitate a single understanding of the
public interest (Cochran, 1974),. For example, several academics have asserted the
view of public interest as a symbolic mechanism to ensure that minority interests are
included in policy formation (Herring 1936; Moneypenny 1953; Pfiffner and
Presthus 1975). Similarly, Pennock (1962) contends that the public interest is a
warning that the good of the community is not simply the sum of the private rights
and self interests. However, Sandel (1996) goes further than this, criticizing the
traditional liberal conception of public interest, and arguing for a more "civic-minded
liberalism," that embraces privatization as a means of "affirming the membership
andforming the civic identify of rich and poor people alike" (p.333).

Hare (1952) argues that to understand what is in the public interest, one must first
define the criteria and values for what is 'good'. Since these criteria and values are
inherently variable, there cannot be a single unchanging concept of the public
interest (ibid.). Flathman (1966) agrees that the public interest is inherently variable
in its meaning and is therefore innately unclear. Bozeman (2007) argues that the
consequences of Hare (1952) and Flathman's (1966) view are that unique aspects of
policies will affect the perception of the public interest at any particular point in
time. This leads Bozeman (2007) to conclude that the Hare/Flathman conception of
public interest is much more complicated than what might first appear, referring to
the "remarkable analytical challenges" it presents (p. 92).

Bozeman (2007) highlights the importance of democratic elections to the
consensualist view. For example. Downs (1962) views the public interest as being

"closely related to the minimal consensus necessary for the
operation of a democratic society" (p. 4).
Similarly, Flathman (1966) argues that democracy is vital for consideration to be
taken of the individual interests in policy formation. Likewise, Cox (1973) contends
that the public interest is simply the majority interest, as evidenced by democratic
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elections, and provides a useful gauge of the needs and concerns of the public in
general. Pfiffner and Presthus (1975) refer to the public interest as "the majority and
usually the consumer interest" (p. 525).

Downs (1962) states that it is difficult to define the public interest because of its
fundamental importance to society, but offers a generalized definition: "those
government actions that most. . . [help] the whole society" (p. 10). However, Down's
(1962) argues that the definition only matters as much as the role it fulfils in political
discourse. Down's (1962) contends that as long as people have a general idea of the
public interest, they are capable of fulfilling it, regardless of not having a singular
definition.

2.6

Symbolic Power of Public Interest in the Public Sphere

Despite the criticisms of the public interest paradigm in the academic sphere, it has
remarkably maintained its status as a quintessential force in the public and political
sphere. As Bozeman (2007) states:

"No political campaign would he complete without opponents
arguing that their respective policies, even if contradictory with one
another, are in the "public interest. ” (p. 11)

Political speeches and editorials regularly invoke the public interest (ibid.). In
addition, legislators and the courts still cite the public interest as a guiding principle
in their roles (Bozeman, 2007). Furthermore, as a concept, public interest is
influential in the law of regulatory commissions, and has remained important despite
the growing scepticism of academics (Cochran, 1974). In short, Bozeman (2007)
states succinctly: "the public remains interested in public interest" (p. 11).

The symbolic power of the term maintains significant influence in society (Goodsell,
1990, cited in Bozeman, 2002). Symbols such as 'public interest' can be seen as a
political strategy to appease several competing interest groups. Lippmann (1922)
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contends that politics and media exploit symbolism in order to "amalgamate the
emotion of conflicting factions" (p. 206). Essentially, each group sees something of
their purpose in the symbol. When symbolism is invoked, the divergent groups tend
to move towards conformity under the symbol rather than critically analyzing the
situation {ibid.).

This begs an important question: To what degree can a symbol shape public policy?
Lippmann (1922) argues that the group that captures the symbol which currently
contains public feeling controls the shaping of public policy by that degree.
“Capture”, in this sense, refers to a group being associated with the symbol in a
particular context. For example, some politicians base their election campaigns on
symbols such as 'law and order'- the symbol only holds weight if the electorate
believes the correlation between the politician and the symbol {ibid.). In general, for
a symbol to be able to affect change in public policy, it must encompass enough
public feeling at a particular time {ibid.).
Lippmann (1922) posits that ambitious groups will continue to compete for
possession of a particular symbol, providing it maintains its unifying power. The
implications of this for groups currently in possession of a symbol are clear: the
group will face challenges to its authority over the symbol. Lippmann (1922)
conjectures that if the group in possession of a symbol acts in a way that conflicts
with what the public perceives the symbol to represent, then the symbol loses
influence for that group. In addition, a group that strongly resists change, by
invoking the symbol, may also cause the symbol's influence to disperse {ibid.).

2.7 Public Opinion

The concept of public opinion is one that has been studied extensively over many
years, with a considerable number of books and Journals devoted to it (Crespi, 1997).
It is a concept as old as civilisation; Aristotle considered that democracy would lead
to the development of a shared will of the people (Herbst, 1993). Despite this, there
is much disagreement about the nature of the concept (Bordieu, 1979), especially
whether it is operative in shaping public policy (Crespi, 1997). Childs (1939) states
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that: “there are about as many definitions as there are studies in the field” (p. 327).
Public opinion shares public interests’ ambiguity, in this regard.

2.7.1

Definition

There are a variety of perspeetives regarding the nature of public opinion (Bordieu,
1979). Definitions of the eoncept vary according to the emphasis placed upon it
(Bardes and Oldendick, 2012). For instance, some scholars emphasise its role as a
guide for government to develop public policy, such as Key (1961), who states that
public opinions are "opinions held by private persons w hich governments find it
prudent to heed" (p. 14). It has been described as the "expression of attitudes
relevant to government and politics" (Cummings and Wise, 1974, p.l68), and as the
"preferences of the adult population on matters of relevance to government"
(Erikson and Tedin, 2011, p.8). Similarly, Bardes and Oldendick (2012) define
public opinion as the "aggregate of the views of individual adults on matters of
public interest" {p. 5).

Others focus on the importance of the subjeet as well as the scope of its support.
Hennessy and Hennessy (1981), who contend that public opinion is the:

"complex ofpreferences expressed by a significant number ofpeople
on an issue of general importance" (p. 4).

Others contend that defining public opinion as a “general will” (p. 6) of the people,
or a unity of opinion, is not satisfactory: Diversified groups of people tend not to
have the same opinion on all topics (Hodder-Williams, 1970). Also HodderWilliams (1970) states that:

"implying that opinions become instantaneously universalized... is
incompatible with what we know about the communication of ideas"
(p. 6).
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Therefore, some scholars define public opinion by its broad acceptability rather than
unanimous support. For instance, Lowell (1919, cited by Hodder-Williams, 1970)
defines public opinion in precise terms, stating that for an opinion to be considered a
public opinion:

"a majority is not enough, and unanimity is not required, but the
opinion must be such that while the minority may not share it, they
feel bound, by conviction, not by fear, to accept it" (pp. 15-16).

Hodder-Williams (1970) argues that this conception of public opinion can be seen as
"essentially metaphorical" (p. 6), in that it is a distinct representation of a
widespread phenomenon, similar to the concept of a will of the nation that is often
espoused by politicians.

Cooley (1918) takes a very different approach to defining public opinion. Cooley
(1918) argues that public opinion is a social process, stating that:

"Public opinion, if we wish to see it as it is, should be regarded as
an organic process, and not merely as a state of agreement about
some question of the day" (p. 378).

This process is characterised by its use of what Shepard (1909) refers to as "organs”
(p. 45), which are conduits for communication, such as the mass media. Similarly,
Crespi (1997) conceptualises public opinion as a "multidimensional interactive
process" (p. 1) of three dimensions: the creation and evolution of individual
opinions, the convergence of these individual opinions into collective judgements,
and the integration of the collective judgement into the "governance of a people ” (p.
1).
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2.7.2

Populism

The consideration inherent in the definitions that public opinion encompasses the
views of the majority, has been a controversial one among researchers in America,
particularly from the late 1800’s to the middle of the 1900’s (Hodder-Williams,
1970). For instance, Jenks (1895) dismisses the popular public opinion as being
filled with opinions based on "sentiment" (p. 159) rather than being "clearly
reasoned out" (p. 159). Furthermore, he contends that much of popular opinion is
simply ideas that have been communicated often enough, especially through mass
media, to stick in the minds of citizens. As Jenks (1895) states: "conviction deepens
simply from the repetition of the thought" (p. 160). Thus, some academics deny the
aggregation of opinion, such as Blumer (1960) cited by Bardes and Oldendick
(2012). They contend that public opinion must not follow the democratic process of
equal representation; rather it must only consider the views of a smaller group of
informed individuals. This is justified so as to avoid "popular opinion" (Nisbet,
1978, p.l89) distorting public policy (Blumer, 1960). Nisbet (1978) laments this
populism, stating that:

"[It is often] utterly at odds with the sentiments of large majorities,
and yet, through the always available channels ofpopular opinion newspapers and television, pre-eminently - take on striking force in
the shaping ofpublic policy" (p. 189).

Interestingly, the "major interest groups" (p. 5), that proponents of this view
consider to be part of the knowledgeable group capable of interpreting and
communicating the public opinion (Bardes and Oldendick, 2012) include the same
media that Nisbet (1978) contends give "striking jorce" (p. 189) to populist views.
Shepard (1909) contends that the press has had a "powerful incidental influence
upon conversation" (pp. 45-46). The expansion of journalism into many forms of
mass media has led to greater participation in the formation of public opinion
(Shepard, 1909; Bardes and Oldendick, 2012). Prior to the advent of mass media, the
majority of public opinion, or "conversation" (p. 46), as Shepard puts it, had a local
community focus (Shepard, 1909). National and international press has, as Shepard
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(1909) states, "unified conversation in space and diversified it in time" (p. 46). The
result of this is that topics that were once the reserve of experts, whose conversations
on such were considered the public opinion, are now discussed "with interest and
more or less intelligence by all classes " (Shepard, 1909, p. 46).

2.7.3

Public Interest

In response to a line of questioning that essentially regarded the determinants of
public policy, Theodore Roosevelt, president of the USA at the beginning of the 20th
century, answered that: "I do not represent public opinion: I represent the public”
(Morris, 2001, p. 1140). Roosevelt considered that the public interest was not
necessarily a rellection of public opinion at a given time. Roosevelt explained that:

"There is a wide difference between the two, between the real
interests of the public, and the public’s opinion of these interests. I
must represent not the excited opinion of the West, hut the real
interests of the whole people” (Morris, 2001, p. 1140)

Childs (1940) offers an alternative view, arguing that public opinion is a "criterion”
(p. 25) of public interest, and that ultimately the public interest "is what public
opinion says it is” (p. 34). According to Bryce (1893, cited by Childs, 1940),
societies that adopt this mentality are both more stable and more effective in
developing public policy. Therefore, it stands to reason that the opposite is true, that
public policy formation that ignores public opinion will lead to instability and
conflict.

2.7.4

f^ublic Values

The relationship between public values and public opinion seems on the surface to
be obvious; that public opinions are essentially "opinions about public values”
(Bozeman, 2007, p. 14). In fact, Crespi (1997) argues that social science scholars
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have, until very recently, treated public opinions as being the expression of the
values or attitudes of the public. However, there is a subtle difference between the
two; the comparative degree of stability over time (Bozeman, 2007).
Public opinion has been described as a "dynamic and changing thing" (Childs, 1940,
p. 24), "highly volatile" (Holsti, 2004, p. 28) in terms of its "concerns
and...directions" (Bozeman, 2007, p. 14). Similarly, Almond (1950) contends that, in
a given time, public opinion encompasses a wide variety of views on even a single
issue, making it difficult for policy makers to interpret a definite course of action.
Furthermore, the vast majority of citizens are too distracted by private endeavours to
focus on issues of government policy (ibid.), and tend to only involve themselves in
issues that directly affect them (Holsti, 2004).

In contrast, public values are "much more stable" (p. 14), though the degree of
stability can vary between subjects (Childs, 1940). Bozeman (2007) contends that

"ne^v public values may enter and old ones may exit but generally
only after great social change and the passing of generations"
(P-14).'

In addition, some scholars differentiate between public opinion and private opinion,
with the latter being more representative of the values of the people (HodderWilliams, 1970). Thus, private opinion may be seen as a conduit for public values to
affect changes in public opinion.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter examined the literature on the complex and ambiguous concept of
public interest. This was demonstrated by the conflicting views on the definition of
public interest, which bring about fundamental questions in regard to the nature and
context in which it is used. This study used the four schools of thought identified by
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Cochran (1974). The abolitionist school views public interest as a vague, mythical
construct that is inherently inoperative. On the other hand, the normative school
views the coneept as a guiding principle; a philosophy that ensures that decisions’
take into aceount the common good. In this view, public interest is a goal to be
achieved. The process school also values the concept of publie interest, but only
from the standpoint of policy implementation. This perspective values the proeesses
that result from pursuing the public interest, whilst acknowledging the difficulty in
achieving publie interest goals, as identified by the abolitionist school of thought.
The consensualist school emphasise the symbolic nature of publie interest, viewing it
as a philosophy closely related to democracy, therefore ensuring that all interests are
taken into account.

This chapter reviewed the symbolic pow'er of public interest, identifying its
prominence in the legal and political sphere. This section illustrated that perhaps the
greatest value of public interest is its use as a symbol that groups seek to capture so
as to gain legitimacy in the perception of the public. The chapter concluded with a
consideration of the concept of public opinion, and especially its relationship with
public interest. Though not quite as dynamic in its definition as public interest, this
seetion underlined the difficulty of identifying a single conception of public opinion.
It is clear that, depending on which definitions are used, public opinion may be a
guide towards publie interest, or be considered as too short-term and variable for
developing public interest policy. The values that underline public opinion, rather
than the opinions themselves, are much more stable, and provide a more secure basis
for public policy formation.
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CHAPTER 3

Economic Individualism

3.1 Introduction
This chapter examines a contrasting philosophy to public interest, namely economic
individualism. Economic individualism has increased considerably in popularity
over recent decades, particularly in Western Europe, driven in part by greater
demand for efficient markets. Economic individualism and other relevant terms will
be defined in this chapter. In addition, the historical and philosophical underpinnings
of the concept will be analysed.

3.2 Definition of Economic Individualism
Economic individualism has been described as both a theory and a doctrine (Moore,
1977; f’eldman, 1982). As a theory, it frames social behaviour in terms of economic
activity, which Moore (1977) charaeterises as a "rational self-interested, acquisitive
eeonomic man" (p. 433). As a doctrine, economic individualism is essentially a
moral contract between an individual and society, whereby the individual contributes
hard work and, in return, reeeives equality of opportunity (Feldman, 1982). In 1971,
Childs stated that:
"many Americans have been disposed to regard the principles
of economic individualism as the definition of the essential
moral foundation of a free society” (p. 216).
A similar sentiment has grown in acceptance in Europe (Bozeman, 2007). In
addition, economic individualism has been described as "a philosophy emphasizing
in matters economic the values and interests of the individual" (Bozeman, 2007, pp.
3-4), and "based on self-reliance and the belief that effort will necessarily produce
success" (Anderson and Bjorkman, 1980, p. 226). This belief in a correlation
between effort and success comes from the relationship between the individual and
society (Feldman, 1982; Bratton, Deutschmann and Denham, 2009). Individuals
participate in society, contributing their skill and effort, in return for the opportunity
to obtain what they require (Feldman, 1982).
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Bratton et al. (2009) state that:
"through this process of economic individualism, society can he
conceptualized simply as an association of independent
individuals acting on the principles of economic exchange of
self-interest" (p. 46).
Likewise, McLean and McMillan's (2009) understanding of the concept highlights
this relationship between the individual, the market, and society, defining economic
individualism as:
"a faith in the capacity of individual action and ambition,
working through the market, to create wealth and to bring
about progress” (p. 262).
Therefore this conception of society is based on the market philosophy (Bozeman,
2007). In general, economic individualism promotes individual ownership of
property, such as land, and has been received by groups such as freehold famers as
"nature's own system for the organisation of human affairs" (Childs 1971, p. 216).
fhis association with ‘natural law’ will be discussed in greater detail in section 3.3.

3.2.1 Principles of Economic Individualism

Various academics have attempted to formulate principles that effectively
encapsulate the “economic individualism” concept. For instance, Gordon (1994)
describes a single principle of economic individualism, stating that:
"individuals can better choose for themselves than can an
outsider what, including helping others, is best to do ” (p. 9).
A more comprehensive perspective is provided by Bozeman (2007), who identifies
three principles of economic individualism. The first principle is termed by Bozeman
(2007) as "human centered” (p.4). He states that values are determined by the needs
of individuals rather than society (Bozeman, 2007). Previously Moore (1977) had
expressed that these values tended to be expressed in economic terms. The second
principle identified by Bozeman (2007) positions the needs of individuals as
dominant over the group, with state institutions existing for the benefit of individuals
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rather than society as a whole. This can be contrasted with the philosophy of
collectivism, which regards "the group as more important than the individuals of
whom it is composed” (Brittan, 1998, p. 3). Government actions that focus on
collective issues such as "community needs, ideals, or transcendent values" (p. 4) are
contrary to economic individualism (Bozeman, 2007). Instead, this principle seeks to
remove restrictions on individual behaviour as, in general, limitations to what
Imamichi (1997) describes as the "fullest development and freedom of the
individual” (p. 106) are expunged. The final principle identified by Bozeman (2007)
states that individuals are the ultimate value, not the society or political institution,
and morally all individuals are of equal value.

3.2.2 Self-reliance

fhe essential aspect of economic individualism is the belief in the capability of the
individual, which promotes self-reliance in society (Feldman, 1982; Fine, 1992).
fhus Feldman (1988) later defines economic individualism as "the belief that people
should get ahead on their own through hard work" (p. 419). Similarly, Fine (1992)
states that the principle underpinning economic individualism is that "the individual,
not society, is ultimately responsible for his success or failure" (p. 315). The
nineteenth century philosopher, Ralph Waldo Emerson, argued that self-reliance in
this context is not the withdrawal of a individual from society, but rather the starting
point of a society formed through the "voluntary association of fulfdled individuals"
(Richardson, 1996, p.322). Hence, government exists to provide the values that
enable this individual expression, such as law, security and education (Bozeman,
2007).

3.2.3 Conceptual Simplicity and Complementary Doctrine

The pursuit of economic individualism as a sole doctrine, particularly in comparison
to public interest, is problematic. Tocqueville (1965) maintained that:
"Self-interestproperly understood is not a very lofty doctrine"
(p. 612).
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However, Toequeville (1965) qualified this by stating that economie individualism
''is a clear and reliable" (p.612) doctrine. This qualification helps explain the
success of the concept, as Bozeman (2007) argues, the popularity of economic
individualism is, at least partially, due to its simplicity. Bozeman (2007) contrasts
this ease of comprehension with the philosophically complex public interest,
contending that self-interest is "salient by definition" (p. 53).

However, even Adam Smith (1910) recognised the potential for self-interested
behaviour to distort the market, arguing that the pillars of society, such as justice and
established institutions, were necessary to correct failures. Polanyi (1957) argues that
the development of free markets
"far from doing away with the need for control, regulation, and
intervention, enormously increased their range" {p. 140).
In addition, Knight (1935) challenged the extension of the philosophy of economic
individualism beyond the marketplace, stating that:
"economic man is not a social animal, and economic
individualism excludes society in the proper human sense" (p.
282).
Modern academics share this view of the concept as a complementary doctrine,
rather than a complete social order. For instance, McNally (1988) argues that
economic individualism can affect society in a positive way, but only within a
society that already has an appropriate legal and institutional system. Brown and
Jacobs (2008), referring to the views of Adam Smith, argue that markets "are means,
not ends in themselves" (p. 124) and require a public philosophy that can harmonise
the public purpose and institutional capacity. Kim (2001) maintains that if essential
ethical and moral principles are not broadly maintained, then legislation will enforce
them.

3.2, t Utilitarianism and Economic Individualism
Bentham utilitarianism, discussed in section 2.4.1 as the root for the aggregative
conception of public interest, is also congruent with economic individualism
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(Bozeman, 2007). Bentham considered self-interest to be the base motivation for all
political actions (ibid.). Dicey (1981) argued that the mid-nineteenth century in
Britain was a period of laissez-faire government policy. In the early twentieth
century, Dicey (1981) attributed this rise of economic individualism in Britain at that
time to Bentham's argument for markets free of government intervention. However,
contemporary academics have disputed this, arguing that Bentham considered some
degree of governmental intervention as necessary (Stone, 1965; Dinwiddy and
Twining, 2004).

Mill (1859) was informed by a slightly different consideration of utilitarianism than
Bentham's, and argued that an individual may act according to his character as long
as such action does not harm another. Mill (1859) accepted regulation as being
necessary in some situations; however, only to the degree that individuals were
allow'ed to exercise their "progressive” nature (p. 24).

3.3 Natural Law
Chalk (1951) argues that economic individualism originated in the rationalization by
Aristotle of self-interest as having a basis in natural law. The doctrine of natural law
has a long and important presence in western civilisation (Cotterrell, 1994).

3,3.1 Universal Fthics
Natural law has been described as a "universal ethics, ” (p.359) the origin of which
depends on an individual’s conception of the natural world (Andersen, 2001). For
instance, in the 4‘*^ century BC, Aristotle viewed the natural law in logical terms and,
therefore, considered it as a number of principles (Chalk, 1951; Andersen, 2001). In
contrast, Martin Luther, informed by a theological conception, considered the natural
law as "a rule of role exchange, ” (p. 359) rather than principles that can form an
ethical theory (Andersen, 2001). The seventeenth century philosopher, Thomas
Hobbes (1976), asserted that "the law of nature and the civil law contain each other

and are of equal extent" (p. 183). Hobbes (1976) considered moral virtues such as
justice, equity and gratitude to have a basis in the laws of nature, and these virtues
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provide a foundation for civil law. However, Zagorin (2010) argues that Hobbes
justification of the existence of a natural law came from his religious belief, stating
that
"inherent in his concept of natural law was its character as a
divine command, which alone made it genuine law" (p. 3).
Adam Smith, the highest profile proponent of laissez-faire governance, was a firm
believer in the doctrine of natural law (Smith, 1761; Viner, 1927; Stone, 1965). In
Adam Smith's (1761) moral thesis, 'the theory of moral sentiments,' he argues for
this doctrine, stating that there is a natural order which, if allowed to lead, will
inherently lead to the maximization of happiness and prosperity. However, Viner
(1927) contends that this doctrine of a "benevolent deity" is of less significance in
Smith's economic thesis, 'the wealth of nations' (p. 207). The doctrine remains only
in the more limited form in the concept of the 'invisible hand,' (Viner, 1927) which
was first coined by Smith (1761) in his moral thesis and will be discussed in section
3.6.3 of this chapter. Furthermore, Ginzberg (1934) argues that Smith used the term
'natural' lightly, being more concerned with the outcome of interactions than the
source. At this time, Cotterrell (1994) argues that classical natural law theory gave
way to a more refined natural law conception, which was necessitated by the
growing complexity of legal systems in the eighteenth and nineteenth century that
recognised opposing interests.

3.3.2 Criticism of Natural Law
Common criticisms of the natural law doctrine regard it as “ambiguous, unwieldy,
and prone to inflated claims” (Kainz, 2004, p. 43). Bentham (1977) is particularly
critical of the doctrine, describing it as a "formidable non-entity" (p. 17). In
Bentham’s view, the law of nature is simply a substitute term for the various
"sentiments" of individuals. Bentham argues that its use is often to convince "the
readers to accept of the author's sentiment or opinion as a reason, " without
recourse to detailed argument (Kainz, 2004, p. 43).
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As such, Bentham’s criticism is motivated by the concern that the law of nature as a
perceived external standard could be used to justify almost any belief system (Kainz,
2004). Hart (1958) has a similar view to Bentham. Hart (1958) considers the
underlying prineipal of the natural law, that society possesses a single common
understanding of what constitutes good behaviour and justice, to be flawed. Hart
(1958) rejects the view that a eommonality exists among moral values in society.
Furthermore, Van den Haag (1991) argues that the contrasting views of individuals
who cite the natural law in support of their stances provides corroboration that the
doctrine has no substance. As for it to have any meaning, the natural law must not be
influenced by self-interest (ibid.).

In addition, despite the earlier support of natural law by theologians, some
contemporary Christian ethieists such as Stanley Hauerwas in the twentieth century
reject the ‘‘universality" (p. 239) of ethies, and consider the natural law to be an
“unqualified ethics" (Danaher, 2004, p. 239)

3.4 Self-interest
The concept of self-interest in political and ethical discourse has existed since at
least the time of classical philosophy, and is especially associated with Aristotle
(Chalk, 1951). Although the earliest eonceptions of self-interest were focused on
individual pleasure, Aristotle defined self-interest in a broader societal sense
(Rogers, 1997). Aristotle believed that individuals should act in ways that promote
self-fulfilment, and that society functions best when they are free to do so (Rogers,
1997; Jaeobs, 2004; Stieb, 2006).

3.4.1 From Dangerous to Useful
However, until the 17th century, many philosophers regarded the "passion of selfinterest" to be at best potentially harmful (Suttle, 1987, p. 461), and at worst a
dangerous obsession to be condemned (Lyman, 1978). Indeed, Lyman (1978)
presents a negative history of self-interest, arguing that the understanding of the
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concept prior to Adam Smith’s ‘the wealth of nations’ was very different to that of
later advocates sueh as Adam Smith and Tocqueville. Lyman (1978) argues that selfinterest was considered to be associated with the “greedy passion ” and, as it was a
product of “biologically given striving, ” it denied an individual any possibility of
having “choice or will" in his actions (p. 238).

The concept of self-interest as a positive force gained popular support tentatively in
the 17th and more forcefully in the eighteenth century (Suttle, 1987). This change
had its foundations in the cultural movement of the Renaissance, with the realisation
that self-interested behaviour may provide societal benefit (Garin, 1965).

Suttle (1987) argues that this revision had little to do with a change in ethical
philosophy, but rather the realisation that self-interest provides a realistic account of
mankind. The source of this realism movement came from the arguments of
Machiavelli (1810), who was highly critical of past philosophers attempts to portrait
individuals in an idealistie manner rather than as they are. The 17th century
philosopher, Benedict de Spinoza, considered human motives to be far from the
ideals of the earlier philosophers, stating that: "all men certainly seek their
advantage" (Hirschman, 1977, p. 44). With this realisation, society had to choose
between the repression of self-interest, which was favoured by the religious and
some of the political establishment, or the beneficial control of human nature, with
the state acting as a "civilizing medium" (Suttle, 1987, p. 461).

However, it is telling that even towards the end of the eighteenth century, Adam
Smith's promotion of a society based on self-interest, led to him being considered a
"subversive" within his own society (Rothschild, 1992, p.74). In contrast. Smith was
highly regarded within the academic and philosophical community (ibid.). This
suggests that change was oceurring quicker at academic level than broader societal
level. However, since the evolving opinion on self-interest had its origins in the
Renaissance, it is also likely this change spread slowly towards Britain and Ireland.
Hence, during his life. Smith's ideas were considered negatively by his society to be
associated with French philosophy which, unsurprisingly, had at that time been
heavily influence by the Renaissance (ibid.).
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3.4.2 False Honour
Montesquieu (1766) referred to self-interest as a "false honour," as it has the
potential to affect the same positive outcomes that a "true honour" may lead to (p.
36). Montesquieu (1766) contended that in a society which harnesses this potential:
"each individual advances the public good, while he only thinks
ofpromoting his own interest" (p. 36).
In the latter part of the eighteenth century, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe shared this
idealistic view. An authority in many disciplines, von Goethe was greatly influenced
by the writings of Spinoza in the previous century, and considered human nature to
"always will evil and aIw’ays bring forth good" (Hirschman, 1977, p. 16). However,
Spinoza observed that the drive within an individual to pursue their own interest
often lacks "sound reason... [taking] no account of the future" (Hirschman, 1977, p.
44).

Mandeville (1720) considered this problem when stating that: "men are naturally
selfish, unruly, and headstrong creatures" {p. 254). According to Mandeville (1720),
the redeeming feature of individuals "is their necessity... [to work together] to make
life comfortable," (p. 254) and this is achieved through the mechanism of "gains or
profits accruing to industry for services done to others" (p. 254). Mandeville (1720)
contends that "in a well ordered society" (p. 254) individuals will work in their area
of expertise for the good of others so as to gain the means to satisfy their own needs.

For these reasons, Holbach (1770) argued for an individualistic perspective of
society, stating that: "self-interest is the only motive of human actions" (p. 312). A
similar sentiment is expressed by Adam Smith in the The Wealth of Nations,' where
the essential notion of his thesis is the pursuit of self-interest (Smith and Seligman,
1929). Adam Smith, along with other prominent eighteenth century economists such
as Turgot, argued that individuals acting in their own self-interest would also
unknowingly be working for the good of society (Hamilton, 1991). This sentiment is
best expressed by Smith (1801), stating that:
"It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own
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interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their selflove, and never talk to them of our own necessities hut of their
advantages”
1801, p. 15).
In addition, issues regarding the efficient use of resources underpinned this support
for an individualistic society. For instance, Turgot argued that:
"Each individual is the only competent judge of the most
advantageous use of his lands and his labour. He alone has the
particular knowledge without which the most enlightened man
could only argue blindly” (Callahan, 2004, p. 308).
Americans often credit the "rich and dynamic’’ (p. 259) position of their country to
this factor, and the competition that derives from it (Smith, 1993).

3.4.3 Self-Interest or Selfishness

In their interpretation of the arguments of Adam Smith, Shaw and Barry (1998)
contend that the philosophy of self interested behaviour is essentially the promotion
of "egoistic pursuits” (p. 60). In addition, Buchholz and Rosenthal (1998) describe
the philosophy as the "pursuit of one's own selfish ends” (p. 106). James and
Rassekh (2000) reject these narrow perspectives, arguing that they misrepresent
Smith's conception of the self-interested individual. This misunderstanding is due to
the greater popularity of Smith's 'The Wealth of Nations,' than the book Smith
considered the more significant, ' The Theory of Moral Sentiments,' which is a
treatise of Smith's moral philosophy (James and Rassekh, 2000). Gramm (1980)
weighs the significance of the two books accordingly, and concludes that Smith's
political-economic perception was social rather than purely individual, as has been
popularly understood. Thus, James and Rassekh (2000) argue that:
"to understand Smith's political economy, one must study his
moral philosophy, othenvise his overall social system will be
incomplete, misinterpreted, and misunderstood” (p. 664).
James and Rassekh (2000) contend that, within the context of his moral philosophy.
Smith considered self-interest and selfishness to be dissimilar concepts. Smith
accounted for the motivation behind honourable actions in addition to self-interested
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ones (Smith el al., 1984). Smith considered self-love, the eighteenth century term for
self-interest, as the motivating factor behind both types of action, as long as no
individual was harmed by that action (James and Rassekh, 2000). Thus, James and
Rassekh (2000) maintain that Smith defined selfishness in a pejorative sense,
considering it to be actions of self-love that have negative consequences for others.
Therefore, according to Smith’s contention, even actions that are taken in the sole
pursuit of an individual's self-interest are morally actions of self-love rather than
selfishness, so long as they harm no one (ibid.).

Furthermore, self-interested behaviour does not necessarily equate with egoism. In
the 17^*^ century, Thomas Hobbes promulgated the view of a "rational selfishness,"
whereby actions that promote an individual's survival, without harming that of
another, are acceptable (King, 1993, p. 548). Hobbes considered the term selfishness
as a "neutral principle", similar to self-concern (Hobbes ct al., p. xxii). Hobbes
accepted self-interest as being a "realistic account of human action" (Hobbes et al.,
2004, p. xxxiii). However, Hobbes considered it necessary to separate those selfinterests determined by the individual, from those considered by the rational group
(King, 1993). Hence, King (1993) states that Hobbes distinguished between a
"natural passion" (p. 548) and a "reasonable passion," (p. 548) with the former
being the individuals perception of their interest, and the latter being what Hobbes
described as the interest of each individual that "all men by reason" (p. 548) would
consider acceptable.

Like Hobbes, Adam Ferguson (1768) recognised self-interest as a primary
motivating factor of individuals, stating that:
"[mankind] are devoted to [self] interest; and this, in all
commercial nations, is undoubtedly true" {p. 53).
Nevertheless, Ferguson (1768) argued against perceiving mankind as being "by their
natural dispositions, averse to society and mutual affection," (p. 53) as Ferguson
(1768) contends: "proofs of the contrary remain, even where [seljj interest triumphs
most" (p. 53).
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However, self-interest may also explain these proofs. As William Paley, eighteenth
century utilitarian, argued, in a functional society supportive behaviour would be
voluntarily advanced since societal cohesion is beneficial to the long-term selfinterest of individuals (Lukes, 2006). A similar view is expressed by Tocqueville
(1840), who considered individualism, which is discussed in the next section, as
being in contrast to what he termed "selfishness" (p. 98). In contrast to Hobbes
neutral conception, selfishness in this context refers to a relationship between the
individual and the broader society, whereby the former regards him/her self as being
the rightful beneficiary of the latter without contributing to society for reasons of
what Tocqueville expressed as "exaggerated love of self (ibid., p. 98).

3.4.4 Self-interest Rightly Understood
Marglin (2008) maintains that self-interest is so broadly defined within economic
individualism that it does not discount the possibility of altruism. In a sense, it is a
neutral concept in regards to individual nature (Novak, 1992). However, Marglin
(2008) laments that, on the other hand, the concept of self-interest does not
encourage altruistic behaviour, unlike, perhaps, doctrines such as public interest.
Novak (1992) proffers a contrasting view to this, arguing that Americans in
particular often use the term self-interest to describe activities that are "generous and
public-spirited," essentially understanding public interest activities as a form of selfinterested behaviour (p. 42).

Tocqueville (1840) considered this justification of public interested behaviour by
American's as unhelpful, stating that they:
"frequently fail to do themselves justice., fpreferring] to do
honor to their philosophy than to themselves" (p. 122).
Tocqueville (1840) contended that the American interpretation of public interested
behaviour as "enlightened regard for foneselff" requires a distinction from earlier
comprehensions of the self-interest view (p. 122). Hence, Tocqueville (1840)
separated the American notion of self-interest from earlier comprehensions, referring
to it as "self-interest rightly understood" (p. 125).
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Interestingly, Suttle (1987) contends that public opinion of self-interest in the second
half of the twentieth century has slowly reverted back to an understanding similar to
the greed conception of the pre-Adam Smith era. Rogers (1997) argues that
contemporary ethics has shifted towards the "self-other model," which values the
moral worth of an action as zero unless it is motivated solely by altruism and not
selfishness (p. 1). However, critics have emerged in the early twenty-first century.
For instance, Hertzberg (2005), a political commentator for The New Yorker
magazine, intentionally refers to decency as a motivating behaviour while arguing in
favour of solidarity through various progressive policies such as social security and
libraries. Likewise, Bozeman (2007) argues that, whilst a specific group or groups
may receive the tangible benefits from progressive policies, the intangible benefits,
such as "peace, decency, and public good, ” (p. 28) are shared by everyone.
Undoubtedly, these are not motivations that are purely from selfishness.

3.5 lndividuali.sm
Weber (1958) laments the imprecise nature of the term individualism. It is a term
that has been used to support a variety of sometimes unrelated views (Weber, 1958;
Lukes, 2006). This has led to generalised definitions, such as that of Townsend
(2000), defining individualism as "a social and political philosophy which stresses
the freedom of the individual" (p. 37). However, in general, freedom of competition
underpins what has been described as the "typical form ” of economic individualism;
that espoused by utilitarian’s such as Smith, Mill and Bentham (Imamichi, 1997, p.
106). In order to maintain brevity, this section will focus solely on Hayek's
understanding of individualism, and its historical development.

3.5.1 Hayek’s 'True' Individualism
In addition to the manifold legitimate versions of the term, Hayek (1948) contends
that 'individualism' has been "distorted by its opponents," and is commonly
associated with attitudes that are misrepresentative of its original meaning (p. 3). In
an effort to delineate its traditional meaning, Hayek (1948) deliberately compares
individualism with socialism, stating that the latter was intentionally proposed to
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contrast with the former. As such, Hayek’s (1948) conception of individualism,
referred to as "true individualism," is concerned with issues such as self-interest and
freedom of individual action and self-determination (p.4).

Hayek (1948) describes individualism as "a theory of society,” a description that
Hayek freely admits is at odds with the characterisations of its critics (p. 6). In
contrast to its detractors notion of the term as a theory of isolation, Hayek (1948)
asserts that the fundamental characteristic of individualism is "an attempt to
understand the forces which determine the social life of man” (p. 6). Hence, rather
than conceiving an individual as isolated from society, Hayek (1948) considers
individualism as a means of understanding "social phenomena” via the actions and
motivations of individuals (p. 6).

3.5.2 Origins of’True’ Individualism

The 'true' conception of individualism, as advanced by Hayek, has its origins in the
works of John Locke, Bernard Mandeville, and David Hume (Hayek, 1948). Locke,
informed by a normative view (Bozeman, 2007) considered individualism as being
in opposition to hierarchy; which Ashcraft (1991) states is essentially "authoritarian
political communities” (p. 72). Heavily influenced by natural law theory, in the 17'*^
century Locke contended that individuals have certain rights within civil society,
such as the right to create and possess personal property, and that these rights are
universal (Moulds, 1965; Lustig, 1991). Grant (1988) asserts that the erux of Locke's
individualism stems from his normative notion that "men are by nature free and
equal, ” and from this fact, their labour, and, hence, their possessions, are legitimately
theirs according to natural law (p. 61). Consequently, Locke promoted the view of
the individual as having a natural right to acquire goods in a market based economy
(MacPherson, 1962; Lustig, 1991).

However, Locke was not an atomistic individualist, and accepted that individuals are
social beings (Grant, 1988). Having acknowledged the "strength of human
communities," Grant (1988) asserts that Locke's political premise, "that men are
born free," is fundamental to understanding his conception of individualism (p. 43).

50

Thus, Locke conceived individualism not as "dissociated individuals," (ibid., p. 43)
as in the atomistic view, but rather, as Grant (1988) contends, individuals free to
interact in their natural environment of social relations.

The eighteenth century English philosopher and economist, Bernard Mandeville, is
credited by Hayek (1948) as being the first to formulate the anti-rationalistic view of
humanity in the context of economics. According to Hayek (1948), this view
considers individuals as being "very irrational and fallible" (p. 8). In this regard,
"individual errors are corrected only in the course of a social process," (Hayek,
1948., pp. 8-9) which, in light of Mandeville's support for laissez-faire, is
undoubtedly free markets (Hayek, 1948; Chalk, 1951).

The eighteenth century Scottish philosopher and economist, David Hume, supported
Mandeville's antirationalistic conception of human behaviour, stating that "human
actions can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason" (Hume, 1751, p. 209).
Hume (1751) contended that the source of human behaviours are the "sentiments and
affections" of individuals (p. 210). In support, Hume (1751) contends that the base
motivation, or "ultimate end" to use Hume's terminology, for various behaviours is
the avoidance of pain which, in itself, is not a rational motivation but, rather, a
natural one (p. 210).

3.5.3 1.alter Proponents of'True' Individualism
Adam Smith's conception of the invisible hand as a social mechanism to resolve the
problems arising from Mandeville's notion of human behaviour as anti-rationalist,
marks an important milestone in individualism. The idea that an individual can act
for their own benefit whilst promoting the public good contradicts the view that
public interest must be formally pursued. Indeed, Smith (1761) provided a strong
moral argument in favour of the pursuit of individual interests as a means of
achieving the public interest, in his principle focused book, 'the theory of moral
sentiments.' Smith (1761) contended that "every man is, no doubt, by nature, first
and principally recommended to his own care" (p. 140). In support of this assertion.
Smith (2007) argued that "man feels his own pleasures and his own pains more
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sensibly than those of other people" (p. 274). Smith (1761) reasoned that since the
sympathies of others towards an individual pale in comparison to the sympathy of
oneself, the individual "is fitter to take care of himself than of any other person" (p.
140). It is Smith's conception of the invisible hand, which will be discussed in detail
later, that transforms this self-interest into public good.

Edmund Burke, the eighteenth century philosopher, had a similar view of
individualism as Adam Smith (Dunn, 1941; Hayek, 1948). For instance. Smith's
concepts of the invisible hand and laissez faire are embedded in Burke's political and
economic philosophy (Dunn, 1941). In addition, Rae (1965) contends that Burke
strongly supported free trade and limited government interference in the marketplace
as an important element of his consideration of individualism. However, Burke's
political background contrasted with Smith's academic perspective, with the former
having expressed his view of individualism in an intermittent manner through
speeches and correspondence (Dunn, 1941)
Like Smith, Burke's ideas of individualism were underpinned largely by his belief in
natural law (Dunn, 1941). In particular, Dunn (1941) argues that Burke "repeatedly
observed the method and discipline of nature" (p. 337), finding this instructive as an
absolute in opposition to relativism, fhis provided a framework for Burke's views on
society and individualism (ibid.). For instance, Burke (1837) makes reference to a
"benign and wise disposer," a force that transforms the self-interest of individuals
into societal benefit, or as Burke describes it: "connectfs] the general good with their
own individual successes" (p. 183).

Tocqueville (1840) was an important proponent of the modern conception of
individualism, stating that:
"Individualism is a mature and calm feeling, which disposes each
member of the community to sever himself from the mass of his
fellows and to draw apart with his family and his friends, so that
after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly
leaves society at large to itself (p. 98).
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Tocqueville's (1840) conception of individualism was based to a large extent on his
observations of American society, and reflects a similar view to that outlined earlier
by Smith in the 'wealth of nations,' which argues for individualism based on
practicality rather than staunch ideology. This view gained momentum in the
twentieth century (Bozeman, 2007), and is typified by Robertson (1933), who gives
one of the best known modern accounts of individualism, stating that:
"Individualism, as a doctrine, sees in the individual and his
psychological aptitudes the necessary basis of society's economic
organisation, believes that the actions of individuals will suffice to
provide the principles of society's economic organisation, seeks to
realise social progress through the individual by allowing him all
the scope fw his free self-development which is possible" (p. 34).
Brouwer (2012) states that "individualism spurs innovation, ” (p. 12) therefore, it is
an important component of any society that bases its economy on dynamism and
diversity of ideas and perspectives.

3.5.4 From Collective to Indiviilual Interests

Aceording to Bozeman (2007), political stability within nations leads to a
progression from eollective interest to individual interest. Public values begin to
refect market values (ibid.). In addition, a positive correlation exists between the
degree of individualism within a nation, and its prosperity (Hofstede, 1980). Nations
with high levels of individualism tend to have higher per capita GNP, an equalitybased legal system, and an economy founded on individual pursuits (Kassim and
Menon, 1996).

3.5.5 riie Individual and Society

Bozeman (2007) expresses the assumptions regarding the individual's role in society
that is inherent in the concept suceinctly, stating that:
"Individualism assumes that the best society is one that permits the
individual maximum freedom of choice, that each person is the
best judge of his or her interests, and that there is no transitivity of
interests" (p. 4).
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Therefore, government intervention in an individualistic society is limited, (Fine,
1992) as society is conceived as "a collection of self-contained individuals"
(Bozeman, 2007, p. 4). Lockhart (1991) considered this limit to be only the actions
required to support and advance individual independence and ingenuity. Specifically,
the role of government is established to being a "means of providing for those few

values that enable individual expression, including education, defense and security,
and enforcement of contracts voluntarily entered" (Bozeman, 2007, p. 4).

3.6 rhe Market System
fhe growth and importance of economic individualism in recent decades is
underlined by Bozeman (2007), stating that:

"public leaders and the public at large oftentimes look first to
markets for solutions and then to government and nonmarket
institutions only in those instances where market approaches seem
unworkable" (p. 5).
Adam Smith (1801) argued that the instinct to trade is a fundamental part of human
nature, and argued for the market system as a means to facilitate this instinct.

3.6.1 Markets and Self-Interest
fhe general consensus among social scientists, from the middle of the 20^^ century to
present, is that "self interest is transformed into public interest (via an invisible

hand) in economic markets" (Moss and Oey, 2009, p. 196). Gutek (1970) states that:
"natural laws of supply and demand were operative in the economic realm ” (p. 59).
Additionally, James and Rassekh (2000) maintain that "market mechanisms can

effectively transform self-interested actions into socially beneficial outcomes" (p.
666). Otteson (2002) argues that this system can form naturally, stating that:

"free exchanges among participating people give rise, over
time, to an unintended system of order" (p. 101).
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It is this system, described by Chin (1996) as a "money-using exchange economy"
(p.l5) that converts self-interest into positive social outcomes. However, James and
Rassekh (2000) acknowledge one caveat, stating that this positive outcome can only
occur "if selfishness is avoided andjustice is observed" (p. 666).

In addition. Smith (1801) argued that competition and minimal government
interference in the market is essential. Smith (1801) justified the use of the market as
a necessity, stating that
"man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren,
and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only"
(p. 15).
Smith argues that an individual is more likely to succeed in procuring what they need
if they appeal to the "self-love" (p. 15) of others (ibid.).

3.6.2 Laissez-faire

Moore (1977) links economic individualism with laissez faire, a doctrine which
contends that
"each individual pursuing his own well-understood selj-interest
without undue restriction will contribute to the good of all" (p.
432).

The first systematic composition of the idea of laissez-faire was provided by
Mandeville in the eighteenth century (Mandeville and Kaye, 1924).

Rudolf von Jhering, the nineteenth century social utilitarian, argued that it was
necessary for some governmental intervention in markets, stating that:
"society has the right to check the excesses of the selfish motive
when these become dangerous to the success of society" (Jhering
and Husik, 1913, pp. 105-106).
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Similarly in the twentieth eentury, Hayek (2001), the Nobel economist and advocate
for laissez-faire governance, admitted that at least some interference in the market
was necessary, stating that:
"The successful use of competition as the principle of social
organization precludes certain types of coercive interference
with economic life, but it admits of others which sometimes may
very considerably assist its work and even requires certain
kinds of government action" (p. 38).
Thus, Hayek (2001) reasons that complete rejection of governmental intervention in
markets is not a realistic proposition. In an effort to reconcile laissez-faire with
recognition of the necessity to maintain some control, Hayek (2001) argues that there
is
"all the difference between deliberately creating a system within
which competition will work as beneficially as possible, and
passively accepting institutions as they are" (p. 18).
Therefore, Hayek (2001) conceives of eighteenth and nineteenth century economic
concepts such as laissez-faire as "crude rules" that shouldn’t be considered as having
"no exceptions" (p. 18).

3.6.3 The Invisible Hand

Whilst certain public interest supporters claim public interest to be a 'transcendent'
system of order, economic individualism is based much more in pragmatism. This is
not to say that individualism is free of'higher power' proponents; for instance, those
advocates that focus on natural law often do so for non-secular reasons. However,
the primary mechanism of economic individualism, Adam Smith's concept of the
invisible hand, is based on the interactions within a system. As Infantino (1998)
states: "it is not a mysterious force: it is a system of indices" (p. 18).

Nozick (1974) describes the concept of the invisible hand as an explanation of
phenomena that seem "to be the product of someone's intentional design, as not
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being brought about by anyone's intentions" (p. 19). In social science, Adam
Ferguson (1768) maintained that
"nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the
result of human action, but not the execution of any human
design"
187).
Similarly in economics, Smith (1799) conceived the invisible hand as an explanation
of how actions at the individual level can bring about unintended consequences at
the societal level. Smith (1799) argued that by applying skill and effort to achieve his
own "security, ” an individual is "led by an invisible hand to promote an end which
was no part of his intention" (p. 181). Smith (1799) reasoned that the interaction of
these individuals acting in their self-interest would, unknowingly, lead to the public
good.

Solomon (1995) is critical of invisible hand arguments, stating that they are
"optimistic fantasies" (p. 294). However, Hull (2001) defends the concept, arguing
that the existence of both positive and negative unintended outcomes negates claims
of the concept being merely hopeful belief. Other criticisms of the concept focus on
its supporters narrow interpretation. For instance, some academies argue that the
modern understanding of the invisible hand relies too heavily on Adam Smith's
depiction of the concept in the 'Wealth of Nations,' and ignores his broader
explanation in his earlier work, 'The Theory of Moral Sentiments' (Heilbroner, 1986;
Olssen et al., 2004). This broader conception (Olssen et ah, 2004) acknowledges
what Smith (1767) described as the "other passions" (p. Ill), such as "sympathy" (p.
116), which temper the passion of self-interest. Therefore, the invisible hand is not
simply the interaction of self-interested individuals, but also requires other passions
such as beneficence, sympathy and justice in order to affect positive outcomes on a
societal level (Smith, 1767; Olssen et al., 2004).

Smith (1767) defined beneficence as the goodness of people that motivates acts of
kindness and generosity towards others, and Justice as the will within individuals to
not cause undue harm. It was these moral sentiments in particular that Smith
emphasised as being vital to the proper functioning of the invisible hand (ibid.).
Smith (1767) argued the need for justice in particular as a foundational pillar, stating
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that society "cannot subsist among those who are at all times ready to hurt and
injure one another" (p. 147). Smith (1767) considered beneficence to be of less
importance to the existence of a society, describing it as an "ornament" rather than a

"foundation which supports the building... sufficient to
recommend, but by no means necessary to impose" (pp. 147148).
Smith understood the third passion, sympathy, in its widest sense to essentially mean
recognising that other people are similar in needs and desires and worthiness to us
(Griswold, 1999).

3.6.3.1 Doubt
Smith's basic tenant, that markets free of governmental interference effectively
balance private and public interest, maintained strong support until the middle of the
nineteenth century (Medema, 2011). At this point, doubt regarding the ability of the
invisible hand to transform self-interested activity into public benefit was quickly
spreading among political economists (ibid.). For instance, Hirschman (1977) casts
doubt on this "marvelous metamorphosis" (p. 17) that the invisible hand is purported
to achieve, arguing that Smith and other proponents are vague on the details of the
conditions within which this transformation occurs. This doubt was tempered by
similar scepticism toward the efficieney of government involvement in markets
(Medema, 2011). Medema (2011) contends that from this point, until the middle of
the twentieth century, doubt in the efficiency of the invisible hand increased, whilst
reservations regarding the role of government in markets deereased, leading to a
signifieant degree of academic support for the "very visible hand of government" (p.
2) to complement the market. In the seeond half of the twentieth century, strong
support for free markets, particularly from America, began to emerge again,
promulgating the view that criticism of market efficiency and promotion of
government competence in markets had been "overblown" (p. 3).

However, criticism of the invisible hand by contemporary academics has continued
the debate. Such criticism and scepticism of the concept tend to focus on the
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mechanism for transforming vices into virtues. Stiglitz (2008) contends that
imperfect information within markets, which is inevitable, counteracts Smith's
assumptions regarding the invisible hand of the market. On this basis in particular,
Stiglitz (2008) argues that "the reason the invisible hand often seems invisible is that
it is not there” (p. 18).

A.6.3.2 Broader Conception
Other criticisms of the concept focus on its supporter’s narrow interpretation. For
instance, some academics argue that the modern understanding of the invisible hand
relies too heavily on Adam Smith's depiction of the concept in the 'Wealth of
Nations,' and ignores his broader explanation in his earlier work, 'The Theory of
Moral Sentiments' (Heilbroner, 1986; Olssen et al., 2004). This broader conception
(Olssen et al., 2004) acknowledges what Smith (1767) described as the "other
passions” (p. Ill), such as "sympathy” (p. 116), which temper the passion of selfinterest. Therefore, the invisible hand is not simply the interaction of self-interested
individuals, but also requires other passions such as beneficence, sympathy and
justice in order to affect positive outcomes on a societal level (Smith, 1767; Olssen
et al., 2004).

Smith (1767) defined beneficence as the goodness of people that motivates acts of
kindness and generosity towards others, and Justice as the will within individuals to
not cause undue harm. It was these moral sentiments in particular that Smith
emphasised as being vital to the proper functioning of the invisible hand (ibid.).
Smith (1767) argued the need specifically for justice as a foundational pillar, stating
that society "cannot subsist among those who are at all times ready to hurt and
injure one another” (p. 147). Smith (1767) considered beneficence to be of less
importance to the existence of a society, describing it as an "ornament” rather than a
"foundation which supports the building... sufficient to recommend, but by no means
necessary to impose” (pp. 147-148).
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3.6.3.3 Market tAiuilibrium Theory

In addition to the societal foundations propounded by Smith, Bresser (1998)
contends that the positive outcomes of the concept require an economy that has
achieved competitive equilibrium. Bresser (1998) argues that this economic context
will provide for the public good, stating that:
"the invisible hand of the market favors actors whose
behavioral repertoires are biased toward cooperation, rather
than opportunism" (p. 511).
Hence, the modern conception of the invisible hand argument is market equilibrium
(Aydinonat, 2008). Market equilibrium theory argues that the mass of individual
choices in an economy will inevitably bring about the optimum potential outcome
for everyone (ibid.). Proponents of this view contend that the consequence of
competitive equilibrium within an economy is the promotion of cooperative
behaviour (Bresser, 1998). For instance, Bresser (1998) maintains that, within this
economic context, the:
"population of economic actors will contain only those whose
behavioral repertoires are biased toward cooperation" (p. 511).
Both the invisible hand and market equilibrium theory generally explain the same
phenomenon (Aydinonat, 2008). Nevertheless, Smith's conception focused more on
the process of how individual actions transfer to unintended societal outcomes
(ibid.). In contrast, as Aydinonat (2008) states, the market equilibrium theory "does
not explicate how individual actions are related to the aggregate outcome" (p. 83).
Aydinonat (2008) argues that this difference indicates that the modern conception of
the invisible hand is essentially an "end-state interpretation" (p. 83).

3.6.4 Mai'ket ^■a!llJre

A particular feature of nations with high economic individualism is their reliance on
the market for solutions, as opposed to government. The United States is in general a
market economy which adheres to the principles of economic individualism to a
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greater extent than other nations (Wilcox, 1966). For instance, Belkin and Morone
(1994) state that:
" for most goods, services, and forms of social status, Americans
will most consistently favour a market-oriented allocation as
equitable ” (p. 330).
Individualism is thought of as fundamental to the American economy (Imamichi,
1997). Such societies only turn to government and nonmarket institutions in the
event the market approach is ineffectual; viz. market failure (Bozeman, 2007).
Market failure theory stipulates the utilization of markets, rather than government or
other similar organizing doctrines, except in circumstances where the efficiency of
niarkets is v/eakened (ibid.). Markets may be weakened by factors such as monopoly
and information asymmetry (ibid.).

3.7 Conclusion
This chapter reveals the complexity and strong historical basis in western society of
economic individualism. It has permeated much of western social and economic
thought. In particular, its basis as a moral philosophy in addition to an economic one
exposes the strong value divisions between it and public interest. The definition of
economic individualism is not criticised as much as that of public interest. Different
perspectives involve the emphasis of individual aspects of the concept over others.
For instance, some academics choose to put the emphasis on the philosophies
promotion of self-reliance. Others highlight the acceptance of natural law as the
basis of a free society.
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CHAPTER 4

Regulation

4.1 Introduction
This chapter commences with definition of the term regulation. A variety of relevant
definitions will be discussed so as to properly encapsulate the concept. Following
that is a discussion of the reasoning behind regulation within the context of the
competing philosophies of public interest and economic individualism. Regulatory
strategies will also be discussed. The chapter concludes with a critical analysis of the
nature of regulatory agencies, and a consideration of the factors that affect the
success or failure of this institution.

4.2 History and Definition of Regulation
On examination of the academic literature, it is clear that there is widespread demand
for a definition of the term ‘regulation’. Regulation has a deep-rooted history and is
imprecisely understood.

4.2.1 Deep Rooted lii.story

Regulation is “not a modern invention” (Moran, 2003, p. 38), it is "as old as
civilization itself (Eshleman, 1915, p.94). Government involvement in private
business has an extensive history (McLean, 2004). Relatively sophisticated efforts at
economic regulation have been traced back four thousand years to the Babylonian
era (Blitz and Long, 1965; Moran, 2003). Later, in the middle ages, the principles of
economic regulation have been described by Lrickson (1915) as “general and
comprehensive’’ (p. 123), centralising strict control over most if not all economic
activity. This reliance on strict regulation of all aspects of the economy had a stark
impact on competition (ibid.). For instance, in medieval England, regulation of trade
created barriers to the formation of, and entry to, markets (Moran, 2003). Licenses
and charters were required to operate a business since trade was considered a
"privilege” (Ogus, 1992, p.38). State sponsored regulation has evolved in recent
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centuries into a much more focused “protection" (p. 123) which is required to be
“adjusted to the nature of the service and the conditions under which it is furnished”
(Erickson, 1915, p. 123).

4.2.2 Imprecisely Understood
Regulation has been described as a “notoriously inexact word” (Moran, 2003, p.l3),
a "slippery concept" (Harlow and Rawlings, 1997, p. 295) and as a "murky word"
(Dibadj, 2006, p.3) which tends to be defined in general terms, if at all. Campbell
and Picciotto (2002) state that regulation has become “sufficiently ubiquitous in
recent years... [to require] some analysis of the term and its usage ” (p. 1).

Thus, Campbell and Picciotto (2002) offer the following as a definition for
regulation:

“[Regulation is] the means by which any activity, person, organism
or institution is guided to behave in a regular fashion, or according
to rule ” (p.l).
Instead of the word “guide” some authors have used the word “control” to describe
the purpose of regulation. Selznick (1985), as cited by O'Regan (2010a), states that
regulation is the:

"sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over
activities that are valued by a community" (p. 363).
Similarly, Majone (1996) defines regulation as rules issued for "the purpose of
controlling” how ''private and public enterprises conduct their operations" (p.9).
OECD (2011) defines regulation as a measure or intervention that "seeks to change
the behaviour of individuals or groups" (p.76). Moran (2003) posits that regulations’
“core meaning is mechanical and immediately invokes the act of steering” (p. 13).
Correspondingly, Crew and Parker (2006) state that regulation implies the "exercise
of some influence on an activity that is different from total control" (p. 34).
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Dibadj (2006) proffers a definition of regulation as consisting "of direct public
intervention in private contractual arrangements" (p. 3). This recognises
government as an appropriate social institution to legitimately regulate (Dibadj,
2006). Since regulation falls, either directly or indirectly, under the purview of
political control, then government is legitimately justifiable in "coercingpeople into
action" (Dibadj, 2006, p. 3).

4.3

Rationale for Regulation; a F’olitical Philo.sophies Perspective

fhere are a myriad of reasons put forth for why regulation is necessary, and equally
numerous reasons for why it is not. Differing perspectives on the role of the state in
economic affairs permeates the debate on regulation. The competing philosophies of
public interest and economic individualism, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, are
significant in this debate. For instance, Krajewski (2003) states that:

"public interest theory was for many decades the predominant
explanation andjustification of regulation" (p. 20).
In contrast, for proponents of economic individualism, laissez-faire (discussed in
section 3.6.2), or free markets, is the optimum situation for prosperity. Hence, this
section will discuss the arguments for and against regulation within the framework of
these philosophies.

4.3,1 The Public Interest Perspective on Regulation

Broadly speaking, the rationale for regulation is to "achieve better outcomes than if
regulation were not present" (OECD, 2011, p. 76). Such ‘"outcomes” include
economic concerns, such as remedying market failure, and managing social concerns
in the public interest (Carroll and Buchholtz, 2008). This section will focus
exclusively on economic justifications, since supporters of regulation in the public
interest particularly highlight the responsibility of government to alleviate market
failure (Croley, 2008; Yeung, 2010). In addition, it is considered the ultimate
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justification for the advancement of regulation, and the one that exerts the greatest
influence (Uabney, 1892).

This responsibility to ease the negative effects of market failure will be discussed,
followed by consideration of the three examples of market failure underpinning
regulation, as identified by Dibadj (2006): natural monopoly; negative externality;
and imperfect information.

4.3.1.1 Incorporating Pnhiic Interest into the Private Market
Campbell and Picciotto (2002) argue that there is a shared view across the political
spectrum that the private sector operates according to self-interest, whilst the public
sector takes into account the "general interest" (p. 2). In this regard, Croley (2008)
states that, according to the public interest view, regulation is an attempt to protect
"the general interests of the citizenry at large ” (p. 57) by ensuring the interests of
the public are not harmed by private sector activity.
Tugwell (1921) states that the "controls of business" (p. 643) whether quasi-public or
private, are often justified as a "prescription... [for] economic illness" (p. 643).
I'Lirthermore, fugwell (1921) contends that the expression "affected with a public
interest" (p. 643) is often used to justify regulation of the market, signifying a
"statement of a business condition in which it seems necessary for the state to protect
the interests of consumers" (p. 643). For instance, Levine and Forrence (1990, cited
by Croley, 2008) consider regulation as the:

"necessary exercise of collective power through government in
order to cure 'market failures, ’ to protect the public from such evils
as monopoly behaviour, 'destructive ’ competition, the abuse of
private economic power, or the effects of externalities" (p. 168).
Polanyi (1957) considers the presence of an administrator that is "constantly on the
watch" (p. 140) to be vital for the proper functioning of the market economy. The
existence of market failures highlights the imperfections of the market system in
producing "outcomes that are consistent with economic welfare" (O’Regan, 2010a,
p. 301). This perspective considers that "only the discipline of the state based on
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explicit norms could restrict private greed” (Campbell and Picciotto, 2002, p. 2).
Haines (2011) summarises this view incisively thus:

"Markets of vice can be flipped into markets of virtue: capitalism
can be regulated so as to serve the public interest ” (p. 18).
Thus, supporters of regulation consider it as "absolutely necessary in a complex
society” (p. 672) for the purpose of defending society from activities by individuals
and organisations that have "economically undesirable consequences” (Salinger,
2005, p. 672).

Croley (2008) argues that endeavours to alleviate market failure, such as those
outlined above, underpins all public interest arguments for regulation. This outlook
considers the pursuit of public interest goals, in addition to the markets' efficiency
objective, as being necessary to assuage, if not eliminate, those failures of unfettered
markets (O'Regan, 2010a).

4.3.1.2 Natural .Monopoly

Natural monopoly is the most prominent of these economic arguments, as it has
historically been the archetypal rationalisation for regulation (Dibadj, 2006).
Regulation is widely considered to be a panacea for failures of an imperfect market
(Ogus, 2004; Carroll and Buchholtz, 2008; Croley, 2008; Smeby, 2013). For
instance, Dabney (1892) argues that regulation is justified as a "remedy for the
existing evils of., monopoly” (p. 449) because of the negative consequences to
consumers of this market failure. Posner (1999) states that a business operates a
natural monopoly if it "is the only seller of a product or service having no close
substitute” (p. 1). This is a result of the "economics of scale” (p. 466) in the market
being so great that "the largest firm has the lowest costs and thus is able to drive out
its competitors” (Carroll and Buchholtz, 2008, p. 466).

Industries in which there is a necessity for investment of a relatively exorbitant level
of capital in fixed assets at the point of entry to a market are particularly susceptible
to natural monopoly (Posner, 1999; Crew and Parker, 2006; Dibadj, 2006). Indeed,
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precisely because of this fact, it is widely believed that for the "proper discharge”
(p. 449) of functions in certain industries such as water utilities, they "must
necessarily be of an exclusive nature” (Dabney, 1892, p. 449). This is justified by
the existence of such industries whereby the
"actual prices of the product of a monopolised industry may he less
than those prevailing where the same industry is carried on under
competitive conditions” (Dabney, 1892, p. 447).
Essentially, a single firm can operate more efficiently and provide a better service to
the entire market than several firms competing with each other (Carroll and
Buchholtz, 2008). Hence, in many countries such industries are, at least partially,
state owned, as this is considered a legitimate response to natural monopoly
(Dabney, 1892; Posner, 1999).

However, if left unchecked, Carroll and Buchholtz (2008) argue that a natural
monopoly may abuse their privileged position. If unregulated, and as a result of
having no competition, Dabney (1892) states that:
"[The] cost to the public is apt to he more than is necessary to
secure to the owners of the monopoly a reasonable net return upon
capital invested” (p. 448).
Carroll and [buchholtz (2008) contend that this risk to the public justifies the
regulation of natural monopolies, regardless of whether they are private or public
owned.

4.3.1.3 Negative Externality

fhe second justification of regulation, according to Dibadj (2006), is negative
externalities; alternatively known as "spillover effects" (Carroll and Buchholtz, 2008,
p. 467). This economic phenomenon refers to the "unintended side effects" (p. 467)
of business that negatively affect individuals and groups other than the original
parties (ibid.). Hence, regulation is considered justified to ensure the full cost of
commercial activities is borne by those who will profit from them (Chaudhary,
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2009). In situations where this cost can be monetised, correcting the externality may
be achieved through a precise tax covering the cost (ibid.). However, not all negative
externalities have quantifiable costs or even predictable costs. For instance, the credit
crisis beginning in 2007 has focused international attention on the true costs of the
banking industry, leading to a limited adoption in Europe of a financial transaction
tax to "correct for negative externalities" (Hemmelgarn et af, p. 84). In this
situation, future costs are not predictable, or even definite. However, commentators
have praised it as being in the public interest (Banks, 2011; Elliot, 2012).

4.3.1.4 Imperfect Information
Thirdly, like Dibadj (2006), Smeby (2013) argues that government regulation is also
a valid response to situations of imperfect information in the market, whereby it is
difficult or impossible for the public to have the required information to make an
informed decision. Proponents of regulation contend that the theoretical assumption
of perfect information inherent in the invisible hand theory does not exist in the real
world (Chaudhary, 2009). fherefore, the market requires state intervention to
achieve Pareto efficiency, or perfect competition (ibid.).

An example of imperfect information may be consumers’ inability to judge the
quality of professional services in an unregulated or self regulated market prior to
procurement (Smeby, 2013). In this case, the public sector may act as a guarantor of
professional credentials in the private sector, usually through some measure of
oversight of the profession (ibid.).

4.3.2 The Fconornic Individualism Per.spet tive on Regulation

Criticism of regulation from the individualist perspective ranges from concerns that
its goals and purpose are too imprecise to avoid scope creep, to a complete dismissal,
considering it to be no more than a political commodity.

68

i.3.2.1 Vague Goals
Public interest justifications have been dismissed by some academics (see section
2.1) for being too vaguely constructed and, as Roberts and Kurtenbach (1998) state,
lacking the

'‘mechanism for translating public perceptions of the types of
legislation which would maximize public welfare into legislative
action ” (p. 212).
Stigler (1971) takes the criticism further, contending that from a self interest
perspeetive regulation is used by those subject to it to benefit them rather than the
public.

4.3.2.2 Criticisms of Regulation as a Panacea for Market Failure
fugwell (1921) contends that supporters of free markets are critical of the view that
regulation is a cure for weaknesses in the market system. Tugwell (1921) states that
this confidence in free markets is based on the belief that "business is more
prosperous and that the interests of consumers are sufficiently protected by
competition," (p. 643) hence requiring no government interference. This perspective
deems '’‘‘decentralized decision-making based on private preferences^' (p. 2) to be the
situation that affects optimum positive outcomes (Campbell and Picciotto, 2002).
Tugwell (1921) laments that this belief is so strong among its adherents, that it is
essentially "a kind of law" (p. 643) leading them to blindly disregard evidenee of
market failure.

Nevertheless, the public interest response to natural monopoly, whereby the state
takes over the means of production (see section 4.3.1.1), has attracted significant
academic criticism since the 1960's (Posner, 1999). This criticism is due to the
perception of political inlluence and subsequent inefficient performance (ibid.).
Laissez-faire advocates contend that natural monopolies are "merely theoretical"
(Chaudhary, 2009, p. 208). Furthermore, laissez-faire proponents such as Nobel
economist Milton Friedman, contend that unregulated monopolies are the least worst
option (ibid.). That government interference in such markets, whether by regulating
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private monopolies or by establishing a government run monopoly, produees more
harmful consequences than a private monopoly (ibid.). For instance, Crew and
Parker (2006) contend that comparisons of public and private business performance,
particularly from the 1960's onwards, regularly demonstrate the superior economic
efficiency of the latter.

4.3.2.3 Special Interest Activity
Free market commentators, particularly those referred to by Yeung (2010) as
"rational choice scholars." (p. 68) advocate the view that regulation is a special
interest activity, noticeably at odds with its public interest image. These scholars
contend, as articulated with neither acceptance nor rejection by Croley (2008), that:

"agencies serve not to correct but rather exactly to exacerbate market
failures by delivering illicit regulatory favors to those who already
enjoy excessive market power" (p. 15).
Similarily, Yeung (2010) summarises this view thus:

"in practice, regulation is operated for the benefit of the regulated
industry and its members, rather than for those it was ostensibly
intended to protect" (p. 68).
This "cynical view" (Croley, 2008, p. 15) of regulation portrays it as "the product of
powerful sectional interests" (Yeung, 2010, p. 68), a "consequence of unfortunate
political dynamics" (Croley, 2008, p. 15), allowing powerful special interest groups
to:

"demand or elicit from agencies regulations that advance their
interests to the greater detriment of others ” (Croley, 2008, p. 15).
In this view, regulation essentially becomes a political commodity that can be traded
by state actors in return for private sector support (Croley, 1998). As the monopoly
supplier of regulation, the state has a high degree of power on the supply side.
However, on the demand side the rewards of favourable regulation can be
exceptional. For instance, regulations that restrict access to a particular market from
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potential competitors may be considered a highly valuable commodity by dominant
private actors in that market (ibid.). In addition, regulation that restricts businesses to
upward only rent reviews are obviously advantageous to the private sector actors that
provide rental properties.

4.4 Regulatory Strategies
The standard perception of regulation is that of two mutually exclusive possibilities:
either liberty or hegemony (Coglianese and Mendelson, 2010; Irwin, 1989).
Coglianese and Mendelson (2010) summarise this view thus:

"Government can either leave businesses with complete discretion to
act according to their own interests, or it can impose regulations
taking that discretion away by threatening sanctions aimed at
bringing firms' interests into alignment with those of society, as a
whole" (p. 146).

Although it may be initially useful to understand regulation as the choice of one or
the other of these possibilities, this view ignores the range of possibilities between
these extremes (Ogus, 1995; Coglianese and Mendelson, 2010), as well as the
political dimensions of compromise that is inherent (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995).
Wotruba (1997) expresses this challenge succinctly, stating that:

"[Within developed nations] there exists a continually expanding
and increasingly labyrinthine set of rules and regulations created by
governing authorities to control business conduct... to strive for that
elusive balance that keeps such conduct both acceptable in its
political-social environment and effective in its economic purpose ”
(p. 38).

In addition, the degree of regulatory influence varies depending on the regulatory
strategy employed. For instance, regulation may take the form of "a framework of
rules for people to follow" (p. 34) or of the "rule setting type" (Crew and Parker,
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2006, p. 34). Additionally, regulation can be prescriptive, in that they not only
"establish the rules" (p. 34) but also restrict the outcome, such as the regulation of
salaries being limited to minimum wage and above (Crew and Parker, 2006).

Baldwin and Cave (1999), cited by O'Regan (2010a), relate a number of regulatory
strategies available to regulators, each with their own strengths and weaknesses.
These include 'command and control' strategies, deployment of wealth, the
harnessing of markets, and self-regulation.

4.4.1 Command and Control Strategy

The command and control strategy was traditionally the common approach to
regulation (Stewart, 1981; Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Parker, 2002). This involves the
regulator enforcing required standards through the threat of "criminal sanctions" (p.
35) for non-compliance (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). Parker (2002) describes this
strategy as:
"the substitution of decisions by democratically elected legislatures
and administrative agencies for the decisions of corporate
management in certain circumstances defined by law" (p. 8).
Short (2008) identifies a number of categorical arguments asserted by academics in
favour of command and control regulation, which include its effectiveness, morality,
necessity, and its imposition of certain technological benchmarks referred to as
"technologyforcing" {p. 171).

4.4.2 Deployment of Wealth Strategy

Gray and Hamilton (2006) declare a ‘consciousness-raising’ among regulators and
academics away from strict promotion of regulation, towards "more diffuse and
subtle strategies of influence’’ (p. 86). Examples of this include the deployment of
wealth strategy, which uses incentives such as grants, subsidies and loans to
encourage the regulated entity to conform to socially beneficial standards (Baldwin
and Cave, 1999). This approach has the benefit of being flexible, both for the
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regulator to adapt to changes in the marketplace, and for the regulated entities that
can choose how they respond to the incentives (Stewart, 1981). However, this
flexibility allows the regulated entity control over its response to the regulation
(ibid.). This may lead to socially undesirable behaviour that may become financially
desirable for the regulated entity in some instances (ibid.).

4.4.3 Harnessing of Markets Strategy

The harnessing of markets strategy involves inducing the desired behaviour by
harnessing markets through the use of legislation (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). For
instance, government's use competition laws to "channel competitive forces... to
achieve benefits for consumers" (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p. 34). Alternatively,
government can "empower consumers," (p. 34) by alleviating information
asymmetry through "information deployed... strategically" (ibid., p. 34).

Driesen (2010) argues that harnessing the market can lead to a lower market cost of
compliance and more effective regulation, stating that:

"market-based approaches address an efficiency problem arising
from the use of uniform standards" (p. 206).
In addition, the market approach to regulation allows the regulator more flexibility in
their approach, which is particularly important in industries that are variable by
nature (ibid.).

4.4.4 Self-Regulation Strategy

fhe self-regulation strategy, holds "government regulation and legislative controls
at bay" (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p. 39) by forming associations to create and
enforce rules on behalf of their members (Cunningham and Rees, 1997, Coglianese
and Mendelson, 2010; Baldwin et ai, 2010). Cunningham and Rees (1997) state that
self-regulation is rules and codes of practice set by industry-level organisations
relating to the ‘‘'conduct offirms in the industry" (p. 365).
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Coglianese and Mendelson (2010) contend that a regulatory approach can be
eonsidered as self-regulation when:

"the regulator issues commands that apply to itself, rather than
when the regulator is an outside entity such as a government
agency... [even when] motivated by implicit threats from outside
regulators” [p. 150).
This has the effect of maintaining a "close connection” (p.l50) between the regulator
and the entity it regulates, removing the "usual organisational distance” (p.l50)
between the public sector regulator and private industry (Coglianese and Mendelson,
2010).

The term self-regulation does not specifieally allude to public sector participation
(O'Regan, 2010b). flowever, in praetice it is an element that, for a variety of reasons,
is commonly present (O’Regan, 2010b; Muller, 2002). Hence, O’Regan (2010b)
states that:
”[Regulation] is best understood as falling somewhere on the
continuum between government regulation at one end and private
ordering at the other” (pp. 6-7).

In recent decades there is conformity among prominent academics in the field of
regulatory governance towards the concept of "regulatory layers” (Power, 1997, p.
55). This layered approach splits the funetion of regulation into separate roles of rule
setting, by the industry itself in the ease of self-regulation, and rule enforcement,
which is almost always at least publie enforeement in addition to private {ibid.). It
has been argued that "self-regulation is rarely effective or legitimate without
outsider involvement and negotiation” (Price and Verhulst, 2000, p.60).

Hence, Ayres and Braithwaite (1995) state that "practical people” (p.l) in the field
of regulation theory aecept the "inevitability of some sort of symbiosis between state
regulation and self regulation” (p.l). Similarly, Black (1996) argues that, when
viewed in the proper context, the term self-regulation has eonnotations of communal
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constriction that is separate from public sector input, and which leads to different
results than those of purely market-based outcomes.

Wotruba (1997) declares that the fundamental qualities of self-regulation are that it is
voluntary and discretionary. These qualities mean that it is essentially at the other
extreme from the command and control strategy. However, Muller (2002) argues
that only when there is a "degree of state involvement,” (p. 13) for instance through
public funding, recognition, or regulatory delegation, that this arrangement is "lifted"
(p. 13) from being purely a market process to also being a regulatory function.

Such a model of enforced self- regulation was proposed by Ayres and Braithwaite
(1995) as a middle-ground between the two extremes of command and control
enforcement and the freedom of self-regulation. Enforced self-regulation is
essentially a compromise which allows private entities to create their own rules
governing their behaviour, which are then publically ratified, for instance by a
governmental supervisory agency, and enforced if there is evidence of a breach of
those rules {ibid.)- This approach has the benefit of gaining some of the advantages
of both regulatory strategies, allowing private business a degree of freedom whilst
being under the threat of a semblance of the eommand and control philosophy if they
break the rules (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995; Gray and Hamilton, 2006).

4.5 The Regulatory Agency
Regulation is

not simply a matter of "passing a law" (Majone, 1996, p. 9).

Implementing

the chosen regulatory strategy from those outlined in section 4.5

requires the administration of an institution. Numerous regulatory institutions exist;
namely local authorities, parliament, courts and tribunals, central government
departments, regulatory ageneies, and Direetors General (Baldwin and Cave, 1999).
These institutions operate in eontrasting ways but with similar outeomes (Ogus,
2004). This section will focus on the regulatory agency, as it is the "characteristic
institution of

the regulatory state" (Moran, 2003, p. 14). However, since all

regulatory institutions are constrained by similar factors, and require certain
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characteristics to be successful, mueh of this section is relevant to other regulatory
institutions.

1.5.1 History and Purpose of the Regulatory Agency
I'he concept of a regulatory agency is widely regarded as having originated in
America in the late 19th century (Moran, 2003). It has been described as a

"specialized agency designed to manage public control as an alternative to public
ownership” (Moran, 2003, p. 14). It has become a widely accepted regulatory form:
a "novel institutional innovation” (Moran, 2003, p. 148), and "one of the most

widespread institutions of modern regulatory governance” (OECD, 2002, p. 91),
having been adopted by much of the western world (Moran, 2003.).

From being an American innovation of the late 19'*^ century, its recent rapid adoption
in Europe is particularly interesting. In 1980, regulatory agencies were present in
about 10 percent of "country-sectors in Western Europe” (Gilardi, 2008, p. 2). By
the year 2000, the percentage was almost 80 percent (ibid.). 4'his swift embrace has
led Moran (2003) to describe the regulatory agency as the "characteristic EU

institution” (p. 17). The suceess of this regulatory form has led to it being used in an
"increasingly wide range of social domains” (p. 78), from food produetion to
medical research (ibid.).

However, there is some disagreement among academics and practitioners regarding
the purpose of regulatory agencies (Salinger, 2005). Progressives, whilst obviously
in favour of regulation, are seeptical of regulatory ageneies, believing their true
purpose to be the preservation of the "broad popular legitimacy of the [capitalist]

system” (ibid., p. 672). That, in effeet, the regulatory agency merely "symbolizes
government oversight, ” (ibid., p. 672) rather than guaranteeing it. In contrast, those
that support regulatory agencies consider its purpose to be the aecumulation of the
neeessary specialist knowledge and skills required to control and monitor activities
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in a specific domain and relieve the ‘'enormous burden ” (p. 672) of rulemaking from
the legislature (ibid.)-

4.5.2 Critical Siicces.s Factors; Knowledge and Adaptability

Effective regulation requires the consideration of a number of influential factors
(Landis, 1966; Majone, 1996; Nickerson and Phillips, 2003). This view is
articulately advanced by Landis (1966), cited by Majone (1996), who states that:

"[The] art of regulating an industry requires knowledge of details of
its operations, ability to shift requirements as the condition of the
industry may dictate, the pursuit of energetic measures upon the
appearance of an emergency, and the power through enforcement to
realize conclusions as to policy” (pp. 25-26).
fhis view is supported by Selznick (1985), who contends that a regulatory body
should possess detailed knowledge of the industry it regulates and the capability and
authority to regulate in order to be effective (Selznick, 1985).

fhis capability is directly affected by the rate of change in an industry. Trebing
(1987) argues that:

"since the evolutionary process makes any set of goals and methods
provisional and intermediary, it follows that the form of regulatory
intervention may change over time " (pp. 1714-1715).
Failure to adapt to change creates barriers to effective regulation (Beesley, 1997;
Kiesling, 2008).

The ability of a regulatory agency to respond to changes by adapting its regulatory
activities is particularly pertinent in economies that are actively pursuing economic
growth and innovation (Kellermann, 1998; Kiesling, 2008). Kiesling (2008)
contends that regulatory agencies are formed in a specific socio-technological
context that will undoubtedly evolve in unpredictable ways. Failure to take into
account this factor of institutional regulation will inevitably lead to what Kiesling
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(2008) describes as "maladaptive” (p.57) regulatory agencies that become
inappropriate when the socio-technological context in which they were conceived
changes.

4.5.3 Guascli and Spiller Framework for Regulatory Effectiveness
Guasch and Spiller (1999) identify five circumstances that are required for the
effective operation of regulatory agencies. These are as follows: managerial freedom,
political autonomy, accountability, checks and balances, and incentives (Guasch and
Spiller, 1999, p. 70). The first required circumstance, managerial freedom, is
necessary to allow the proper staffing and operations of a regulatory agency (ibid.).
This is because effective regulation requires flexibility and expertise (ibid.).

Likewise, the second circumstance identified, political autonomy, is related to
regulatory independence. Ghosal (2010) states that independence in this context
"connotes an arm's-length relationship from...parties within the regulatory domain"
(p. 161). Guasch and Spiller (1999) draw parallels between regulatory agencies’ and
the judiciary in their susceptibility to political influence, stating that:

"political autonomy, combined with the technical capability that
results from managerial freedom, leads to well-informed and fair
decisions ” (p. 71).
This, in return, leads to public confidence in the institution, which may again be lost
if there is the "appearance of a conflict of interest" (ibid., p. 71). Hence, political
autonomy, particularly the perception of such, is an important factor in the success or
failure of regulatory agencies (ibid.).

Thirdly, Guasch and Spiller (1999) contend that such institutions must be
accountable, which requires the establishment of formal and defined objectives from
the outset. It is recognised that accountability is among the most problematic
challenges for regulatory agencies’, as it is as much an issue of perception as it is one
of operation {ibid.).
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The final two requirements, as Guasch and Spiller (1999) state, “complement
accountability” (p. 72) - on the one hand making it difficult for a single individual to
have undue influence, and on the other, creating a culture that is properly motivated
to proactively regulate.

1.5. t Power Relativities

In the context of regulation, interest groups, including both private institutions and
regulators, seek to "develop and articulate their objectives... [and] manipulate and
appropriate public sentiments towards their own ends" (Nolan, 2008, p. 20). In this
regard, these 'actors' continuously seek to gain "power and resources" (p. 19) at the
expense of each other (ibid.). Therefore, their "relative power can wax and wane" (p.
20) over time (ibid.). Consequently, as Cavazos (2007) argues, the potential for an
industry to influence the "regulatory agency rule-making process" (p. 232) is
dependent on their relative degree of power at a given time, which Cavazos labels
"field level standing" (p. 232).

Helleiner and Pagliari (2010) argue that it is public actors rather than private that
“provide the ultimate political foundation” (p. 89) for all industries. However,
within the context of these power relativities, Cavazos (2007) contends that “the
state is not a universally dominant actor” (p. 246). That rather than having a
privileged position, the state is simply an actor “inside of the field” (p. 246), and
must establish its “legitimacy and status in the same way as other field-level actors”
(ibid., p. 246).

A number of factors can affect the field level standing of these actors. For instance,
Nolan (2008) contends that within a regulatory field, relative power is unequally
shared in favour of "existing owners of regulatory property" (p. 20) compared to
"challengers to such ownership" (p. 20). Consequently, Cavazos (2007) posits that
regulatory agencies that enter an established field may "find it difficult to impact the
field" (p. 233), and will thus accept the conventional regulatory processes favoured
by the industry (Suchman, 1995). These regulatory processes are the result of a
"social structure [thatf evolved independent of a state actor" (p. 234) and will thus
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meet the needs of the "dominant firms" (p. 234) rather than the public interest goals
of the state (Cavazos, 2007).
In addition, lack of political support for the regulatory agency, and in particular the
absence of politically sanctioned "regulatory goals" (p. 285), will result in the
agency being "unable to make significant headway against the opposition of the
regulated interests" (Bernstein, 1977, p. 285). Furthermore, in regulatory fields that
are transnational, such as accounting, the position of a national public actor, already
possessing an "inferiority complex" (p. 33) as a result of lacking the same level of
expertise of the established private actors, will be further weakened by their
reluctance to take actions that have international consequences (Tsingou, 2010).

Regarding the regulation of established fields, Cavazos (2007) contends that the
reverse is also true. State agencies that have regulated an industry from its
conception will be less affected by "pressure from the actors it regulates" (ibid., p.
234). Consequently, the regulatory processes and "industry conditions" (p. 234) will
match the regulatory aims of the agency rather than the industry (ibid.).

In addition, crises that focus the attention of the public on the practices of an industry
can also affect the relative field level standing of public and private actors (O’Regan,
2010b). In the financial industry, Doyran (2011) contends that "regulatory systems
are created by financial crises" (p. 44). For example, in reference to the 2002
financial crisis in America and Fhirope, Helleiner and Pagliari (2010) state that:

"The unprecedented politicization of financial regulatory politics triggered
by large-scale use of taxpayers’ money to rescue financial institutions
unleashed popular and legislative pressures in the US and Europe for
policymakers to regulate ” (p. 89).
This spur of regulation from newly empowered public actors was also welcomed by
some private actors who were now facing "weakened political legitimacy"
(Helleiner and Pagliari, 2010, p. 89). In a sense, public involvement allowed the
weakened private actors to regain some public trust by appearing accountable to a
higher authority (ibid.).

80

4.5.5 Regulatory Capture
rhe influence of private actors on the operations of regulatory agencies is commonly
known as regulatory capture. The concept of regulatory capture gained prominence
in the 1950’s and 60’s (Fiorino, 2006), having the distinction of gaining support
from academics across the political spectrum (McLean, 2004). Haines (2011) states
that such capture is characterised by "lower standards" (p. 19) of enforcement, with
the regulator essentially "taming a blind eye” (p. 19) to transgressions by the
regulated industry.

Bernstein (1955) contends there is a life-cycle that regulatory agencies pass through
which explains why this capture occurs. The first phase, after its establishment, is
characterised by strong public and political support with an idealistic purpose of
operating in the public interest (ibid.). As the attention of the public wanes and
consequently the political support declines, the agency moves away from its public
interest focus towards a centre ground between the public and private interest (ibid.),
rhe agency must then rely on the private entities that it regulates for support, both
technical and political (ibid.). As a result, regulators become "sensitive to the needs
of the... institutions they supervise” (Doyran, 2011, p. 45). This sensitivity makes
them hesitant to affect regulatory changes that are strongly opposed by private actors
(ibid.), leading them to be "captured by the interest being regulated" (McLean,
2004, p. 45). A captured agency puts "industry’s interests over those of society”
(Fiorino, 2006, p. 37).

In addition, Tsingou (2010) contends that since the 1970’s, there has been a gradual
progression in business regulation towards "intellectual capture” (p. 33), or
essentially a convergence of public and private sector considerations of what
sensible regulation should be. Woodward (2001) posits that a combination of private
sector funding in regulation research as well as the future job prospects of regulators,
particularly financial, being almost entirely within the industries regulated creates
the environment for convergence.
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4.6 Conclusion

It is clear from the extant literature that regulation is highly complex and therefore
difficult to define. Permeating the debate on regulation are the philosophies of public
interest and economic individualism as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, Definitions of
regulation vary wildly, with some forms of regulation viewed cynically by
proponents of both public interest and economic individualism. However, support
for regulation can generally be divided along these philosophical lines, with
regulation advocated in the public interest and opposed in the private interest.

The numerous regulatory strategies and institutions discussed in this chapter reveal
the difficulty in balancing the competing goals and philosophies. The goals of
political acceptability and economic effectiveness are difficult to define clearly, as
they vary from one country to the next, and the basic premises of public interest and
self-interest on which they are based are Iluid in their definition. In addition, it is
clear from the literature that power relativities have played a large role in the
evolution of regulation theory and its implementation. The role of the regulatory
agency in particular has been complicated by the variability of political power,
giving it greater authority only at times when its function has already failed.
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CHAPTER 5

Historical Development of Accounting
Regulation in Britain

S.l Introduction
Hopwood and Vieten (1999) contend that the development of accounting regulation
in Britain has been charaeterised by "ambiguity and vagueness" (p. 337). Birds
(2006) states that it has been ''fairly dynamic since its inception” (p. 10) in 1844.
Even in contemporary times, British accounting has rather uniquely featured a mix
of "creativity functioning alongside a rhetoric of standardisation" (Hopwood and
Vieten, 1999, p. 336). Indeed, Hopwood and Vieten (1999) assert that there can be
no definitive concept of British accounting, fhis is evidenced by the far greater level
of "diversity of practice" (p. 337) than would be expeeted in a regulated regime
(ibid.). This chapter will trace the development of British aceounting regulation
within the context of regulatory eras, or spurs of regulatory innovation, and consider
the factors that have intluenced its development.

S.2 Pre-Victorian Era
Until the seventeenth century, it was generally accepted in Britain that the state had
the authority to supervise and regulate the private seetor (Cheadle, 1920). From that
point, this "social condition" (ibid., p. 550) changed dramatically, with a move
towards the laissez-faire model advoeated by economists such as Adam Smith (See
section 3.6.2). This model survived for two centuries. The relationship between the
private sector and government in Britain, prior to what is commonly referred to as
the Victorian Reform Era of the middle to late nineteenth century, has been
described as somewhat "adversarial" (p. 226) in nature, with private industry
"strongly opposed to government intervention" (Vogel, 2003, p. 226). MacDonagh
(1977) observes that this period, up until the early Vietorian governments, witnessed
regular policy battles, in which:
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"business interests fought each attempt at interference as if it were a
matter of life and death" (p. 18).
The dynamic of this relationship changed during the Victorian era to become
"significantly more cooperative" (ibid., p. 226).

5.3 Victorian Reform Era in Britain
The history of accounting regulation has its origins in Britain during the Victorian
Reform era. Moran (2003) contends that this era was "critical in shaping both
regulation in Britain and the surrounding state system" (p. 31). Vogel (2003) argues
that the driving force of reform through state regulation during the Victorian era was
"the public exposure of a particular intolerable social evil" (p. 232).
Eckstein (1966) argues that the philosophical foundation of Victorian era regulation
was a "belief in persuasion and knowledge as the best administrative devices"
(p.l72). Hence, although the Victorian reform saw the rise of state regulation in
Britain and Ireland, it still "practised something that approximated to self
regulation" (Moran, 2003, p.61), best demonstrated by its "style of cooperative
regulation that disavowed sanctions" (p. 61). fhis manifested itself as a "Victorian
ideology ofprofessional self-regulation" (ibid., p. 60).

5.3.1 The Joint Stock Companies Registration and Regulation .\ct of 1044

The first attempt in Britain at regulating accountancy at the State level arose in the
early 1840's in response to concerns about insurance company fraud (Cahill, 1999).
The first quarter of the nineteenth century had seen a sharp increase in the number of
insurance companies trading in the areas of fire and life insurance (Edwards, 1989).
The Bubble Act of 1720, which prohibited Joint Stock Companies not authorized by
Royal Charter, was still in effect (Harris, 1994). Eobbying from the insurance sector
led to a repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825 (Edwards, 1989).
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The repeal of the Bubble Act reinstated the Common Law stance (Edwards, 1989).
Edwards (1989) opines the likelihood that:

"there was no objection to raising a joint stock at common law, nor
to transferring shares, provided fraud did not occur" (pp. 100-101).
Essentially, the restrictive stance of the Bubble Act was replaced by a much more
liberal approach, making it significantly easier to form a joint stock company. The
lack of regulation, however, meant that fraud did indeed occur, in particular among
the insurance sector that had earlier successfully lobbied against the restrictive
Bubble Act (ibid.). The large number of the start-up insurance companies in this
period seems to be as a result of the relaxed registration laws. Edwards (1989) states
that "many of these [new insurance companies] were bogus from the outset" (p.
101).

fhe British government was concerned by the apparent regularity of deception and
fraud among Joint stock companies (Edwards, 1989). A select committee, referred to
as the Gladstone Committee, was established in 1843 to investigate the claims and
make recommendations (Hein, 1963a). William Gladstone assumed chairmanship of
this committee, expanding its terms of reference and role (Cahill, 1999). The report
subsequently published by the committee led to the formation of The Joint Stock
Companies Registration and Regulation Act of 1844.

Rix (1945) claims that the 1844 Act was the "end of a phase rather than a
beginning" (p. 242). 'fhis view was formed in light of the Act's emphasis on
regulation of unincorporated joint stock companies that existed at the time, rather
than

assisting

new

business

developments

(ibid.).

However,

contemporary

academics, such as Cahill (1999), view the Act as the beginning of UK financial
reporting regulation.

The Act is described by Cahill (1999) as "a most elaborate piece of pioneering
legislation" (p. 180). A testament to this is the Act's requirement for the preparation
of a "full and fair" (p. 314) balance sheet; a significant milestone, and a principle
which is still upheld in contemporary accounting legislation (Clarke et ah, 2003).
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Although the Act didn't define this phrase, it was understood to mean that the
balance sheet accurately represented the company's financial position (Lee, 1989).

One of the mechanisms contained in the Act to ensure the accuracy of financial
statements was its advancement of the audit function. Grout et al. (1994) states that
the act was the: "first formal recognition of the need for an auditing process"
(p.316). Companies were required by the Act to appoint auditors, giving them
complete access to the books of account (Day, 2000). Auditors then prepared a
report for the annual general meeting of shareholders (ibid.).

Prior to 1844, a broad association of owners or administrators, known as a board of
directors in contemporary times, would elect two groups (Hein, 1963a). The first
group were managers, charged with controlling the business (ibid.). The second
group were auditors, who were responsible for ensuring the correct reporting of
business activities by the managers to the board (ibid.). Both groups were assigned
from within the company (ibid.). Naturally, managers were selected on the basis of
managerial acumen (ibid.). However, Hein (1963a) states that

"there is little to indicate that the auditors were selected on the basis
of their aptitude for the position" (p. 508).
This is significant because the 1844 Act introduced the requirement of the auditor in
much the same way. The Act obliges that companies accounts must be audited by
one or more auditors (Hein, 1963a). However, the Act fails to specify who can
perform the audit and what qualifications were necessary (ibid.). If the auditors were
unqualified to perform the function, then the position was ineffectual.

For its far-sightedness, the Acts' pioneering status is not impaired by the obvious
weaknesses of the audit function. Hein (1963b) considers that the Act "contained
controls many of which are reminiscent of those contained in the more modem
enactments" (p. 138). In addition to the audit provision, the Act included a provision
for proper books of account to be maintained (Hein, 1963b). Furthermore, a copy of
the balance sheet was required to be submitted at each ordinary meeting of the
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shareholders, and subsequently filed with the Registrar of Companies within
fourteen days (ibid.).
Despite this, there was no requirement for companies to prepare a profit and loss
account, and no prescribed form and content for the balance sheet (Day, 2000).
However, the Acts' eventual failure cannot be blamed on this. The Acts' weakness
seems to be that it was overly ambitious, and this led to its eventual failure.

5.3.2 rhe limited l.iability Act of 1855
The 1855 Act enhanced the audit function introduced in the 1844 Act. The audit
function was given greater importance so as to protect third parties- specifically
shareholder (Hein, 1963a). This was in response to concerns around the issue of
owners private wealth being unknown during insolvency (ibid.). In addition, the Act
was more discerning about who could perform the audit function than its
predecessor. Section 14 stipulates that at least one of the auditors must be approved
by the Board of Trade. However, the Act failed to establish the qualifications
necessary to gaining approval. I’he 1855 Act was repealed the following year.

5.3.3 The foint Stock Companies Act of 1856

The 1856 Companies Act created a more lenient regulatory regime which marked the
beginning of a "laissez-faire period" (p. 180) that would last until the Companies
Act of 1900 (Cahill, 1999). Hein (1963a) describes this Act as "a new, liberal
concept of company law" (p. 509). This liberalism in accounting regulation
punctuates much of the history of accountancy regulation in Britain, and can be
explained, in part, by cultural context. Hopwood and Vietin (1999) provide an
insightful explanation of this, arguing that:

"[A] conception of a dynamic, changing and purposeful accounting
practice remains deeply embedded in both the British corporate and
professional accountancy mentality" (p. 343).
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In addition, the nature of companies as private entities provided a justification for a
liberal approach to accounting regulation (ibid.). This is certainly evidenced in the
principle for the 1856 Act, initially laid down by Robert Lowe, then Vice-President
of the Board of Trade:

"having given them [businesses] a pattern the State leaves them to
manage their ovn affairs and has no desire to force on these little
republics any particular constitution" (Hein, 1963, a, p. 509).
The Act reduced all compulsory controls and replaced them with model regulations
(ibid.). The financial reporting provisions of the 1844 Act mentioned earlier, such as
the maintenance of proper books of account, auditing, and submission of the balance
sheet, were relaxed. They were reclassified as articles of association, and the
incorporators were free to choose to adopt them or not. They remained optional for
the majority of company's until 1900.

Maltby (1998) argues that the 1856 legislation w'as not introduced to serve the
interests of all. Rather, Maltby (1998) concludes that the legislation and the
mandatory accounting disclosure in particular, only found favour among regulators
because it was now considered to be in the interests of large investors, increasing the
confidence among this group to invest.

S3 A The Companies Act of 1900

The enactment of the Companies Act 1900, and the return to a more conservative
accounting regime was, once again, in response to concerns regarding corporate
fraud (Cahill, 1999, p. 180). This act further consolidated the position of accountants
in the "audit niche" (Sikka and Willmott, 1995, p. 554). The Act required that all
companies registered under the Companies Act undertake an annual audit - optional
since the 1856 Act (Hein, 1963b).

The Act was not only a return to a more hands on regulatory system, but also marks
the point at which the audit function became seen as an important accounting
mechanism. This view is given credence by the subsequent development of auditing.
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Since the reintroduction of compulsory auditing in the 1900 Act, every significant
companies act has increased and improved the aecounting requirements (Hein,
1963b).

5.3.5 The Companies Acts of 1907/1908

The successive companies’ aets of 1907 and 1908 eontinued this trend, introducing
the concept of a compulsory audit for limited liability companies. The 1907 Act
obligated companies to file a balance sheet annually (Hein, 1963b). In addition, the
Aets required that a company's balance sheet display a 'true and correct view' of the
company's dealings - an evolution of the 1844 Act's 'full and fair' requirement
(Cahill, 1999). Although these Acts were intended to tighten accounting regulation
and prevent fraud, they proved to be inadequate. Cahill (1999) deseribes the Acts
requirements as a "broad-brush approach to financial disclosure" (p. 180), and
evaluates their impact as

"extremely deficient in terms of accounting principles of
measurement, valuation and the form of the balance sheet"
(p.180).
An example of this is its overlooking of profit and loss accounts (Cahill, 1999).

5.4 Post Great Depression Era; 1929 tol970
Day (2000) argues that, from the first attempts at state level regulation of accounting
in 1844 until the great depression of 1929, government regulation of the profession
evolved slowly with very little signs of progress. This stunted development was a
result of the British government’s then characteristic hesitancy to interfere in private
affairs, summarised succinctly by Edey and Panitpakdi (1956, cited in Hopwood and
Vieten, 1999) as being the belief that matters of accounting should be dealt with by
private contract between shareholders and directors.
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The aftermath of the great depression was characterised by attempts to stabilise the
highly variable back and forth nature of developments in accounting regulation up to
this point (Hopwood and Vieten, 1999). However, these efforts are distinguished by
a reactionary approach to fixing problems created by the previous reserved attempts,
rather than any coherent strategy or framework (Day, 2000). Furthermore, the
prevailing view about the role of government in private business, being that
government involvement was not "inherently legitimate" (p. 45), continued to
contlict with attempts to create a coherent regulatory framework (Vogel, 1996).
Constraining all efforts during this era was the implicit requirement that there be a
"specific rationale" (p. 45) for government interference, which was culturally
ingrained (ibid.). Thus, much of the development of accounting regulation during
this era came in response to scandals and public outrage (Day, 2000).

5,4.1 The Companies Act of 1929

The Report of the Company Taw Amendment Committee of 1926, commonly
known as the Report of the Greene Committee, was the basis for the companies’ act
of 1929. Although the act was not directly inlluenced by the great depression of
1929, they are related. The Greene Committee report investigated high profile
scandals in the 1920's which revealed fraudulent attempts to artificially inflate profit
results using transfers from reserves (Day, 2000). fhis practice was so widely
accepted among practitioners that D’Arcy Cooper, a prominent accountant of the
time, gave evidence to the Committee to the effect that if such transfers were
outlawed in 1921 every company in England would be insolvent (Day, 2000).

In an effort to repair the weaknesses identified by the Greene Committee, the
companies’ act of 1929 expanded the required financial information disclosed by
companies, particularly with its requirement for the reporting of the profit and loss
account alongside the balance sheet (Lee, 2006). fhis change had been previously
resisted because companies claimed it would give the competition an advantage
(ibid.). This change alone meant that act was a significant, though flawed,
progression towards a freer flow of financial information (ibid.). The fatal flaw of
the act, however, is that it failed to prevent the use of creative practices such as the
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use of transfers to post profits that were not representative of company performance
(Day, 2000).

5.4.2 fhe Companies Act of 1948
The modest beginnings of a reversal in the laissez-faire approach to accounting
regulation in Britain of the companies’ act of 1929 significantly progressed with the
act of 1948. The Cohen Committee of 1945 identified significant weaknesses in the
regulation of accounting, and there was a general sense that the state needed to play a
greater role in ensuring that financial statements reflected honestly the reality of
company performance (Day, 2000). The great depression and the outbreak of World
War 2 thereafter meant that many changes in this act were a result of weaknesses
identified over the preceding two decades (ibid.). For instance, the act was the first
discernible effort to differentiate reserves and provisions (llopwood and Vieten,
1999). This was a late attempt to rectify weaknesses in British accounting regulation
that were identified by the Greene Committee in the 1920’s, but not sufficiently
rectified by the 1929 act.

Furthermore, the defining feature of this Act, compulsory group accounts (Flopwood
and Vieten, 1999) was a response to the improper use of subsidiaries to inflate
profits decades earlier (Day, 2000). Thus, the financial results of minority holdings
now had to be included in consolidated financial statements (Lee, 2006). Previously,
consolidated tmancial statements had been implemented by some businesses on a
voluntary basis, notably at Dunlop in the 1930’s, to wide acclaim for increasing the
usefulness of the statements (Day, 2000). In addition, the techniques of consolidation
had been developed decades earlier in America, and would have been considered a
reputable accounting practice, even in Britain (ibid.). Thus, the act wasn’t as radical
as suggested by its authors (Magnus and Estrin, 1948), continuing the trend of
changes occurring only once they have gained broad acceptance from the private
sector (Day, 2000).

Nevertheless, the Act added a considerable number of new disclosure requirements
in an attempt to restrain the creativity and lack of comparability inherent in British
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accounting at this time (Lee, 2006). In addition, the act also heralded an increase in
the scope of the auditor's role. Auditing of the profit and loss account was now
compulsory, and the auditor was required to assess the quality of the financial
statements to guarantee their "truth and fairness" (p. 23) — a term that was not
defined (Lee, 2006).

.S.4.3 Inertia of the lO.SO's and early 60’s

The 1948 companies act was followed by two decades of regulatory inertia, caused
by the economie prosperity of the post war era (Day, 2000). This inertia again
characterised the reactive nature of British accounting regulation. The lack of major
reporting scandals, possibly hidden by the economic boom, meant that the state had
little motivation and political clout to make drastic regulatory changes (ibid.). In the
absence of government interest, the accounting profession took on a more proactive
role, developing principles to guide practitioners (Hopwood and Vieten, 1999).
Despite the fact that these principles were not obligatory, it was nevertheless a
beginning of greater involvement from the profession in regtilating its members in
the context of greater public scrutiny of their actions (ibid.).

5.5 Regulatory State Era; 1970 to Present
The inertia of the preceding deeades gave rise to increasing legislative activity within
the context of what Moran (2003) terms a period of "hyper-innovation" (p.l), which
transformed Britain from being among the least innovative regulatory nation in the
western world to a "leader in institutional and policy change" (p.l). This change
partially resulted from entry to the European Union and the rise of globalisation
which required Britain to adopt the regulatory state concept which began in America
decades earlier (ibid.). These factors were also partially responsible for the increased
state involvement in the accountancy profession, with EU Directives in particular
playing an important role (Hopwood and Vieten, 1999). In addition, the evolving
perception of the nature of'the company' into a "more public institution" (p. 341),
and the emerging strategic role of accounting created greater pressures to regulate
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financial reporting and auditing practice (ibid.). However, the significant driver of
change in accounting regulation during this period was accounting failure (Day,
2000) and the greater public scrutiny of these failures (Hopwood and Vieten, 1999).

5.S.1 Accounting Failures and Increased FHiblic Scrutiny
A number of high profile accounting failures in the late 1960's and early 1970’s
served to weaken the public’s faith in accounting regulation (Day, 2000). The first of
these failures, described by Elliott and Elliott (2011) as a "calamity for the
profession" (p. 102), came about as a result of a takeover of British based
multinational electric company AEl by an industrial conglomerate, GEC, in 1967.
Post-takeover accounts showed a material difference compared to the pre-takeover
accounts which had been approved by auditors as having:

"been prepared on a fair and reasonable basis and in a manner consistent with
the principles followed in preparing, the annual accounts" (Pdliott and Elliott,
201 l,p. 102).'
However, the judgments of stock valuation and work in progress prior to the
takeover were inaccurate to the extent that they materially impacted the reliability of
the financial statements (ibid.). Likewise, in 1968 an independent audit of the British
publishing firm, Pergamon Press, revealed incorrect judgements in valuing stock and
suspicious transactions that allowed the company to post greater profits than were
made in reality (ibid.). Rutherford (2007) contends that, in the case of Pergamon in
particular "it is easy to he confident that the 'errors' were contrived to flatter
Pergamon's profits" (p. 5). Yet Pergamon's application of accounting standards were
considered, from a neutral perspective, "acceptable practices" (p. 5) at the time
(ibid.).

The fact that these accounting scandals were not the result of companies directly
breaking financial reporting rules gave rise to concerns regarding the effectiveness of
financial reporting regulation at this time (Day, 2000). Although it was understood
that "accountancy is not an exact science" (p. 103), there was widespread surprise at
the extent of how much scope accountants had to interpret the financial data and
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produce wildly varying results with it (Elliott and Elliott, 2011). In addition, the role
of the auditor came into question in light of the initial approval of the AEI and
Pergamon Press aecounts, which declared that they represented a true and fair view
ot the businesses financial position (ibid.). With this subsequently found to be
erroneous, two issues became clear to the investing public: that determinations of the
true and fair view were dependent on the individual judgements and practices of
accounting firms; and that in the absence of legally required accounting standards,
auditors were under pressure to apply standards that company directors required
(ibid.).

Unique to these accounting failures was the media response (Hopwood and Vieten,
1999). Rutherford (2007) contends that:

"The more technical, and thus, obscure, the operations of a profession, the
more influential is the press in shaping the perceptions of its activities held by
those outside the profession" (p. 8).
fhe precise nature of the aecounting failures at AEI and Pergamon Press were
brought to the attention of the public through the increasing interest of the financial
press (Hopwood and Vieten, 1999). Phis period marked the beginning of greater
publie interest in the affairs of large companies, and particularly failures of
governance (Birds, 2006). Financial supplements and editorials in "quality
newspapers" (p. 341) brought expert analysis to the general public regarding matters
of accounting policy (Hopwood and Vieten, 1999).

1 he media response to the AEI 'calamity' was mixed, with some newspapers such as
The Times calling for legislation to enforce stricter accounting rules, and others
simply attributing the difference to more stringent accounting practices at GEC
(Rutherford, 2007). However, the response to the Pergamon Press situation was
markedly resolute, with widespread condemnation of both the latitude given to
aecountants in preparing financial statements, and the relationship between auditors
and management (ibid.). Thus, in this climate eame greater public scrutiny of what
were previously relatively private scandals, resulting in greater political pressure to
fix these failures of governance (Day, 2000). This signalled an increasing public
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acceptance that government has a legitimate place within private affairs (Hopwood
and Vieten, 1999).

5.S.2 The Response of the Accountancy Fh ofession to These Failures
In keeping with the trend, the profession reacted to the growing critieism of financial
reporting and auditing practice before the state could enforce legal control (Taylor
and Turley, 1986). d'he Institute of Chartered Aecountants in England and Wales
(ICAEW), the largest of the then six UK and Irish accountancy bodies, established
the Aeeounting Standards Steering Committee (ASSC) in 1970 to harmonise
financial reporting practice (Wood and Sangster, 2005). Taylor and Turley (1986)
contend that the ASSC was required for two reasons:

"to deal with the real problem of too mueh flexibility in the choiee of
aeeounting policies and also to divert criticism that the accounting
profession was complacent about the apparent deficiencies in
accounting practice” (p. 49).
Blake and Lunt (2001) suggest that the reason the ASSC was formed by only one of
the accounting bodies may be due to an exploratory suggestion at the time that the
major bodies should merge; a proposal that was rejected by ICAEW members in
June 1970.

By 1976, the other five aecountaney bodies had become members of the ASSC,
which was then renamed the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) with a revised
constitution (Higson, 2003). Like its predeeessor, the primary aim of the ASC was to
decrease diversity in financial reporting practice as much as possible by establishing
best praetices and standards (Blake and Lunt, 2001). Thus, Hopwood and Vieten
(1999) contend that the ASC introdueed a "new dynamic in accounting practice” (p.
340).

Despite having been established in response to pressure from the state and the
growing influence of the financial media, the ASC had no legislative authority and
was created within the "institutional context” (p. 340) of the profession (Hopwood
and Vieten, 1999). The 'institutional eontexf inevitably resulted in standard setting
95

that was not "as decisive and independent as was desired" (Wood and Sangster,
2005, p. 149), with "ponderous debate and a great deal of sensitivity to the interests
and demands of interested parties" (Hopwood and Vieten, 1999, p. 342). Drafts of
proposed new standards were given to special interest groups well in advance and
published in official magazines of the accountancy bodies, and required approval
from all six bodies before being passed (Wood and Sangster, 2005). Thus, the impact
of this 'new dynamic' was limited, with Hopwood and Vieten (1999) stating
incisively that:

"[The] institutional positioning alone would ensure that laissez-faire
accounting principles were far from dead in the UK" (p. 340).
Accounting Standards Committee given authority to set accounting standards by the
companies act of 1985. Its successor, the Accounting Standards Board, retained that
authority when it took over the task of setting standards in 1990.

5.5.3 I he Impact ot Kuropean Directives on Hritish Accounting Legislation

EU Directives (known then as the EEC but referred to hereafter as the EU for
simplicity) played a significant role in increasing state involvement in financial
reporting and auditing regulation (Bromwich and Hopwood, 1992). The EU Fourth
Directive was enacted into British law in the companies’ act of 1981 (Hopwood and
Vieten, 1999). The Fourth Directive had been drafted prior to Ireland and Britain's
entry to the EU, and had been particularly inlluenced by German company law
(Nobes and Parker, 2008). As such, the enactment of the Directive in Britain was
much delayed, with heavy lobbying to make it more palatable to the principles based
regime in operation in Britain.

The 1981 act prescribed formats for the preparation of company accounts that were
stipulated by the EU Fourth Directive (MacCann and Courtney, 2013). In addition,
the act stated that accounts must represent a 'true and fair view' of the businesses
financial position (ibid.). The 'true and fair view' requirement had previously been
lobbied for inclusion as an "overriding criterion" (p. 182) in the EU Fourth Directive
by the Irish and British governments (Cahill, 1999).
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The EU Seventh Direetive was issued in 1983 and extended the requirements of the
Fourth Directive to consolidated entities (Whittington, 2007). Unlike the Fourth
Directive, the Seventh Directive was influenced much more by Anglo-Saxon
practice (Roberts, Weetman, and Gordon, 2008). At the time the Directive was
issued, Britain and Ireland were the only two counties in Europe with
"'comprehensive legal requirements" (p. 347) regarding the consolidation of
accounts (Whittington, 2007). In addition, much like the Fourth Directive, the
Seventh Directive was essentially a compromise, taking into account the diversity of
consolidation provisions in Europe (ibid.). As a result, the Directive gave significant
scope for implementation (ibid.). Despite this, there was still considerable delay in
ratification, with the Direetive enacted into British law with the companies’ act of
1989 (Barker and 6 hOgartaigh, 1998). The 1989 act also gave statutory recognition
to accounting standards for the first time (Barker and 6 hOgartaigh, 1998).

In addition, the companies’ act of 1989 tightened the regulatory requirements for
auditing bodies. The profession had "considerable autonomy in the way it regulated
its members" (p. 107) prior to 1989, and the act "gave legitimacy" (p. 107) to that
regulation with the statutory establishment of two bodies: The Recognised
Supervisory Bodies, and the Recognised Qualifying Bodies (Gray and Manson,
2008). The tormer legally recognised the monitoring function of auditing bodies, and
the latter allowed auditing bodies to legally confer the qualification of auditor, with
both legal powers subject to auditing bodies meeting specific criteria set out by the
act (ibid.).

S.5.4 The Bearing Report and its Impact
The Dearing Committee, named after its chairman, Ron Dearing, was formed in
1987 in response to the decreasing "credibility" (p. 33) of the ASC (Lewis and
Pendrill, 2004). The Committee considered issues surrounding standard setting, the
relationship between standards and the law, and the enforcement of standards
(Flopwood and Vieten, 1999). The Committee published its report in 1988 which
proposed "radical and fundamental changes" (p. 221) in these areas (Alexander and
Britton, 2004). Notably, the report recommended the discontinuance of the ASC,
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because of the Committee's poorly funded, slow and part-time status (Hopwood and
Vieten, 1999; Lewis and Pendrill, 2004). The report recommended it be replaced
with a full-time two-tiered structure: the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) on top
with a diverse membership that would "determine broad policy and direction" (p.
221); and an Accounting Standards Board (ASB) to issue standards (Alexander and
Britton, 2004). To avoid the problems that plagued the ASC (see section 5.5.2), the
ASB would be set up to issue standards independently of the CCAB, and would only
require a two thirds majority for standards to pass (Lewis and Pendrill, 2004).
Further significant recommendations by the Bearing report were the establishment of
a review panel to investigate compliance with standards among large companies, and
progress towards establishing a general conceptual framework for accounting
(Alexander and Britton, 2004).

The recommendations of the Bearing Report were largely accepted and subsequently
adopted by the Bepartment of Trade and Industry (Flopwood and Vieten, 1999). I he
Accounting Standards Board was established in 1990 to replace the ASC. The
review panel recommendation of the committee was fulfilled by the creation of the
Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) in 1990 as a subsidiary of the FRC
(Weetman, 2006). The FRRP enforced the accounting standards issued by the ASB,
with its authority derived from the companies’ act 1985 (ibid.).

S.6 Reform in the New Millennium
The regulatory environment in Britain in the last years of the twentieth century was
very different to that at its beginning. The state had a significant role in accounting
regulation, with Hopwood and Vieten (1999) contending that it was "more likely"
(p. 360) that this role would increase in the future rather than recede. Two major
pieces of legislation, the companies acts’ of 2004 and 2006, helped reform British
accounting legislation in the new millennium and increase the role of the state in the
regulation of financial reporting and auditing. However, the two acts’ had very
different origins; with the 2004 act being in response to an immediate crisis, and the
2006 act being the culmination of over a decade of deliberations on reform.
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5.6.1 I'he Companies (Audit, Investigations anti Coniinunity Knterprise)
Act 2004

The Bill establishing the companies’ act of 2004 was submitted to the House of
l.ords in early December 2003 (Pettet, 2005). Pettet (2005) refers to it as a '‘mini
Bill” (p. 84), in light of its narrow focus. A string of bankruptcies of large American
corporations as a result of creative accounting practices and poor oversight by
auditors created an environment of distrust among investors, and general public
discord at the regulatory regime (Conrad, 2010). The collapse of Enron in particular,
and the subsequent public criticism of the role of the auditor, led to the passing of the
companies act of 2004, with a focus mainly on reforming auditing regulation (Birds,
2006). The Bill passed all parliamentary stages in both Houses of Parliament and, as
is required by British law, was submitted to the Queen and was passed by Royal
Ascent (Gifford and Salter, 1996).

fhe act amended the requirements of auditing bodies introduced in the 1989 act with
a particular emphasis on promoting the independence of auditors (Gray and Manson,
2008). Gray and Manson (2008) suggest that, although the auditing profession
maintained self-regulation, the act lessened the "pure self-regulation” (p. 108) of
auditing by requiring the auditing bodies to work within a framework.

5.6.2 Companies Act of 2006

In the 1990’s there was a growing realisation that the companies’ act of 1985 was
unbalanced, with over regulation of some areas and under regulation of others
(Hannigan, 2012). A Company Law Review group was established with a "wideranging” (p. 11) remit to investigate company law reform (Birds, 2006). The group
produced a "stream of consultation documents” (Hannigan, 2012, p. 21) notably
including the ‘Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy’ in 1998, and
culminating with a Final Report in 2001 (Birds, 2006). In regards accounting, the
Final Report recommended a reduction in the financial reporting and auditing
requirements of small and private businesses, and that larger companies publish a
financial and operating report (Hannigan, 2012). Consequently, the British
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government eommissioned a White Paper whieh was published in July 2002, entitled
Modernising Company Law (Pettet, 2005). The White Paper examined the Final
Report and largely approved its recommendations (Hannigan, 2012). However, the
failure of Enron and other significant companies at this time shifted focus away from
the reforms recommended by the Final Report.

Renewed interest in the recommendations of the Company Law Review group came
in March 2005 with another government White Paper, entitled Company Law
Reform (Hannigan, 2012). The recommendations of this White Paper were used as
the basis for the drafting of Company Law Reform Bill, which was introduced in
Parliament in November 2005 (Birds, 2006). The Bill was the largest ever produced,
with the intention of replacing the companies’ act of 1985 (ibid.).

The Bill received Royal Assent in November 2006, with most of the act’s provisions
coming into effect in 2008 (Gray and Manson, 2008). Birds (2006) describes the
process of deliberation and consultation that eventually culminated in the act as a
sign of a "change of culture" (p. 11), in that it was the first detailed and
comprehensive attempt to overhaul company law in Britain in its "broader context"
(p. 11) since the first act in 1844.

5.7 Conclusion
By taking an historical approach to the development of financial reporting and
auditing regulation in Britain, this chapter revealed its convoluted and contradictory
nature. From the earliest attempts at state regulation of accounting in 1844 through to
recent developments at the beginning of the new millennium, the state has slowly
and, for the most part, hesitatingly played a greater role in its regulation. This
hesitation was particularly evident in the study of the periods leading up to the Great
Depression in America, which had a knock on effect in Britain. From that point on,
the state increasingly sought to influence the accountancy profession. These
developments were punctuated, with change occurring predominantly in the
aftermath of major incidences of accounting failure. The development of the
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financial press brought greater knowledge and insight to the general public regarding
accounting fraud and failures, particularly from the 1960’s onwards. I’he greater
public scrutiny of accounting failures that resulted from this coincides with greater
action by the state to improve financial reporting and auditing regulation. In
response, the accountancy bodies took greater action to rectify the causes of these
failures under the watchful eye of the state. The rise of the regulatory state during
this period led to a greater acceptance of state level intrusion into private affairs.
State sponsored reports regarding the efficacy of the regulatory regime, such as the
Dearing Report in 1988, led to action from both the state and the profession to
improve the regime. In addition. Directives from Europe played an increasing role in
the evolution of Britain’s regulatory regime in the 1980’s. The changes in the
regulatory regime that took place in the first decade of the new millennium were as a
result of both external events, in the case of the companies’ act of 2004 which
focussed on auditing reform, and slow internal deliberations, that culminated in the
2006 act. fhe contrast of these processes is revealing, with the state working in a
tentative, deliberate manner, in consultation with the stakeholders to reform
regulation, resulting in the 2006 act, but acting with haste in passing the 2004 act in
response to an unforeseen crisis.
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CHAPTER 6

Historical Development of Accounting
Regulation in America

6.1 Introduction
Accounting regulation in America has been shaped by three great phases of
regulatory change: The progressive era of the late nineteenth century; the New Deal,
which was a consequence of the great depression; and finally the era which saw the
creation of the modern regulatory state that developed out of the public interest
movements of the 1960’s. This chapter will trace the development of financial
reporting and auditing regulation in America within both the context of these eras
and the country's unique political environment of staunch individualism and
widespread distrust of government pow'er.

6.2 Progressive Era
1 he Progressive Era (equivalent to the Victorian reform in Britain) had a profound
and widespread impact on American politics, from the late 19th century to early in
the 2()th century (Moran, 2003). The rise of the middle class in the late 19th century
created a powerful intermediary class between the working class and the upper class
(Vogel, 1986).

6.2.1 Context of Financial Reporting Developrnent.s in the Progressive Era

Prior to this period, the relationship between government and private business was
similar to that which preceded the Victorian era in Britain; essentially "adversarial"
(Vogel, 2003, p. 226), with the private sector being hostile to government
interference, and government being bound by the principles of laissez-faire which
enjoyed significant support among the American population (Calhoun, 2007).
Therefore, the federal government mostly left the accounting profession to selfregulate until the Progressive era witnessed a changed in this environment. In
contrast to previous eras, the Progressives were driven by the desire to modernize
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and regulate the free market system (Moran, 2003). The movement was strongly
influenced by evangelical Protestantism (ibid.). As a result, the ideology of the
movement was broadly comparable in both the U.S. and Britain (ibid.). Vogel (1986)
describes the Progressives as having

"promoted the values and ideals of professionalism, scientific and
technical expertise, administrative competence and neutrality, and
efficiency in both business and government" (p. 231).
The institutional outcome of these principles was the conception and adoption of
specialised administrative agencies. The impact of this legacy is best captured by
Moran (2003) who states that :

"the spirit of neutral, scientific administration would prosper, above
party strife and sectional interest" (p. 14).
This is not surprising, as Progressives were guided by the public interest paradigm
( Bozeman, 2007).

6.2.2 Early Developments in Accounting l.egislation
The impact of this movement on the accounting profession began with a national
crisis - fhe Banking Panic of 1907 (FRBM, 1988). A committee was formed to
investigate this panic, headed by Abram P. Andrew, secretary of the National
Monetary Commission (ibid.). This commission identified the ultimate cause as
being a complete disregard for the public interest, with banks competing
aggressively with each other (ibid.). As a consequence of the findings of the
commission, the Federal Reserve Act was signed into law in 1913, creating the
Federal Reserve System. This development was a watershed moment in accounting
regulation in America, with Federal Agencies playing a growing role in the affairs of
the profession for the rest of the twentieth century (Carey, 1969).

The first major consequence of this development came in 1917 when a special
committee was formed by the Federal Trade Commission with a broad scope to
investigate relevant issues in accounting and report back to the Trade Commission
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(Moonitz, 1970). The committee prepared, at the request of the Trade Commission, a
"programme for audit procedure” (ibid., p. 145), which was approved by the
Commission and subsequently by the Federal Reserve Board which published the
guidelines in a bulletin entitled ‘Uniform Accounting’ (Carey, 1969). The bulletin
was reprinted as a pamphlet for wider distribution in 1918 (Moonitz, 1970) with the
new title of ‘Approved Methods for the Preparation of Balance Sheet Statements’
(Carey, 1969). In addition to its focus on auditing of balance sheets, the pamphlet
gave guidance as to the recommended presentation of the income and balance sheet
(ibid.). However, since it contained only recommendations rather than any concrete
legally enforced directives, it had limited impact (ibid.). Nonetheless, it marked the
beginning of greater state level involvement in accounting practices.

6.3 New Deal Era
fhe second wave of regulation was the New Deal; a succession of economic
programs initiated to reform the severely depressed American economy in the
1930's. fhe New Deal brought an end to the "period of corporate opacity" (p. 248)
that had preceded it, and with it, the laissez-faire approach to the accountancy
profession (Francis, 2008).

This regulatory era had a long term impact on the

profession, which will be discussed in section 6.2.4.

6.3.1 Context of the New' Deal Kra

The 1920's had seen a boom in the economy, which faltered suddenly and severely in
1929 with the market crash (Moran, 2003). According to Sitkoff (2000), this flurry
of regulatory innovation re-imagined the role of government as the "guardian of the
individual" (p. 165), particularly from big business. Although the New Deal was a
response to economic crisis, the drive to modernise and regulate the free market was
comparative to the Progressive Era (Moran, 2003). Like the Progressives of the
nineteenth century, the movement was about being open to trying new things.
Hofstadter (1989) expresses this well: "At the heart of the New Deal there was not a
philosophy hut a temperament" (p. 411). Roosevelt's temperament was that of a
pragmatist and a bold experimenter, and this paralleled with the temperament of
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Depression era voters (Keuehel and O'Sullivan, 1989). In fact, Roosevelt expressed
the base belief that unites the Progressive Era with the New Deal thus:

"it is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it
frankly and try another. But above all, try something" (Keuehel and
O’Sullivan, 1989, p. 174).
The political aspect of this movement is particularly relevant as it also permeates the
circumstances of the Progressive Era and that of the latter movement in the 1960's.
The New Deal was influenced, unsurprisingly, by the democratic ideology. The fact
that this realignment occurred in the aftermath of an economic depression is critical
to understanding such spurs to regulatory innovation. In support of this, Sergeyev
and Weatherford (2000) assert that: "most critical realignments in American political
history have been stimulated by severe economic reversals" (p. 312). Essentially, the
Depression created a temporary period of broader political support for democratic
led innovative action (ibid.).

6.3.2 The Securities Act ot 1933

The Securities Act of 1933 gave the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) the legal
authority that it had been lacking previously (Carey, 1969). The FTC now had the
power to prescribe accounting methods that companies were legally bound to
comply with (ibid.). 3'he act put the onus on accountants to ensure that financial
statements were free of significant errors and material omissions, with the threat of
being open to liability for losses that occur due to such compliance failures (ibid.).

6.3.3 The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934

The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is notable for having established the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a new regulatory body in which the
authority to prescribe accounting methods contained in the Securities Act of 1933
was transferred from the FTC (Carey, 1969). Furthermore, the Act of 1934 required
that financial statements be filed with the SEC and sanctioned by an accountant
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independent of both the state and private company (ibid.). This gave the SEC
relatively significant powers to influence accounting practices.

The SEC has been described as the "crown jewel" (p. 1) of the numerous regulatory
agencies that were created during Roosevelt’s term as U.S. president (Silver, 2004).
During the Depression, there was a widely held perception that fraudulent activities
were prevalent in Wall Street during the boom years of the 1920's (Moran, 2003).
The SEC was established so as to restore confidence in the market and encourage
trading, which it achieved (ibid.). In general, the regulatory institutions were an
attempt to fix perceived market failure, and restore a sense of probity in the
American economy (ibid.).

6.3.4 l.egacy of the New Deal

The New Deal marked a change in the relationship between government and private
business. Although the changes that encapsulated the New Deal were implemented
in response to a crisis, the radical realignments that resulted have had a long term
influence. The legacy of the Great Depression bears out this assessment, as Moran
(2003) states, the New Deal was "the great formative influence on the modern
American regulatory state" (p. 15).

Francis (2008) contends that the New Deal, and in particular, the establishment of
the SEC was a radical change in the relationship between the American government
and the accounting profession, stating that:

"the age of opacity gave way to what could he termed the age of
corporate transparency, in which accounting practices (including
audits) were now subject to federal government oversight, at least
for public companies ” (p. 249).
The SEC remained the regulator of the financial industry for seven decades until
events such as the Enron scandal led to the creation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In
the political climate of the New Deal, the accountancy profession faced the credible
threat of losing professional autonomy. Only the happenstance of a greater political
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crisis prevented this outcome. It was the advent of World War 2 that redirected
attention away from the aceountancy profession (Merino and Previts, 1998). After
the war, the SEC's regulation of the profession ehanged eonsiderably, but
accountants had maintained professional autonomy (ibid.).

In fact, the outeome for the accounting profession of the securities laws enacted in
the 1930's was the conferring of the eritical role for the profession as a gatekeeper in
the US fmaneial market. Mueh of the power given to the SEC in 1934 was
relinquished in 1938 when the SEC delegated a signifieant amount of these powers
to prescribe accounting methods to the American Institute of Accountants (AIA) and
its Committee on Accounting Procedures (CAP) (Carey, 1970). The CAP retained
these powers until 1959 when it was replaced by the Accounting Principles Board
(APB), whieh in turn was replaced by the Financial Aceounting Standards Board
(FASB) in 1973 (ibid.). However, the SEC retained the authority to essentially force
listed corporations to comply with the accounting standards prescribed by the
accountancy profession; a statutory authority that remained unique to America until
it was replicated in I^ritain in 1985 (Blake and Lunt, 2001).

6.4 TFie American Regulatory State
In the decades after the New Deal, aceounting regulation continued to evolve slowly
from the laissez-faire approach at the beginning of the century, through self
regulation and eventually greater state involvement (Francis, 2008). This evolution
of the profession took plaee within the context of what Moran (2003) argues was the
rise of the American regulatory state, with the government increasingly participating
in the regulation of many areas of importanee to the economy. However, the
American regulatory state was somewhat different to similar movements in eountries
like Britain as a result of the nation's unique history (ibid). This history, and its
subsequent impact on American politics and considerations of public interest, played
a role in the development of accounting regulation.
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6.4.1 Origins of the American Regulatory State; A Clash of Cultures

Moran (2003) contends that: "the modern regulatory state is an American invention"
(p. 13), that originated in the public interest movement of the 1960's. McCann (1988)
describes this movement as "uniquely adversarial, [and] legalistic" (p. 393),
embracing law as a source of change. The movement gained an increasing degree of
influenee through the 1970’s, becoming an important voice in domestie policy
discussions and demanding greater levels of public regulation (Rabkin, 2004).
Moran (2003) describes this period as the "age of the new social regulation" (p. 15).
Thus, the movement created the environment for the emergence of the regulatory
state in America (Moran, 2003). Majone (1994) states that:

"Reliance on regulation - rather than public ownership, planning or
centralised administration - characterises the methods of the
regulatory state ” (p. 77).
Although the concept of the regulatory state has developed in most of the western
world, Moran (2003) defends his assertion of its American origins and influence
thus:

‘77 is in the USA that the concept of regulation has been most closely
studied, the regulatory agency most deeply institutionalized, and the
idea of guiding the state's economic mission by regulation most
historically entrenched” (p. 17)
However, the evolution of the regulatory state has been affected by the unique
aspects of American culture, such as its foundational and deep-seated mistrust of
government" (Bozeman, 2007, p.49), with Americans believing their government as
having a natural tendency to increase its control over citizens, if it is not tamed
(Wills, 2002). For instance, Thomas Jefferson warned that, even with the best
intentions, governments "entrusted with power have, in time, and by slow
operations, perverted it into tyranny" (Alexander and Alexander, 2005, p. 28).

Historical legacy and, in particular, colonial legacy, has helped shape a distinct form
of political individualism in America. Whereas American egalitarians perceived
central government authority as being in opposition to equality, their European
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counterparts were not bound by the same historical legacy. In contrast to America,
European egalitarians accept a greater extent of hierarchy to achieve their goal to
reduce inequality (Wildavsky, 1991). This unique eharacter of the American psyche
conflicted with the public interest movement, meaning the regulatory state was
uniquely created through an amalgamation of egalitarian and individualistic cultures
(Wildavsky, 1991). Bozeman (2007) suggests that historical reasons have allowed
these two seemingly opposed positions to co-exist; mostly by assuming a distinct
view of the public interest. Nevertheless, this came through conflict. For instance,
Ronald Reagan became the American president in 1981 partially on the back of
attacking the legacy of Roosevelt's New Deal programs (Sitkoff, 2000), warning the
American people: "Don't trust your government, and get them off your back" (Bell,
1991, p. 68). Pro-regulatory groups were relatively successful in countering the antiregulatory campaign of the Reagan era (McCann, 1988).

fhis clash of opposing ideologies in addition to external crises created a uniquely
uneven regulatory state. For instance, Veggeland (2009) states that the global
economic crisis of the 1970’s led to a widespread adoption of neo-liberal economic
ideas, with the embracing of "Management by objectives... and frameworks of
deregulation" (p. 8) as the distinguishing features of this change. However,
Veggeland (2009) argues that: "this period also introduced an incredible increase in
the number of new regulations and the extension of regulative policies" (p. 8). This
distinctive development of the American regulatory state was to have an
international impact. Scharpf (1999) asserts that, particularly in Europe, governments
deregulated areas of economie importance and re-regulated to advance rights in areas
that concern human, ecological, and social rights.

6.4.2 Financial Reporting Regulation in the Regulatory .State; Post New
Deal
The increasing global nature of business and the growing complexity of accounting,
in addition to the ideological context of the American regulatory state, meant that the
accounting profession was essentially self-regulated in the decades after the New
Deal, with little government intrusion (McEeay and Riccaboni, 2001). The authority
to set accounting standards was devolved by the SEC in 1938 to the profession
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controlled CAP (Carey, 1970). The CAP took a "hush fire approach" (p. 2) to its
operations, dealing with areas only when problems had arisen (Gibson, 2010). The
authority to set accounting standards was retained by its successor, the Accounting
Principles Board (APB) when it was formed in 1959 (Carey, 1970). The APB was
created by the AICPA (The successor of the AIA which had created the CAP) in
response to criticism of the CAP having "existed within the institute" (p. 12) and thus
being considered incapable of serving the public interest (Carmichael and Graham,
2012). Despite the AlCPA's attempts to "establish credibility" (p. 12) by selecting
highly competent members for the APB, the public perception was that it was still
too close to the profession and thus carried the interests of auditors and their clients
over the interests of the public (ibid.). External pressure, particularly from the SEC
and the public, led to the AICPA agreeing to the establishment of a Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in 1973 to replace the standard setting function
of the APB (Gibson, 2010). The FASB membership was larger and more diverse
than its two predecessors and was open to suggestions and advice from the SEC and
industry organisations (ibid.).

I'he rise of globalisation led to International standard setters such as the International
Accounting Standards Committee (lASC) established in 1973, and its successor, the
International Accounting Standards Board (lASB), which were created through
cooperation between the professional accounting bodies in several countries
(Botzem, 2012). These regulatory organisations allowed the accountancy bodies to
keep oversight and standard setting within the profession (ibid.).

6.5 Accounting Fraud and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002
I'he Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is widely considered to be the most important and
extensive legislation in America to impact listed corporations and the accountancy
profession since the securities acts of 1933 and 1934 (Fass, 2003; Seitzinger and
Bazan, 2003).
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6,5.1 Origins of the Act; From its Roots in the 197()’s to Corporate Scandal
at Enron and WorldCom

Pass (2003) argues that the indireet origins of the SOX aet streteh back to the 1970's
in legislation drafted by Senator Lee Metcalf and Representative John Moss in the
wake of the Penn Central bankruptcy. That proposed legislation included an
accounting oversight board that eventually came into existence with the SOX act
(ibid.). The legislation failed to gain support, but resurfaced again in the mid 90's
when it was redrafted by Representative Edward Markey (ibid.). However, Pass
(2003) contends that in an environment of economic boom during the mid to late
1990's. there was a lack of widespread support for reform.

Several significant instances of accounting fraud were revealed in the late 1999's,
most notably at Xerox which had claimed billions of dollars in non-existent profits in
1998 and 1999 (Conrad, 2010). However, the impetus for change was provided by
the Enron fraud discovered in 2001 and its bankruptcy early in 2002 (Seitzinger and
Bazan, 2003). Enron's collapse was the result of a large scale accounting fraud that
allowed the company to post substantial profits that didn't exist (Labaton, 2006). The
fraud was revealed on the 16th of October 2001 when the company posted a net loss
of $618 million dollars for the previous financial quarter (Brickey, 2003). The
following day the SEC opened an investigation into Enron for suspected fraudulent
accounting practices (ibid.).

The Enron bankruptcy created a large degree of publicity and scrutiny of accounting
practices at large firms (Brickey, 2003), particularly because of its position as the
"darling of the stock analysts and the economic press" (Conrad, 2010, p. 9), but also
because of the role played by its auditors (Gibson, 2010). Nevertheless, it was
generally considered to be an "anomaly" (Brickey, 2003, p. 358). However, the
Enron fraud was soon joined by more scandals, especially the revelations of
WorldCom's "less sophisticated accounting fraud" (p. 358) and subsequent
bankruptcy while the SOX act was being debated in the Houses of Congress (ibid.).
The second largest telecommunications company in America at the time, WorldCom
had fraudulently manipulated its accounts by $7.15 billion dollars (Conrad, 2010).
WorldCom's bankruptcy eclipsed Enron's, which had itself eclipsed previous
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bankruptcies (Ferrell, Fraedrich and Ferrell, 2010). The two consecutive record
bankruptcies as a result of fraud created a political situation in which the government
had no choice but to act "quickly and radically" (Du Plessis, Hargovan, and Bagaric,
2010, p. 304).

In addition, the auditing profession lost the confidence of the public, having failed to
prevent the failures at Enron and WorldCom among others (Brewster, 2003; Gibson,
2010; Flarris, 2010).The auditor for both companies, Arthur Anderson, had either
been complicit in the fraud or failed to identify the material misstatements (Ferrell,
Fraedrich and Ferrell, 2010), and subsequently lost its licence to audit after being
convicted of obstructing justice by destroying evidence related to the Enron case
(Conrad, 2010).

6.S.2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002

Within this context of accounting fraud and auditing failure, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
was signed into law by President Bush in July 2002. The act was formed by the
merging of bills from each of the two Houses of Congress in the bicameral American
legislature: The Flouse of Representatives; and the Senate (Jickling, 2008). The first
was Representative Oxley's bill that had passed through the House of
Representatives in April 2002 (ibid.). A more rigorous bill was proposed by Senator
Sarbanes and was passed in the Senate on the 18th of June (Pass, 2003). The extent
of the fraud at WorldCom was revealed within days of the Senate's bill passing and
prompted the House of Representatives to agree a compromise bill that broadly
followed the Senate's bill (Fass, 2003; Gibson, 2010). The new Sarbanes-Oxley bill
was approved by both Houses five days prior to its enactment (Jickling, 2008).

The SOX act had "far-reaching consequences" (p. 8) for financial reporting and the
accounting profession in general (Gibson, 2010). The act is legally enforceable, with
the principle behind it being, as Du Plessis et al. (2010) state: "comply or else" (p.
307). In broad terms, the SOX act marked the end of American reliance on principle
based governance that has remained in force in Britain (Tricker, 2008).
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6.5.3 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)

The greatest outcome of the SOX act for financial reporting and auditing in America
was the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB), which effectively "brought an end to self-regulation of the accounting
profession" (Spedding and Rose, 2007, p. 559). The PCAOB was tasked with
oversight of the accounting profession in the public interest (ibid.). Boster (2007)
describes the PCAOB as a "quasi-public entity" (p. 130), that is "structured as a
private non-profit corporation with federal statutory authority" (Francis, 2008, p.
252), with an "innovative if not unique financing scheme" (Boster, 2007, p. 130).
More than 99% of its budget comes from a mandatory accounting support fee paid
by public companies, with the level of payment based on the companies' prior year
average monthly market capitalization, subject to SEC approval (ibid.).

Prior to SOX, and the establishment of PCAOB, subgroups (see section 6.4.2) of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) were responsible for
standard setting in auditing (Boster, 2007). SOX transferred the authority for
standard setting for audits of public companies, as well as regulation of auditors to
the PCAOB, thus replacing the professions' role in its own regulation (Francis,
2008).

The SOX act granted the PCAOB a "broad authority" (p. 134), within SEC
oversight, to investigate any breaches by a registered public accounting firm or its
associates that may violate any of its provisions (Boster, 2007). The act also gave the
PCAOB the authority to use of a "broad range" (p. 134) of sanctions for punishing
offenders (ibid.). These range from "significant monetary penalties" (p. 134), to the
withdrawal of registration, which would prevent a firm from auditing public
companies (ibid.).

6.5.4 Relaxing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

Opposition to the act grew sharply in the years after its enactment, in what Ghertman
and Menard (2010) refer to as the "post-SOXpushback" (p. 261). In late 2006, the
government began to relax the requirements of the act (Eabaton, 2006). The passing
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of the Dodd-Shelby amendment in 2007 allowed the SEC to ease the auditing
requirements for small businesses (Ghertman and Menard, 2010). In addition, there
has been international eondemnation to the PCAOB's extension of its regulatory
reach, claiming jurisdiction over non-American accounting firms that audit
companies that are registered with the SEC (Francis, 2008). In particular, the
European Federation of Accountants (EFA) formally objected to these perceived
attempts by the American regulatory agency to interfere in the governance structures
of other countries (ibid.).

6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to identify the unique factors that have affected the
development of financial reporting and auditing regulation in America through a
heavily context driven approach. The chapter has revealed a complex interconnected
context for this development. In the first place, three broad regulatory eras were
distinguished that have provided the context for changes in accounting regulation.
Furthermore, the country's uniquely widespread support for individualism across the
political spectrum was recognised as a factor that has constrained attempts to
increase government regulation right through these regulatory eras.

The changes have been tentative and, in some cases, temporary. For instance, the
Great Depression led to significant standard setting powers in America being
imparted on the newly established public body, the SEC. Much of those powers were
then transferred back to a private body within four years. The trend is clear: A crisis
leads to public sector regulation of the accounting profession, of which the severity
is determined largely by the level of public anger and distrust. When the crisis has
passed, political support for the public regulation decreases, which leads to a
government that is uncomfortable intruding in the operations of the profession. This
unease by government at having significant control over the profession is consistent
over all three eras, with at least some power returned to the profession after each era.
However, the chapter highlights that the overall degree of regulation of financial
reporting and auditing has increased between eras, with relatively significant
increases in the past decade.
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CHAPTER 7

Historical Development of Accounting
Regulation in the Irish Republic

7.1 Introduction
Until 1921, Ireland was ruled as a province of Britain. As a result, all developments
in British financial reporting and auditing regulation until 1921 are also Irish
developments. At this point, the development of such accounting regulation in
Ireland and Britain diverges with the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922.
This chapter traces the development of Irish accounting from this point to the
legislation in 2003 that created the Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory
Authority (lAASA). The factors that determined the path taken will be identified at
each important milestone.

7.2 Dependency on Inherited Regulation; 1922 - 1963

In 1922 the newly formed Irish Free State adopted much of the existing courts, laws,
administration and democratic structures of Britain (Cahill, 1999). In addition, the
largest of the accountancy bodies in Ireland, the Institute of Chartered Accountants
in Ireland (ICAI), maintained an “all-Ireland remit” (p. 6) in the aftermath of the
island’s political separation into north and south (Annisette and O'Regan, 2007). As
a result, the Irish profession retained close links to private sector activity in Britain
(Cahill, 1997).

Furthermore, with the most recent financial reporting legislation at this time being
the British companies acts of 1907 and 1908 (see Chapter 5, section 2.5), the Irish
Free State inherited accounting law that had stagnated due to a mixture of continued
British hesitancy to interfere in private affairs (Hopwood and Vieten, 1999), and the
outbreak of the First World War (Napier, 2010). In addition to being relatively
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archaic, these aets had proven to be "extremely deficient" (p. 180), particularly in
terms of fmaneial disclosure (Cahill, 1999). The implication of this is that Ireland
adopted defieient aecounting law that remained the sole statutory foundation of
financial reporting legislation until 1963 (Cahill, 1999). In the period between 1922
and 1963, international aecounting regulation evolved, mostly in response to various
incidences of fraud and seandals (Cahill, 1999). Ireland's inexperience in forming its
own laws may, at least, be partially responsible for this inaetion, with the result that
it became isolated from international accounting developments.

7.3 Reform in the 1960's
The fmaneial reporting legislation from 1907/1908 that was inherited from Britain
was still in effect in Ireland until 1963. Having been isolated from international
accounting developments during this period, it is fitting that change eame from an
awareness within the Irish government that reform was necessary, rather than any
"externalpressure" {CahWl, 1999, p. 181). fhis awareness may have been intlueneed
by the need for economie modernisation which had become inereasingly apparent in
the late 1950's (ibid.).

7.3.1 Report ot the Cox Committee on Company Law Reform; 1958

The first significant milestone in the development of fmaneial reporting in the
Republic of Ireland was the Report of the Committee on Company Law Reform,
commonly known as the Cox Report after its chairman, Arthur Cox (McCague,
1994). The Cox Report has been described as the "first comprehensive review’ of
Irish Company Law’ since independence" (ibid., p. 114).

The Company Law

Reform Committee whieh produced the report was established in 1951 (Whyte,
2002) to investigate potential defieiencies in Irish eompany law and make
recommendations (McCague, 1994). The report was completed and its findings
reported to the Irish government in 1958 (ibid.).
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7.3.2 (Companies Act of 1963

As a result of the findings and recommendations of the Cox Report, the Irish
government passed the Companies Act of 1963 (Whyte, 2002). Cahill (1999)
contends that the financial reporting aspects of the 1963 act were comparable to the
British companies act of 1948 to a '\ery large degree” (p. 181), particularly
regarding the role of auditors and the stipulated form and content of financial
accounts. Like its British predecessor, the 1963 act explicitly required that company
accounts be maintained for cash How, sales and purchases, and assets and liabilities
(MaeCann and Courtney, 2013). In addition, the role of the auditor was clearly
defined as a guarantor of compliance, with auditors having to formally state that
accounts properly represent the books of account and comply with the act.
Furthermore, the act required that accounts represent a 'true and fair view';
com.parable to the 'true and correct view' requirement in the British companies acts
of 1907/1908, though neither term was defined (ibid.).

7.4 Regulatory Inertia; 197()'s - 1990'.s
Despite the public interest movements of the 1970’s and 80’s, Ireland retained the
traditional position of having very little direct public sector/public interest
participation in financial reporting regulation. Developments in Irish accounting in
this period were driven largely by greater private sector participation in setting
standards (Cahill, 1999). Public sector involvement came almost entirely as a result
of EU Directives (ibid.). Even then, there were significant delays in Ireland's
implementation of Directives in the area of financial reporting; examples being the
Fourth and Seventh Company Law Directives.

7.4.1 (mmpanies Act of 1986

The EU Fourth Directive was issued in 1978, prescribing instructions for the
preparation of annual accounts (Lynch-Fannon and Cuddihy, 2010). This was an
attempt to harmonise accounting practice in Europe and facilitate comparability of
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accounts across member states (ibid.). The Directive was intended to be enacted by
member states by 1980 (Nobes and Parker, 2008). However, in keeping with the
Irish government's reserved approach to implementing EU Directives -- and fmaneial
reporting legislation in general from 1922 to this time — the Directive was eventually
enacted by the companies' act of 1986.

The act prescribed formats for the preparation of company accounts, and gave
particular emphasis to the neeessity for accounts to show a 'true and fair view', with
amendment explicitly required if they do not (MacCann and Courtney, 2013). Like
the 1963 act, the act of 1986 did not define what constituted a true and fair set of
accounts. However, former Chief Justice of Ireland, Ronan Keane, interprets the
requirement in this act as being satisfied if accounts are devoid of material error and
substantive misleading content, and have been prepared according to acceptable
accounting standards (Keane, 2007).
In addition to the true and fair criterion, which had previously been lobbied for
inclusion in the Fourth Directive, the Irish and British governments had also
successfully lobbied for an increased upper limit for small and medium-sized
businesses (SME's) (Cahill, 1999). All companies below this limit were subject to
less burdensome accounting and filing requirements, and this higher cut off point
was included in the 1986 act (ibid.).

7.4.2 Companies Act of 1990

The companies’ act of 1990 marked the next development in fmaneial reporting
legislation in Ireland, but had a very different source to its predecessor. While the
1986 act was required to comply with an EU Directive — with the changes being
almost entirely determined by the EU — the 1990 act was enacted in response to
developments in the Irish economy (Cahill, 1999). The legislation was required
particularly because of a specific crisis; the imminent collapse of the Goodman
Group, which was a large meat processing company of significant importance to the
Irish economy (Keane, 2007). The act introduced the insolvency process of
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examinership into Irish law, which ultimately saved the group (Lynch-Fannon and
Cuddihy, 2010).

In relation to financial reporting, the act extended the requirements contained in the
1986 aet. For instance, greater emphasis was placed on the clarity of financial
reporting, with the aet instructing that entries be timely and consistent, transactions
recorded and explained completely, and that the books allow for a company's
financial position to be ascertained with reasonable precision (MacCann and
Courtney, 2013). In addition, the act also emphasised the role of auditing, making
reference to the requirement that financial books be capable of being timely and
effectively audited (ibid.). Cahill (1999) contends that this act marked the beginning
of a divergence between Ireland's fmaneial reporting legislation and Britain's.

The 1990 act was amended nine years later because of "unsatisfactory aspects" (p.
127) identified in the legislation for insolvency in regards it being "balanced too far
in favour of rescue" (Lynch-Fannon and Cuddihy, 2010, p. 127). From a financial
reporting perspective, the 1999 amendment act (no. 2) introduced an exemption from
the audit requirement for small businesses (MacCann and Courtney, 2013). This was
the result of lobbying from the SME sector which argued successfully that the
auditing requirement for small businesses below a certain revenue threshold was too
onerous and unnecessary (ibid.).

7.4.3 Pre.s.sure from Europe; Re.sistance to the Seventh Directive

While Ireland had been slow in adopting the financial reporting requirements of the
EU Fourth Directive, it had at least done so with Britain's support (Cahill, 1999).
Furthermore, since both nations had successfully lobbied for changes to the
Directive, with the revised Direetive issued only twenty months prior to its
enactment in the 1986 companies act, the delay was relatively minimal (Cahill,
1999).
A much more protracted and controversial delay oecurred with Ireland's
implementation of the EU Seventh Direetive, whieh was issued in 1983 (Cahill,
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1999; Whittington, 2007). At that time there was significant diversity of practice
with regards to consolidation of group accounts across member states (Barker and O
hOgartaigh, 1998). The Seventh Directive was intended to increase comparability
across the EU by standardising the form and content of consolidated accounts (Pierce
and Brennan, 2003). The diversity of practice in consolidation, and particularly the
contrast between Ireland/Britain and most of continental Europe, required that the
Seventh Directive be flexible in allowing member states to make decisions on how to
implement some of its requirements (Barker and O hOgartaigh, 1998). Britain
enacted the Directive in 1989 (Hopwood and Vieten, 1999). However, the Irish
government did not, and had to be served with notice to appear at the European
Court in September 1992 for continual failure to implement the legislation (Cahill,
1999). This prompted the Irish government to act, and the Directive was enacted in
August, 1992 (ibid.).

7.4.4 The Ryan Report

In the early 1990's, when public attention was focussed on the question of the
reliability of financial statements in light of a series of high profile Irish
bankruptcies, the government left the accountancy profession to investigate. An
independent commission was established in 1991 by the largest Irish accountancy
body at the time, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI), to
investigate disparities between the expectations of a wide variety of users of
financial statements and the reality of those statements (Pierce and Kilcommins,
1996). The commission's task was completed the following year, and the report
presented became commonly known as the Ryan Report, after its chairman. Dr
Louden Ryan (Barker and O hOgartaigh, 1998). The report concluding that the
expectations of all interested parties were not met by current financial reporting
arrangements and that rectifying this must be of immediate concern to the profession
(Pierce and Kilcommins, 1996). Cahill (1999) describes the Ryan Report as a:

"milestone in discussing publicly the role and context of financial
reporting, the 'expectations gap' and the future of accounting
regulation in Ireland" (p. 187).
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Although the report recommended that standard-setting in accounting continue to be
a private sector practice, it did at least accept the need for accounting standards to
carry legal weight (ibid.), and recommended the establishment of a Financial
Reporting Review Panel (FRRP)

7.4.5 DETE and the Company Law Review Group

At this time, the Department of Enterprise and Employment maintained a limited
role in supervising the accountancy bodies, with the company act of 1990 requiring
that auditors inform the Department of the compliance status of businesses (Cahill,
1999; O’Regan, 2010a). The Department’s involvement in company law increased
through the 1990’s with the next notable event being the establishment of the
Company Law Review Group (CLRG) in 1994 to "advance regulatory reform”
(OECD, 2001, p. 35). Cahill (1999) describes this group as an "ad hoc” (p. 197)
company law review forum, with sixteen representatives drawn from diverse
interests such as the legal, business, banking, and accountancy professions. OECD
(2001) states that the creation of this forum was "a departure from the usual means
of reforming legislation” (p. 35). fhe CLRG issued its first report in 1994, with
particular focus on the Ryan Commission and financial reporting in Ireland (ibid.).
The CLRG report agreed with the Ryan report's recommendations regarding the
"private sector basis” (p. 197) of accounting standards, and the recognition of those
standards in Irish law (Cahill, 1999).

7.4.6 Regulatory Capture

The laissez faire approach of the Irish government to financial reporting regulation
from 1922 to the turn of the century was not unique. However, Cahill (1999)
contends that Ireland was even more dependent on private sector expertise than
Britain and most of Europe. Responsibility for standard-setting in the areas of
accounting and auditing was effectively left to the professional accountancy bodies
(ibid.). As a consequence of this, Cahill (1999) describes the system in place to the
end of the 1990’s as "regulatory capture ” (p. 178) by the profession.
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7.5 From Reactive to Proactive in the New Millennium; 2000-2003
The Irish regulatory regime for fmaneial reporting and auditing at the beginning of
the new millennium depended on the expertise of the accountaney profession to a
much greater degree than Britain (Cahill, 1999). The recommendations of the Ryan
Report had yet to be implemented at this time. Indeed, because of Ireland's reliance
on the profession's self-regulation at this point, Cahill (1999) argues that:

"It would be difficult to ascribe the term 'regulatory system' to
financial reporting behaviour in the Republic of Ireland because of the
continued absence of a monitoring or enforcement mechanism" (p.
178).
However, a year into the new millennium the government responded to the "high
levels of non-compliance in Ireland’’ (p. 56) by establishing an enforcement agency,
the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement (ODCE) (Heneghan and
O'Donnell, 2007). Two years later, legislation establishing a supervisory authority
for the accountancy bodies, the Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisor Authority
(lAASA), was enacted into law (ibid.).

7.5.1 Background to Change

Despite the comparable time periods, Heneghan and O'Donnell (2007) argue that the
drivers of Irish reform precede that of the American enactment of the SarbanesOxley Act, which was primarily the collapse of Enron. In the Irish situation, two
events precipitated change: a series of corporate financial crises involving Irish
multinational companies (Cahill, 1997); and the discovery of large scale tax
avoidance in Ireland (Nolan, 2008). The first involved the discovery in the 1990's
that a number of internationally high profile Irish companies, such as Waterford
Crystal, had overstated their earnings through accounting fraud (Cahill, 1997). There
was a growing realisation that Ireland had a compliance problem with company law,
notably identified in the report by the Working Group on Company Taw Compliance
and Enforcement submitted to the government in 1998 (Appleby, 2005). The
Working Group recommended the creation of an independent enforcement agency to
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promote compliance of company law (ibid.). Subsequently, the report by the
Comptroller and Auditor General, and the extended Public Accounts Committee
(PAC) investigation into Deposit Interest Retention Tax (DIRT) avoidance in Ireland
(DIRT Enquiry Report 1999), were completed and presented to the government
(Nolan, 2008). The DlRl’ Enquiry Report was particularly critical of auditors and the
supervisory bodies that failed to act, and recommended a review group be
established to investigate the deficiencies identified in the application and
supervision of auditing in Ireland (ibid.). Similarly, the reaction to these revelations
in the Irish media was highly critical of the accountancy profession (Cahill, Bougen
and Young, 1999).

In response to these reports, and in a political climate of growing distrust towards the
profession, the Review Group on Auditing (RGA) was established in February 2000
with a wider remit to investigate deficiencies in both auditing and accounting
regulation, and reported its recommendations to the Irish government in July of the
same year (OECD, 2001). fhe key recommendation of the RGA was for the
establishment of an Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisor Authority (lAASA),
which would provide a monitoring mechanism for the accounting profession for the
first time in the Irish regulatory regime (Appleby, 2005).

7.5.2 Company Law Lnforcement Act of 2001
The recommendations of the Working Group on Company Law Compliance and
Enforcement were implemented in the company law enforcement act of 2001
(Appleby, 2005). This act established the Office of the Director of Corporate
Enforcement (ODCE), which provided the "enforcement mechanism” (p. 178) that
Cahill (1999) lamented was missing from the Irish regulatory regime. The ODCE
was tasked with enforcing Irish companies’ acts, encouraging compliance, and
investigating noncompliance, with the act conferring legal authority to the ODCE to
prosecute offenders (Heneghan and O'Donnell, 2007; MacCann and Courtney,
2013). The act also established a Company Law Review Group (CLRG) to
continually review and amend company law in Ireland to ensure its relevance within
the context of external developments (Appleby, 2005).
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7.S.3 Companies (Auditing and Accounting) Act of 2003

The Companies’ Act of 2003 enacted most of the RGA's recommendations into Irish
law including, notably, the establishment of the lAASA (Heneghan and O'Donnell,
2007; Nolan, 2008). The act conferred extensive authority and responsibility to the
lAASA in regards supervision and oversight of the accountancy profession
(MacCann and Courtney, 2013). The lAASA was created with the principle
objectives of supervising the regulatory activities of the accountancy bodies, and
encouraging high standards in the accountancy and auditing professions {ibid.). In
addition, the lAASA monitors the compliance of companies with a balance sheet
value greater than twenty five million Euro or revenue in excess of fifty million Euro
{ibid.).

In regards auditing, major companies with balance sheet or revenue values in excess
of those above, were obligated by the act to form an Audit Committee to examine the
accounts and determine whether they represent a true and fair view of the company’s
performance (Heneghan and O'Donnell, 2007). The act required that directors of
such companies sign statements of compliance that must be explicitly validated by
auditors as being fair and reasonable (MacCann and Courtney, 2013). This Audit
Committee requirement was heavily criticized by affected parties due to the
perceived high cost of compliance and faced immediate lobbying post-enactment to
“tone down some of its elements” (Heneghan and O'Donnell, 2007, p. 58). Appleby
(2005) notes that, despite this requirement being considered a "moderate version of
the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act" (p. 261), the recommendation by the RGA for its
inclusion in the act pre-dates the international financial scandals that prompted its
inclusion in America.

In addition, the role of the ASB in standard setting was given statutory recognition
by the act through the lAASA (MacCann and Courtney, 2013). The act required
company annual accounts to explicitly state whether they were prepared according to
applicable accounting standards issued by the ASB (ibid.).
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7.6 Conclusion
In tracing the development of Irish financial reporting and auditing regulation from
the formation of the Irish Free State in 1922 to eontemporary times, several factors
that influenced this development were illuminated. For instanee, the traditional
dependenee of Ireland on British developments, and subsequent lack of experience in
regulating independently, meant that Ireland was slow to change accounting
legislation that had been adopted from Britain. Thus, Ireland relied heavily on the
accountancy profession to regulate itself for much of this period. Public sector
developments have tended to be in response to external pressures, such as
developments in Britain and Directives from the EU. Even then, Ireland has been
slow to change, consistently demonstrating a conservative approach to accounting
legislation until the end of the 20th eentury. The enactment of the EU Fourth
Directive was significantly delayed, even more so than it was in Britain. Likewise,
the enactment of the EU Seventh Directive only came as a result of legal aetion
taken by the EU. This cautious approach changed drastically with the passing of the
companies’ acts of 2001 and 2003 that transformed the Irish regulatory regime from
one of largely self-regulation to one in which the state plays a greater role.
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CHAPTER 8

8.1

Research Methodology

Inlrodiictioti

This chapter commences with a definition of research, a brief discussion on how the
research objective of this study was determined and a clear statement of the
objective of this study. It then breaks this research objective into two separate
research questions. These questions will be answered in the subsequent chapters.
This chapter then lays out the research strategy/methodology that will be used to
answer the questions and a justification of the research methods used.

8.2

Re.search Definition

Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009) define research as:

"something that people undertake in order to find out things in a
systematic \vay, thereby increasing their knowledge" (p. 5).
fhe word 'systematic' highlights the careful and logical approach of academic
research as opposed to personal beliefs (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005; Kumar, 2005).
In addition to the word 'systematic', Kothari (2009) adds the word 'scientific' to his
definition, highlighting its association with the scientific philosophy, stating that
research is a "scientific and systematic search for pertinent information on a specific
topic" (p. 1). Kumar (2005) considers research to be a "voyage of discovery" (p. 1), a
movement from having questions about a topic to having the answers.

Finding things out suggests a clear intent behind research (Kumar, 2005; Saunders et
al., 2009), that it is focused on discovering new knowledge (Redman and Mory,
1933). The clear purpose is what the researcher wants to find out about (Burns, 1994;
Saunders et al., 2003; Kumar, 2005). It provides the foundation for the research, and
as such, must be identified at the initial stage (Kumar, 2005; Saunders et al., 2009).
Therefore the primary and most significant step of the research process is the
formulation of the research objective (Saunders et al., 2003; Kumar, 2005).
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8.3

Research Objective

The researcher has an interest in accounting and auditing regulation and wants to
explore the development of regulation in Ireland in more depth. As an initial step in
determining a research objective, the researcher commenced an in-depth review of
the existing literature in this area.

8.3.1

Literature Review

Anderson (1998) defines the literature review as a

“summary, analysis and interpretation of the theoretical, conceptual
and research literature related to a topic or theme ” (p. 76).
Thus, as Pan (2008) describes, a literature review is a ‘‘‘'synthesis of the literature on
a topic" which provides an "organized overview of the state of knowledge on a
topic" (p. 1).

Hakim (1987) states that the literature review is a vital part of the "preparatory work
undertaken in the initial stages" (p. 17) of research. Depoy and Gitlin (2005) state
that "reviewing the literature is a significant thinking and action process in the
world of research" (p. 42). This vital part of research is however often undervalued
(McCracken, 1988; Depoy and Gitlin, (2005). It is not just a collection of other
people’s ideas but a qualitative analysis of the work of others (McCracken, 1988). A
good literature review allows the researcher to maintain a distance from their
research, by taking a broad perspective of their field of study (McCracken, 1988).
This requires the researcher to critically assess the literature, and maintain a
sceptical perspective throughout, assisting researchers in formulating more questions
about a topic (Yin, 2003) and focusing the research (Cottrell and McKenzie, 2005).
Indeed, the literature review has increased in value in recent decades, having similar
processes to original research in terms of data collection, analysis and interpretation
(Anderson, 1998). Therefore reviewing the literature is not just an early stage
activity, but an ongoing process that continues until the end of a research study
(Anderson, 1998). A literature review may even be used in place of original
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research, adding value by combining the research of others in new ways (Anderson,
1998).

The literature review process for this study commenced in 2009 and continued
throughout the study with a continuous examination of academic journals, books,
online databases, other internet sources, and conference papers.

8.'T2

Gaps in the Literature

fhe researcher identified a gap in the extant literature and a calling for more
research in this area. The literature review revealed a limited number of studies into
the regulatory changes in accounting in Ireland. Cahill's (1999) chapter in the book,
Accounting Regulation in Europe, was the first major book of interest to the
researcher in this field of study. It discussed the state of Irish accounting regulation
at the end of the twentieth century within a historical context. Because this work was
published in 1999, it was published prior to the major changes of the subsequent
decade. The researcher was keen to exam the developments of this period. After this
study had commenced, O’Regan (2009) published a paper focussing on
developments in recent decades, using a public interest framework. Even though the
work of O’Regan (2009) does overlap with the work of this study, the researcher
wishes to expand on the findings of O'Regan (2009).

Carnegie and Napier (2002) call for an exploration of comparative international
history in Irish accounting research. Walker (2006) states:

"Accounting historians have found that modern day accounting and
auditing scandals offer opportunities to reveal that previous
catastrophes indicate the enduring nature of the issues confronting
the profession and lessons from former disasters are seldom
learned" dp. 107).

The continued instances of failure in accounting and auditing, exacerbated by the
recession, provided the motivation to examine the history of accounting regulation
to discover what it reveals about recent developments. The objective of this study is
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to trace the influences whieh have determined the course of recent changes in
aeeounting and auditing regulation in Ireland, building on the work of Cahill (1999)
and O’Regan (2010).

8.3.3

Research Questions

The objectives of this research, to examine both the historical and recent
development of aeeounting and auditing regulation in Ireland, are broken down into
the following questions that will be addressed in this study:

1. How have international developments, particularly in the UK and
America, inlluenced the development of the Irish accounting and
auditing regulatory regime?

2. What other factors influenced the development of the Irish Companies’
Act 2003 and how?

The initial stage of this researeh provides a framework for regulation, fhe two
concepts underlying regulation, namely publie interest and self-interest, are
discussed in detail, fhe theory of regulation was examined, with particular emphasis
on the philosophieal perspectives behind it and their impact on regulatory forms.

To provide an answer to the first research question, the second stage of this research
involved a detailed comparative examination of the historical development of
aeeounting and auditing regulation in Britain, America, and Ireland. The objectives
of this was to identify the international influences and separate out the uniquely Irish
elements.

To provide an answer to the second research question, the third stage of this research
involved a detailed study of the process that led to the enactment of the Companies’
Aet of 2003, in an effort to identify its regulatory basis and, tying up with stage two,
identify the uniquely Irish aspects of its development.
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8.4

Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods

The difference between qualitative and quantitative research methods is one of the
most frequent and fundamental distinctions in research (Adam and Healy, 2000).
Kumar (2005) states that these research methods are distinguished by the philosophy
"that underpins their mode of inquiry" (p. 17). Stake (2010) describes this
philosophy as the difference between "aiming for explanation and... aiming for
understanding" (p. 19), and the difference between "a personal role and... an
impersonal role for the researcher" (pp. 19-20). As a result of the contrasting
philosophies, the two methods diverge in their approach to collecting data, data
processing and analysis, and their manner of communicating findings (Kumar,
2005).

B.4.1

Quantitative Research Methods

Quantitative research is the "structured approach to inquiry" (Kumar, 2005, p.l2),
an approach to investigation that "employs strategies of inquiry such as experiments
and surveys, and collects data on predetermined instruments that yield statistical
data" (Creswell, 2003, p. 18). As such, the research objectives, design, sample and
questions are all determined prior to the commencement of the study and rarely
change (Kumar, 2005). Creswell (2003) argues that in a quantitative approach "the
problem is best addressed by understanding what factors or variables influence an
outcome’’ (p. 75). Thus, quantitative research is defined by its focus on cause and
effect (Stake, 2010).

8.4.2

Qualitative Research Methods

Merriam (2009) describes qualitative research as seeking to explain the interaction of
the components of a process. In essence, qualitative research studies how things
work (Stake, 2010). In this way, it is distinct to quantitative research, which
examines the individual components in isolation {ibid.). Hakim (1987) contends that
the benefits of qualitative research include:
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''richly descriptive reports of individuals' perceptions, attitudes,
beliefs, views and feelings, the meanings and interpretations given
to events and things, as well as their behaviour ” (p. 26).
Stake (2010) argues that there is "no one way of qualitative thinking, but a grand
collection of ways" (p. 31). Creswell (2003) contends that qualitative research is
"emergent rather than tightly preconfigured" (p. 181), lacking the structure of the
quantitative approach (Kumar, 2005). Qualitative research is exploratory and unfolds
through phases, with each phase charting the next (Creswell, 2003; Crabtree and
Miller, 1999). As a result, the research question is constantly refined by the data
collected (Adam and Healy, 2000).
Qualitative data is collected in the form of words gathered using a number of
methods,

including observation, analysing documents,

interviews, and the

researcher’s experiences (Creswell, 2003). Collis and Hussey (2009) describe
qualitative data as "transient, understood only within context and is associated with
an interpretive methodology that usually results in findings with a high degree of
validity" (p. 143). Morse (1991) contends that some research problems require the
unstructured approach of qualitative methods for a number of reasons:

"a) the concept is "immature" due to a conspicuous lack of theory
and previous research; b) a notion that the available theory may he
inaccurate, inappropriate, incorrect, or biased; c) a need exists to
explore and describe the phenomena and to develop theory; or d)
the nature of the phenomenon may not be suited to quantitative
measures" (p. 120).
Qualitative methods have the disadvantage of having a more complex data collection
and analysis phase compared to quantitative methods, due to its unstructured
approach (Stake, 2010) and use of both primary and secondary sources (Collis and
Hussey, 2009). In addition, the conclusions of qualitative methods may be perceived
to be less credible than quantitative research because of its greater emphasis on
interpretation (Stake, 2010).
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8.4,3

Appropriateness of Qualitative Methods for this Study

I'he context driven, interpretive nature of this study requires the use of qualitative
methods. Hopper, Otley and Scapens (2001) contend that quantitative research is too
narrow, obsessively mathematical, and is of little or no benefit to problems involving
complex multiple factors and uncertainty. Stake (2010) states that qualitative
methods give "careful study to contexts" (p.52) and allows for an explorative
approach to the topic. However, in following Merriam’s (2009) warning, the
researcher recognizes that as a result of the interpretive nature of qualitative researeh
it is necessary to remain objective.

8.5

Research Strategy

Saunders et al. (2009) state that the research strategy "will he a general plan of how
you will go about answering the research question(s) you have set" (p. 90). There are
many types of research strategy, including survey, experiment, exploratory,
descriptive and explanatory studies, grounded theory, ethnography, case study action
research, cross sectional and longitudinal studies (Yin, 2003; Saunders et al., 2009).
The type of research strategy used depends on the research question, with case
studies, histories and experiments being particularly suited to questions regarding the
‘how’ or ‘why’ of a phenomena (Yin, 2003). The researcher selected an historical
research strategy as the main researeh strategy because the questions being posed
regarded ‘how’ and ‘why’ the Irish regulatory regime evolved.

Historical research is a systematic examination of the past to provide an account of
what has happened (McDowell, 2002; Rowlinson, 2005). Rowlinson (2005) expands
this stating that rather than being merely a list of facts and dates or even a
description of the event, historical research provides an understanding of past events
and their relationship with the present. It provides:

“r/ flowing, dynamic account of past events that involves an
interpretation of the events in an attempt to recapture the nuances,
personalities, and ideas that influenced these events" (Rowlinson,
2005, p. 296).
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McDowell (2002) contends that "history enables us to view ourselves and society in
a proper perspective" (p. 3). Thus, historical research is particularly useful in putting
current events and problems into context (Marriott, 2010), and may offer an insight
into their solution (Previts and Merino, 1998). Marriott (2010) contends that
historical research is particularly useful in the investigation of slow moving events
such as policy development, because the historical researcher can identify all the
threads of such events which would not be possible in real time. It provides a
renewed understanding of historical data (McDowell, 2002; Rowlinson, 2005;
Blaxter, Hughes, and Tight, 2006). Blaxter et al. (2006) state that a secondary
analysis of historical events can give "fresh insights" (p.l70) and that this potential
for a "secondary analysis of qualitative data is increasingly being realized" (p. 170).

The main limitation of historical research is that a research strategy dependent on
historical data is limited by the amount of data that is available, since the researcher
can’t create more (Anderson, 1998). In addition, historical research is heavily
influenced by the perspective of the researcher, who:
"like the novelist, can create a storyline and text which is only
incidentally shaped by the available data " {ibid., p. 99).
Previts and Merino (1998) contend that accounting research that uses an historical
perspective cannot be objective. Stanford (1986) summarises the problem thus:

"the dilemma of historians is that they want to see the past 'as it
actually was' but can see it only through the medium of their own
and other people’s ideas" (p. 27)
Thus, there is a degree of subjectivity in historical research that is greater than most
research strategies, and must be factored into the results (Marriott, 2010). At the very
least, objectivity has a different meaning for historical research than other forms,
with the historical researcher attempting to separate his/her philosophical, social and
political views from the research (Parker, Cooke, and Nobes, 1997). Nevertheless,
historical accounts will be based on some degree of subjectivity (Marriott, 2010).
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As Marriott (2010) states:

"The most objective history will inevitably remain a selection
undertaken by the researcher and interpreted with the particular
belief of that researcher"
16).
This study uses an historical strategy to investigate the factors that affected the
development of the Irish legislation that created the Irish Auditing and Accounting
Supervisory Authority (lAASA), namely the Companies Act 2003. It builds a
comparative framework to examine the development of accounting and auditing
regulation in Britain, America, and Ireland. Doing this will aid the researcher in
identifying influences on the Irish regime and, potentially, signs of uniquely Irish
solutions. To combat the limitation of subjectivity the researcher has also used an indepth interview and analysis of documentation to triangulate the findings of this
research.

8.!>.1

Historical Comparative Methodology

There are two schools of thought regarding the effective comparability of policy
making across countries. The policy sector hypothesis predicts that the processes
and outcomes of public policy are a result of unique aspects of a policy sphere
(Vogel, 1986). On the other hand, the national differences hypothesis predicts that
these processes and outcomes are a result of unique political and social
characteristics within the country wherein they are developed {ibid.). Therefore the
effectiveness of a comparison based analysis of regulatory response across specific
countries is dependent on the assumptions of these competing premises.

This study used the national differences hypothesis, giving a detailed account of the
political and social characteristics of each of the countries used in the study. These
characteristics were used to compare and ultimately understand the divergent
developments in each country. The countries selected for comparison were chosen
for their significant influence on Ireland and broadly similar political and social
institutions, particularly in the case of Britain. Similar regulatory eras were
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identified in each nation, and the influence of external pressures, and each nations
reaction to these pressures, was examined.

In addition to the general problems of objectivity in historical research, this
dissertation relies heavily on secondary sources. Thus, the subjectivity of the
researcher is added to by the subjectivity of other academics, whose opinions on
developments in accounting history are constrained by their own perspective. To
minimise the problems posed by this, the researcher used as wide a variety of
sources as was feasible and obtained additional information from an in-depth
interview.

8.5.2

Research Interview

The interview is one of the most effective methods for qualitative research
(McCracken, 1988; Kvale, 1996; Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005). Blaxter, Hughes, and
fight (2006) state in a straightforward way that this method: "involves questioning
or discussing issues with people" (p. 172). Kvale's (1996) research into qualitative
research discovered that interviews have at times been dismissed as lacking rigor
and objectivity, and thus not being a scientific method. However, Fultz and Herzog
(1996) assert that the interview provides a researcher with an opportunity to explore
events and experiences that would be problematic and restrictive in more structured
circumstances.

Ghauri and Gronhaug (2005) believe that interviews require genuine interaction
between the interviewee and the research. The interview allows the researcher to
benefit from the experience and unique perspective on the world of the interviewee
(McCracken, 1988). This is underlined by King (2004), stating that:

"The goal of qualitative research interviews is therefore to see the
research topic from the perspective of the interviewee and to
understand how and why they have come to have this particular
perspective" (p. 11).
This dynamic requires more of the interviewer than most other methods because
they are the vital instrument in unearthing the required information from the
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interviewee (Kvale, 1996). The researeher’s ability to relate with the interviewee
during this process is vital to the success of interviews, particular those that require
detailed probing of views (Chirban, 1996). In addition, Munhall (2001) concludes
that exploration of difficult and somewhat controversial issues require the
interviewer to provide an environment that makes the interviewee comfortable to
discuss openly. In addition, the researcher must gain the trust and confidence of the
interviewee (Neale, Allen, and Coombes, 2005). The beginning of the interview is
vital to its success, particular in portraying a positive view of both the interviewer
and the research in general (McCracken, 1988; Cihauri and Gronhaug, 2005).
Interviewing is a craft, and requires knowledge, sensitivity, and empathy to be
successful (Kvale, 1996).

The semi-structured interview is one in which the general themes and questions are
prepared by the researcher, but scope is given for altering the order and wording of
questions, and allowing for new questions to emerge from answers (Saunders et a!.,
2009). This is in contrast to a fully structured interview, in which the questions and
order are set and are generally not deviated from, and the unstructured interview, in
which complete freedom is given to questioning with no predetermined structure
(Kumar, 2005; Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005; Saunders el al., 2009).

The advantages of interviews include their usefulness in studying complex
situations, they allow for the collection of detailed information, they provide instant
feedback, questions can be explained or reformulated if required, and new questions
can be formed from answers (Kumar, 2005). The disadvantages of interviews
include their time and expense, their dependency on the interviewer's ability to be
effective, and the potential that the interviewer will bring his/her bias to the process
{ibid.). In spite of these disadvantages, the potential of the interview process to
reveal rich, detailed data makes it one of the most powerful methods available to
researchers (Saunders et al., 2009).

Kvale (1996) contends that interviews that have an emergent quality, allowing for
new issues and questions to emerge from answers, can have interesting outcomes,
and require flexibility in the interviewers questioning. However, interviews that
136

have little if any structure can be self defeating, leading to the interviewee being
confused as to what issues the researcher is looking to understand, and creating an
unclear picture of the issues being discussed (Jones, 1985).

The use of a tape recorder allows the interviewer to focus on the topic and the
answers (Kvale, 1996). Berg (2001) agrees, arguing that note taking creates an
unnecessary distraction. The use of a tape recorder can allow for a freer and more
interpersonal discussion. However, the researcher must remain engaged with the
process, indicating their continued interest by using body language (Ghauri and
Gronhaug, 2005).

McCracken (1988) contends that the best approach to an interview is to balance the
degree of formality and informality, creating an atmosphere that is professional
enough so that the interviewee remains assured during difficult questioning, and yet
relaxed enough so that the interviewer and interviewee can relate to one another.
The scales of balance arc dependent on the research demands (ibid.).
This research study employed a semi-structured interview with Minister Simon
Coveney to complement the historical research approach. In this way, a deeper
understanding of the events and relevant concepts was gained. It was decided to use
a single, though in-depth interview in this study due to limitations of time and access
to suitable interviewees. It was important to find an individual in the Irish legislature
who would be willing to offer frank views on difficult topics. In addition, it was
preferable that the interviewee also have the experience of working within another
legislature, so as to be capable of offering views on the unique aspects of Irish
legislation development. Minister Coveney's experience in the European Parliament
as well as his current experience in the Irish government meant that he had the
experience to offer broad, vivid insights into the Irish situation within its greater
context. The interview illuminated the unique political process in Ireland, and the
influence of interest groups behind the creation of legislation.

d'he use of a semi-structured form for the interview was for two reasons. Firstly, the
broad nature of the research required a degree of scope for the discussion. Some of
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the answers to questions created more questions that built a greater understanding of
the issue being discussed. Secondly, the added flexibility of the approach allowed
the interviewee to focus more on aspects of the questions that were closer to his
expertise. As such, the interview questions used by the researcher were shaped by
the need to be aware of the following considerations:

a) The information required to answer the research aim
b) The suitability of questions to attain this information
c) The degree to which the interviewee was capable of giving an opinion with
knowledge and expertise
d) fhe willingness of the interviewee to offer frank and honest opinions in
answering
e) The usefulness and weight given to such opinions
0 The possibility of bias

The questions were crafted to be open-ended and allow the interviewee maximum
scope in answering. The questions were intended to lead to answers that would also
create new ad hoe questions, allowing the interviewer to probe further. The
interviews were taped and later fully transcribed, allowing for inclusion of quote in
the findings

8.S.3

Documentary Evidence

Blaxter et al. (2006) state that virtually all research projects involve ‘Vo a greater or
lesser extent, the use and analysis of documents" (p. 167). Such documents can
include:

"notices, correspondence, minutes of meetings, reports to
shareholders, diaries, transcripts of speeches and administrative
and public records" (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 87).
The advantages of studying documents include their solid nature and ability to be
examined by multiple researchers from different perspective (Yin, 2003).
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Documents used in this research project include:
•

I'ranscripts of Dail and Seanad debates and committee stage deliberations

•

Submissions to the Tanaiste by representative professional accountancy
bodies

•

Press Releases by the professional accountancy firms

•

Commentary by other relevant parties in academic journals and business
newspapers

8.6

Triaiigulation

Abrahamson (1983) argues that all research methods and strategies are flawed in
some way. As such, it is recommended to use multiple measures in order to balance
the strengths and weaknesses of each approach (Denzin, 1970; Abrahamson, 1983;
Merriam, 1998). This approach, referred to as triangulation, uses a combination of
'''dissimilar methods such as interviews, observations, and physical evidence to study
the same unit" (Merriam, 1998, p. 69). Triangulation helps reduce the impact of bias
in research (Denzin, 1970; Merriam, 1998), and thus increases the credibility of the
results (Yin, 2003).! he use of multiple measures helps the researcher to achieve
confirmation or convergent validity (Zikmund, 1997), ensuring that "the data are
telling you what you think they are telling you" (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 99).

The methods used in this study to achieve triangulation are historical comparative
methodology, in-depth semi-structured interview, and documentation review. These
methods curtail the limitation of subjectivity and add to the richness of the
conclusions of this study.

8.7

Conclusion

This chapter set out the objective of this research and the research methods to be
used in realising this objective. The main data was gathered from an examination and
comparison of the historical development of accounting and auditing regulation in
Britain, America and Ireland. The aim of analysing this data was to produce a
comparative framework that was further validated from the use of a semi-struetured
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interview and examination of documentation. The semi-structured interview
provided an in-depth analysis of the Irish situation. The examination of a variety of
documentary evidence to identify the basis for the regulation of accounting in an
Irish context, focussing on the legislation that created the lAASA, confirmed the data
found. This strategy, together with a review of academic literature, fulfilled the
criteria of sourcing data from a wide array of sources.
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CHAPTER 9

Comparative Analysis of Regulatory
Developments in Britain, Ireland, and America

9.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to illuminate the influences on, and ultimately identify the
unique aspects of, the evolution of Irish accounting regulation. The chapter is
divided into three sections, using the broad regulatory eras identified in the literature
review; namely the Victorian Reform/Progressive era, the aftermath of the Great
Depression, and the era of the regulatory State from the 1970’s to the turn of the
century. Each section examines the parallels and differences in the development of
accounting regulation in Britain, America, and Ireland, with particular emphasis on
the political philosophy, the influence of fraud, and the relationship between the
State and the accounting profession.

9.2 Victorian Reforni/Progressive Era; 1844-1922
As Ireland was a political entity of Britain during the years 1844 to 1922, in this
section British developments will be discussed as also being representative of Irish
developments. It is during this period that the disparity in the development of
accounting regulation in Britain and America is arguably most striking. Legislation
introducing limited accounting regulation surfaced in Britain in 1844 while it was
nearly a century later that comparable America legislation was passed. The reasons
for this divergence include unique aspects in each country’s dominant political
philosophy; reaction to incidences of fraud; and the relationship between the State
and the accounting profession.

9.2,1 Political Philo.sophy in Regulatory Developments during this Era
As revealed in the literature review, the answer to the question "to regulate or not to
regulate" depends on the balance of two competing philosophies: public interest and
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economic individualism. It is clear from the historical review of the development of
accounting regulation contained in chapters 5 and 6, that a broad political philosophy
of economic individualism and, in particular, laissez-faire was dominant during this
period in both Britain and America. However, the significant variance in time
between the introduction of limited accounting regulation in Britain and its
introduction in America is highly suggestive of profound divergences in the broader
contexts of both nations. In relation to economic individualism, it is clear that this
difference is one of degree. In America, the laissez-faire approach of non
interference by the government in private affairs maintained significant public
support throughout this era. The uniquely American form of individualism, whereby
government action was looked at with suspicion by individuals across the political
spectrum, gave pause to any considerations of regulating the professions. In contrast,
support for laissez-luire in Britain stemmed more from the beliefs of those in power,
and the aversion of the private sector to government oversight, rather than any broad
public support.

‘).2.2 IiiniHMUv of \( counting rraud/Sccnulals

Support for the laissez-faire approach to the accounting profession in Britain was
tested by the high number of joint stock company frauds in the early to mid-19th
century. It became a major concern for the government at the time, and the
subsequent investigation led to the first regulation of accountancy in 1844. Further
accounting failures throughout this era were the drivers of further regulation of the
profession, though constrained by the State's discomfort in involving itself in the
business of the profession.

Similarly, in America, accounting failure, and the associated scandal, was the driver
of government intervention in the profession. However, in contrast to Britain, it took
a national crisis in America - The Banking Panic of 1907 - for the government to
intervene. Even then, it took a decade for even the modest accounting regulation,
which amounted to little more than recommended guidelines, to be introduced.
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9.2.3 Relationship between the State and the Accounting FVofession

The relationship between government and the accounting profession in both Britain
and America during this era was adversarial, with the profession perceiving
government intrusion as a threat to its position as a gatekeeper for accountants.
However, the relationship with the profession in American was significantly
different to that of the British during this time. In Britain, a limited government
intervention in accounting was maintained during the second half of the 19th
century. Although the profession fought attempts to increase the scope of this
regulation, the presence of at least some government involvement in accountancy
seemed to be accepted. Throughout most of this period, the British legislature gained
significant experience negotiating and drafting accounting regulation. Likewise, by
the end of this period, the British accounting profession had several decades of
experience in combating legislative attempts to increase regulation.

In contrast, the American legislature gained none of this experience in regulating
accountancy, and neither did the American accounting profession, which operated
under essentially complete self-regulation until the early 20th century. In America,
which was a relatively young democracy, the government had practically no
involvement with the profession during this period, leaving accountants to manage
their own affairs.

9.2.4 The Divergent Regulatory Landscape and Its Impact on Ireland

As a consequence of the differences in the political context, intluence of fraud, and
the State/profession dynamic in Britain and America during this era, the regulatory
approach to accountancy in both nations was fundamentally dissimilar by the end of
the period. Developments in the era set Britain and America down differing
regulatory routes, with the former maintaining its unique mixture of government
directed self-regulation, and the latter having to react to the consequences in the
following era of its previous hesitancy to regulate.
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This divergent development and its legacy have had a significant impact on Irish
developments in regulating accountancy in the decades after this period. Firstly, the
fact that British developments in accounting regulation were adopted in Ireland
while it was a province of the former gave rise to a shared regulatory identity,
however little the Irish contribution to that development was. Secondly, Ireland
maintained a close economic and political relationship with Britain after it became a
separate political entity towards the end of this era. Coveney (2012) suggests that
this was due to geographical and cultural influences, stating that:
"... at the time, you know, Irish people hadn't travelled to the extent
that they... travel now, and so you tend to adopt best practice from,
you know, the most... influential country around you, which was
our next door neighbour"

This relationship, and the continuance of the affiliation between the accounting
professions in both nations after political separation, ensured that future
developments in Britain would continue to influence the Irish situation.

9.3 The Decades after the Great Depression; 1929-1960's
This section comparatively examines the influences on the development of
accounting regulation in the three selected countries during the period starting with
the Great Depression in 1929, and follows its legacy into the I960's. This section
discusses several factors that have driven and shaped change in accounting
regulation during this era, such as changes in the perceived role of government; the
growing influence of accounting fraud in affecting regulatory change; and the
evolving relationship between the State and the profession in each of the countries
selected.

9.3.1 F^ilitical Philosophy and the Changing Role of the State

The political philosophy of economic individualism, with its belief in free markets,
was challenged by the events of the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent
economic recession. Particularly in America, popular opinion regarding the role of
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government in the market changed profoundly. I'he creation of federal agencies,
such as the SF:C, signalled a repositioning of the government's role in the market
from being passive to an active, and somewhat proactive, component in the system.

In Britain, changes in the role of the State in the affairs of the profession were more
subtle than in America. The State had played a part in regulating accounting
throughout the previous era. However, this had continued to be a source of
discomfiture to legislators during this time. A general belief in the power of laissezfaire held by many of the people in power remained at odds with the practical and
political necessities of preventing future corporate scandals. Therefore, the
developments in accounting regulation in Britain during this era were, like the
previous era, in response to significant political pressure arising from corporate
failure rather than a genuine change in philosophy.

Apart from the British accounting regulation adopted by Ireland when it gained
independence, most of this era is marked by a lack of involvement by the State in
regulating the profession. It is difficult to ascertain the extent that philosophical
beliefs regarding the role of the State in private affairs affected this stagnation. The
issue is further clouded by the nature of Ireland's transition from being a province of
Britain to a sovereign nation. For instance, Ireland didn't just copy the legislation of
Britain. As Coveney (2012) states, Ireland adopted its "legal structure and a way of
legislating, and indeed the structure of a parliament" from Britain. Coveney (2012)
argues that this was not unusual, stating that:

It’s not surprising that the British approach towards law
making and regulation was adopted in Ireland because it was the
only thing we knew
In addition, the accountancy profession in Ireland maintained strong links with the
profession in Britain. As such, a comparable regime operated in both countries in the
decades immediately after independence. However, Coveney (2012) states that
"Ireland has been quite a conservative country for a very long time. It still is,
actually". As a consequence, Coveney (2012) contends that this has resulted in
Ireland "being fairly slow to move on areas and issues that other countries would
have moved on before us". For instance, the first major Irish legislation in relation to
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accounting practice was introduced towards the end of this era, and was heavily
influenced by legislation enacted in Britain two decades earlier. The combination of
slow to change, British influenced, and conservative character of Irish politics at the
time played a large part in shaping the State of the Irish regulatory regime, and
differentiating it from both British and American regimes.

9.3.2 Continued Influence of Accounting Fi aud/Scandals in Developments

Much like the previous era, instances of corporate fraud caused by accounting failure
were the primary drivers of change in the regulatory regime in each of the countries.
There is a clear pattern in all three countries of reactive regulation, whereby
regulatory initiatives by the Slate are preceded by significant accounting failures.
This causal relationship is most notably revealed by the absence of regulatory
developments in Britain and America during the booming economic conditions of
the 1950's and 60's which, as identified in the literature review, likely lessened the
impact of corporate fraud and possibly concealed much of it.
In contrast, during these two decades accounting failures were evident in Ireland to
such a degree that it was the driver of legislative change in 1963. However, despite
considerable evidence of weaknesses in Irish accounting legislation over the
previous decades, the 1963 act was the first major change to the accounting
regulatory regime in Ireland since independence. As such, it must be seen as an
attempt to catch up with developments in Britain and America rather than a proactive
response to fraud in this era that would be essentially divergent with British and
American developments.

9.3.3 Relationship between the State and the Accounting Profession

The creation of the SEC altered the relationship between the American government
and the accounting profession. It created a then unique arrangement whereby the
profession would take on an official gatekeeper role in setting and maintaining
standards in accountancy, and the State would provide an enforcement mechanism.
In contrast, during this era the British government continued its approach of
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legislating for changes in accounting practice. This overlap between the
responsibility of the profession and the State was significantly more adversarial than
the American experience. Both the 1929 and 1948 acts enforced significant change
in the preparation of accounts, and were opposed by the profession.

Prior to 1922, Ireland benefitted from accounting legislation introduced by the
British Parliament. This legislation was adopted by the newly established Irish Free
State. However, the Irish Parliament had gained none of the experiences of the
British legislators in creating and amending regulations for the accounting
profession. For much of this period, the accounting legislation adopted from the
British in 1922 remained the statutory foundation of the Irish accounting regime.
This remained the case for two decades after British recognition of its flaws, and
subsequent actions to take legislation that was formed in the early years of the 20th
century and upgrade it to the needs of post World War 2 Britain. Furthermore, the
Irish legislation introduced in 1963 was little more than that introduced by Britain in
1948. Thus, the Irish State allowed the profession greater autonomy than the British
for most of this era.

9.4 Regulatory State Hra; 1970’s-2000's
The following section comparatively examines the infuences on the development of
accounting regulation in the three selected countries during the last era studied; the
age of the regulatory State between the 1970's and the early 2000's.

9.4.1 Political Philosophy and the Regulatory State

The dominant political philosophy of the regulatory State era in the western world
has its origins in developments in America during the previous era. The delegated
self-regulatory form that was characteristic of the New Deal institutions has become
the standard model of regulation in the west in recent years. The philosophical
foundation of this form is rooted in neo liberal ideas about the relationship of the
market and the State. However, unlike the laissez-faire beliefs of earlier era's that
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discouraged all government intervention, the regulatory State provides the freedom
to the profession to regulate itself, whilst the State essentially regulates the regulator.

This philosophy, then, is one of eompromise and balance between the public interest
and

economic

individualism

paradigms.

Coveney

(2012)

summarises the

philosophical dilemma underpinning the philosophical position of the regulatory
State era, thus:

"There's a balance always to be struck betu’een having a sufficient
amount of independent regulation to ensure that the public interest
is looked after while at the same time not over regulating to make
an economy uncompetitive
This dilemma in the regulatory State era is particularly illuminated in the aftermath
of instances of market failure. In these circumstances, Coveney (2012) expresses the
philosophical perspective, thus:
"... [Government] needs to make the political judgement call... to
get the balance right between... State intervention and, you know,
allowing the market solve the issue"

Mence, the overriding philosophy is balancing the market mechanism and the public
interest expectations of the citizens.

0.4.2 Relationship between the State and the Accounting Profession

As the archetypal regulatory State, America maintained a delegated self-regulatory
form throughout this period. However, conflict regarding the effectiveness of the
profession to regulate in the public interest was common. Yet, the reluctance of the
SEC to intervene, except in cases where public support was with them to do so, is
again characteristic of this relationship.

In Britain, the profession responded to weaknesses in accounting practice,
particularly those highlighted by inereasingly public instances of fraud, by
anticipating government intervention and implementing regulatory changes. This
semi-proactive approach, taking place after scandals but before any government
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response, allowed the profession in Britain to have significant self-regulatory control
until the late 1980’s. This loose oversight of accountancy by the State changed after
the Bearing report was published in 1988, the aftermath of which heralded a period
of greater government oversight and involvement in identifying and correcting
weaknesses illuminated by instances of fraud.

In Ireland, the relationship between the State and the profession during the
regulatory era was even more uneven than in Britain. The close association between
the Irish and British profession meant that developments in Britain remained a strong
influence on Irish accounting. The addition of an extra external influence during this
period, European Directives, created a situation whereby the prominent actors and
influences for change came from outside Ireland, with the State playing a relatively
minor role up until the 1990’s. A combination of the Irish profession’s intellectual
backing from the British profession, and what Coveney (2012) agrees is the
potentially greater lobbying power of special interests in Ireland as a result of the
relatively small size of the country, gave the Irish profession a more pronounced
degree of influence in the State/profession relationship than that of the British
situation.

9.4.3 Growing Influence of Accounting Fraud/Scandals

Greater media emphasis and public attention on accounting fraud in this era
increases the influence of these failures to drive change in the regulatory regime. The
unique responses, or lack thereof, by each of the three nations to these crises provide
insight into the divergent/convergent regulatory bases of the countries. For instance,
in America the SEC pressured the profession to take action to improve standard
setting only after a significant level of failure in the regulatory regime was revealed.
Similarly, the British response to growing popular condemnation of accounting
frauds was to pressure the profession, undoubtedly with the implicit threat of losing
their self-regulatory arrangements.

From an Irish perspective, Coveney (2012) states that:
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"In company law, when you gel a big scandal... you need to respond
to it to make sure you minimise the chances of it happening again"
Yet, in Ireland, the response to accounting fraud was even more timid than in Britain
up to the early 1990's, with the profession being subject to little State level oversight.
However, the Irish response to accounting fraud changed in the 1990's, with the
Department for Enterprise, Trade, and Employment (DETE) operating a degree of
oversight for the profession. The significant instances of fraud and accounting failure
unearthed in the late 1990's and early 2000's are the driver for structural changes in
the regulatory regime in Ireland. This signals a growing confidence and
independence in Irish regulatory development. Coveney (2012) agrees with this
assessment, stating that:

"We [Ireland] have matured an awful lot as a country over the last
forty years or so, and we're well capable of making our own
decisions now, and if that means moving away from a British way of
doing things, I think people have no problem with that"
d'he fact that the development of a comprehensive regulatory regime implemented in
the Companies Act 2004 was initiated prior to the similar developments in Britain
and America are highly suggestive of this greater regulatory independence.

9.4.4 External Influences

In contrast to the two previous eras, the influences of external forces are evident in
driving regulatory change in accounting. Firstly, attempts to standardise accounting
practices internationally added a new dimension to national regulations. Issues of
international competitiveness play an increasing role during this period.

Secondly, Ireland and Britain are influenced in this era by their membership of the
now European Union (EU). Coveney (2012) contends that this gave Ireland the
opportunity to pull away from its reliance on Britain, stating that:

"I think that as time has moved on, we [Ireland] have looked to
differentiate ourselves from the UK, particularly when we joined
the European Union".
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From an economic perspective, Ireland’s traditional geographic dependence on
Britain has decreased during this era, largely as a result of joining the EU. In this
regard, Coveney (2012) states that:

"... / think actually that was probably the biggest step towards
real economic independence for Ireland, and has proven to be
that"
The comparative impact of the EU influence on both countries is highly suggestive
of this independence. Ireland and Britain are subject to EU Directives, the fourth and
seventh of which aimed to harmonise the diverse level of accounting practice in
Europe. The divergent responses between Ireland and Britain to the enactment of
these two EU Directives marked the first significant signs of Ireland moving away
from the influence of Britain in legislating regulation. The seventh Directive in
particular was enacted by Britain three years before Ireland was effectively
compelled by the European Commission to comply. Ireland "wouldn’t be unique’’
(Coveney, 2012) in its resistance against and being legally pressured by the
Commission to implement Directives. However, these two instances demonstrate a
break in the traditional Irish legislative situation of closely following the British lead,
and hint at a more independent minded legislature developing in Ireland during this
era.

9.5 Conclusion
fhe comparative analysis of accounting regulatory developments in Britain, Ireland,
and America, through the three regulatory eras identified in earlier chapters, has
revealed a gradual evolution, with a slow and hesitant movement towards greater
State involvement. This progression has been significantly affected by the unique
aspects of each country, and in turn by their responses to unforeseen internal and
external events. For instance, the distinctive political considerations of the role of the
State in Britain and America affected the developments in both countries, leading to
a more gradual evolution in the former compared to the later and more widely
punctuated change in America.
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In addition, the particular exigencies of significant events, such as the Great
Depression, played a large role in shaping and advancing the role of the State in the
accountancy profession. Greater State involvement in all three countries was driven
to a large degree by evidence of fraud and scandals associated with accounting
failure. Exceptions to this include issues of political integration, such as the efforts of
the EU to harmonise accounting legislation.

The Irish situation has been influenced much more by external circumstances than
Britain and America. In the latter two, the political beliefs of the citizenry and
legislature were historically the primary constraints of the advancement of public
regulation. In contrast, Ireland’s traditional reliance on Britain, including its adoption
of British law and legislative structures during separation in 1922, weakened the
State’s ability and willingness to interfere in the operations of the Irish profession
which had considerable intellectual support from the British profession. As a result,
Irish developments were much more dawdling and reactive that those in Britain and
America. However, signs of greater independence were evident in response to EU
Directives and, with the State taking a more central role in regulating the profession
during the 1990’s and early years of the following decade, it must be concluded that
there has been a significant shift in the Irish circumstances affecting regulation.
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CHAPTER 10 Development of the Irish Companies
(Auditing and Accounting) Bill 2003

10.1 Introduction

This chapter will analyse the development of the Irish Companies (Auditing and
Accounting) Bill, 2003, which provided the legislative authority for the Irish
Auditing and Accounting Supervisory Authority (lAASA), through the two houses
of the Oireachtas: the Seanad and the Dail. The analysis will focus primarily on
influences that affected this development of Irish accounting regulation in light of
the findings of the comparative analysis in chapter nine. In addition, this chapter will
provide commentary on the influence of relevant unique aspects of Irish politics.

10.2 Influences on the Irish Companies (Auditing and Accounting)
Bill ZOOS

The debated surrounding the development of the Irish Companies (Auditing and
Aceounting) Bill in the house of the Oireachtas were influenced by the public
interest symbol, economic influences, political influences, accounting lobby
influences, the influence of scandal and public opinion, and the influence of
international developments (see figure 10.1). fhis section of the study will analyse
each of these issues and examines the extent of their influence on affecting the
change brought forward by the Companies Act, 2003.

10.2.1 Public Interest Symbol Influence

I'he literature review identified the malleable and symbolic nature of public interest,
in that its meaning can be shaped by whoever captures it. Opposing groups may
claim to act in the public interest, yet may have different interpretations of that
interest.
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Figure 10.1

Influences on the Irish Companies (Auditing and Accounting) Bill

2003

Irish
Companies
(Auditing and
Accounting)

Politicians are "elected to look after the public interest" (interview with Minister
Coveney). The basis for the acceptance or rejection of arguments using the public
interest during the Oireachtas debates on the Bill seems to have been based on the
Senators and Ministers collective opinion of what is in the public’s interest, rather
than the public’s opinion of its own interests. This was stated frankly by Senator
Maurice Hayes, who warned of the "enormous difference ” between the public
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interest and public opinion, stating that "quite a lot of what the public is interested in
is not in the public interest" (Seanad. Committee Stage). However, Senator O’Toole
attempted to reconcile these two interests, stating that:

"The tribunals brought up matters ofpublic interest which were also
interesting to the public" (Seanad. Committee Stage).

Throughout the process that led to the creation of the Companies Bill 2003, the
concept of public interest was invoked by both the state actors and the accounting
profession. However, its influence in the progression of the Bill through the houses
of the Oireachtas, though complicated by its ambiguity, was demonstrably captured
by the state actors in defiance of the accounting lobby’s efforts. When the
Companies Bill 2003 was introduced in the Seanad, the state had essentially captured
the public interest symbol, as evidenced by its use in the Bill to further the state’s
position. The opposing view attempted to recapture the symbol by questioning its
meaning and use.

Several speakers in the Seanad questioned the ambiguity of the public interest
symbol. Prominent among the critics of the indefinable nature of public interest was
Minister Michael McDowell, who relayed the concerns of the accountancy bodies
regarding the "discretion ” of the lAASA to "determine that it should carry out an
investigation in the public interest. " (Seanad, Committee Stage). Minister McDowell
argued that the term should be explicated in the legislation, stating that the public
interest is not defined and "it is left up to the authority to decide if there is a public
interest or not" (Seanad. Committee Stage). Likewise, Senator Hayes argued for
clarity regarding the use of the term public interest in the Bill, stating that:

"When it is necessary for the authority to act in the public interest, it
should state the reasons for doing so" (Seanad. Committee Stage).
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Senator O’Toole admitted that in the formation of the Bill it was not possible to
frame an operative definition of publie interest. He stated that:

“/ could not come up with an objective test for it. The only example I
could give was to say that if a matter which was not anticipated and
should be investigated w’as raised in the Ddil or Seanad - for
example, that an elephant walked into the chief executive officer's
office and disturbed the auditor - and if that matter was not covered
by the legislation in any objective way, there should be some
subjective way of dealing with it” (Seanad. Committee Stage).

The reasons given by Senator O’Toole for not being able to define public interest
was because “/7 changes over time ” and its subjectivity. He lamented that he didn’t
know if they could "'come up with words to describe the public interest” which
means it may be possible for "'somebody to define 'public interest ’ as something
which is not in the public interest ” (Seanad. Committee Stage). He admitted that this
vagueness left a gap in the legislation.

Opponents were unable to counter the interpretation of public interest identified by
the RGA Report and reflected in the Bill in relation to matters that affected the
accounting profession, like the disciplinary authority of the lAASA. In contrast, the
public interest was summoned successfully in relation to the Bill’s impact on small
businesses.

In the early stages of the Seanad debate, Senator Coghlan summoned the public
interest in arguing that the Bill as it stood could unfairly impact small businesses,
and contended that:

"The core principle of all regulation is that it should be
proportionate to a clearly stated public interest ” (Seanad. Second
Stage).
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Minister Crawford later made an identical argument using the public interest at the
Dail stage (Dail. Second Stage). This argument was eventually accepted despite the
ambiguity of its public interest basis, and the Bill was amended to rectify this
supposed breach of the principle. I'he most interesting of all statements at the Seanad
stage was that of Senator O’Toole, when he argued that public interest doesn’t need
to be defined in the Bill, stating that:

“All members know what we mean by “public interest”, though it is
like the old saying, “1 couldn't describe it to you but I will know it
when I see it. ” That is the issue which has been raised and 1 cannot
answer it. We will have to rely on the good sense of the people
sitting around the table, although I am not sure that is possible ”
(Seanad. Committee Stage).

This further suggests the symbolic nature of public interest, and its use in
legitimising the regulatory direction chosen by the state.

10.2.2 Kcononiic' Context Innuenct*

The Companies Bill 2003 was introduced during a period of significant economic
growth in the Irish economy. This growth played an important role in driving the
Bill. Minister Coveney stated that the government thinking behind this development
was as follows:

"... the Irish economy is growing and expanding... we're at the start of
an exciting period, and we need to make sure that we modernise our
company law....it isn't surprising that a government would look at
assessing how to manage that growth and expansion'' (interview with
Minister Coveney, 2012).
Arguments in the early stages of the Seanad debate on the Bill certainly seem to
support this. Several speakers asserted that implementing a vigorous regulatory
structure was an essential means to maintain and encourage further growth in the
Irish economy. Senator Paul Coghlan contended that the lAASA would provide this
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structure, stating that the Bill will eonfer upon the lAASA the legislative authority
to:

‘'rigorously examine how the accountancy bodies carry out this self
regulation, can ensure that the right procedures and processes are in
place, and can make sure that fair, independent decisions are made ”
(Seanad. Seeond Stage).
However, Senator Coghlan argued that a balanee must be stuck between “proper
and effective regulation and unnecessary burdens on business” (Seanad. Second
Stage). There is some degree of subjectivity in determining this balance. As a result,
economie arguments were also marshaled against the Bill. For instance. Senator
Quinn based his argument on international competitiveness, warning that they were
proposing a regulatory regime that would be ''more stringent than any that exists
elsew’here” (Seanad. Second Stage). In particular. Senator Quinn argued that
comparable developments, such as the Sarbanes/Oxley Act in America, were not as
far reaching, and cautioned that this should give pause to Irish legislators as it may
affect future Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). I’he Senator argued that when
deciding whether to invest in Ireland of some other country, multinational companies
would see that the "Irish regime is far tougher than that applied by the Oxley Act in
the United States’’ (Seanad. Seeond Stage). I’hese comments reflect a view that the
consequences of regulating the aeeounting and auditing professions have wider
economic implications. Senator Coghlan expressed this eoncern regarding the Bill,
thus:

“Although it is directed at the accountancy profession, in reality, the
cost being imposed by it will be felt by every business in Ireland”
(Seanad. Second Stage).
The then assistant director of IBEC, Marie Daly (2003), expressed this concern,
stating that:

"The problem with this Bill is not the core idea; it's the add-ons. The
enthusiasm for reform refected in the Bill has grown gilt-edged
wings”.

158

The failure to carry out a regulatory impact assessment prior to introducing the Bill,
an issue which was raised several times by Senator Quinn (Seanad. Committee
Stage), is suggestive of a narrower focus by the state. This was hinted at by the then
Minster for State of DETE, Michael Ahern, who argued the importance of
confidence in accounting. He stated that:

"Confidence is vitally important to the continuing growth of the
economy. If people did not have confidence in accounts and
information being presented, it would have a more adverse effect on
the growth of the economy than regulation" (Seanad. Committee
Stage).
Minister Ahern again reiterated this motive while introducing the Bill to the Dail,
stating that the regulatory changes are imperative if they were to "maintain
international confidence in Ireland as a place in which to invest and do business"
(Dail. Second Stage).
It is reasonable to conclude, in light of these stated motives, that the overarching
economic basis for the Bill was to reaffirm trust in the Irish economy to maintain
foreign direct investment.

10.2.3 Political Context Influence
1 he development and progression into law of the Companies Bill 2003 took place
during a period where the Irish State had greater political capital to instigate change,
fhis was a result of two factors: the economic situation and the weakened public
confidence in the accounting profession due to the revelations of accounting fraud
over the previous decade. Within the context of the first factor, Coveney (2012)
states that:

"... there was a focus on company law and accounting law at that
time... there was also the resources to do it, from a government
point of view"
These resources are evident in the content of the Bill, which contained all of the
important recommendations of the Review Group, despite the lobbying of the
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professional bodies. In addition to the increased political capital of the State, the
accounting profession was in a period of weakened influence due to the latter factor.
Coveney (2012) explains this, stating that rather than being stable, "credibility and
power and lobbying capacity shifts’’'. He states that it is the combination of “a
politically strong government and a weakened accounting lobby that affected the
development of the regulation. As a political pressure group Coveney (2012) states
that the accounting profession is "an important lobby"''ouX '"not as public or as high
profile as some of the other lobby groups".

The profession could not maintain its political influence while lobbying the state in
the public spotlight, and this political context provided the state with a strong
position to legislate.

10.2.4 Relationship between the State and the Profession's Influence

Chapters seven and nine of this study identified the effectively non-interventionist
relationship that existed between the Irish state and the accountancy profession for
much of the state’s existence. This relationship was characterised by a willingness by
the state to let the profession regulate itself, with the state intervening only when it
was unavoidable.

10.2.4.1 Reliance by the State on the .Self-Regulatory Form

In his contribution to the Seanad during the debate on the Bill, Senator Coghlan
stated that the model of regulation in place previously was "effectively based on
complete self-regulation by the profession of the profession" (Seanad. Second
Stage). The general theme of the recommendations of the Review Group and the
Companies Bill 2003 was for the State to move to a different model of self
regulation, rather than ending self-regulation (Seanad. Second Stage). Senator
Coghlan stated that the Bill would maintain self-regulation, but be a "supervised
self-regulation” rather than the "delegated” model previously accepted by the State
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(Seanad. Second Stage). This new model would, in the view of ICAI, combine the
“best features of self and State regulation’’ (‘Accountants Argue’, 2003).

This compromise is suggestive of the dilemma facing the state at this time -- that is,
the self-regulatory form had both advantages and disadvantages, and the state was
unwilling to disregard the advantages and accept full responsibility for regulating
accounting. The advantage of this form that the state wanted to maintain was
expressed by Senator Coghlan, who stated that self-regulation:

"... involves professionals who understand the nature of the work
and the technicalities of the work in the regulatory process’’
(Seanad. Second Stage).

Primarily for this reason, support for maintaining a form of self-regulation was
expressed by Senator O’Toole, who had chaired the Review Group on Auditing,
while introducing the Bill: He state that he believed in self-regulation and that
'"accountancy bodies can do a good job’’ (Seanad. Second Stage). The principle of
this self-regulatory form was clearly stated early in the Seanad debate, most notably
by Senator O’Toole, who stated that:

’’In terms of self-regulation, it was not the intention of the audit
review group, this legislation, or the directors of the board of the
lAASA that the members of the board would interfere with the work
of accountancy bodies on a daily basis ’’ (Seanad. Second Stage).

This was later expressed succinctly by Minister McDowell, who stated that the
lAASA is an oversight authority and that they should “preserve the self-regulation
of the accountancy bodies’’ (Seanad. Committee Stage). This is suggestive of a
maintained degree of reliance by the state on the professions’ expertise to regulate
itself.
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10.2.4/2 Power of the Accounting Profession

The apparent high degree of intluenee that the aecounting profession has
traditionally held within Irish polities was challenged by the opposing forces of
economic, political and scandal influenced public opinion identified in this chapter.
The political dynamics of legislating require a balancing of opposing influences.
Coveney (2012) explains this in relation to company law, thus:

”... 1 think most of the time what you are trying to do is you are trying
to forge a middle ground that maybe neither side is fully happy with
but at the same time, you know, is necessary to ensure that you can
stand over independent regulation, which is important".
Despite its weakened political position, the profession maintained significant
opportunity, if not authority, to influence the regulatory change. For instance, having
been given significant opportunities to contribute to the Review Group’s report on
which the Bill was based, the profession maintained three conduits of influence
during the Bill's consideration in the houses of the Oireachtas, fhe first conduit
came from submissions to the I'anaiste from each of the accountancy bodies while
the Bill was being circulated. Secondly, the concerns of the profession were
expressed via several senators and ministers, some of whom were qualified
accountants, during the Seanad and Dail debates. Thirdly, the opinions of the
profession were expressed publicly via press releases to the print media.

However the degree of this influence by the accounting profession through the three
conduits was relatively weak. Evidence of this is revealed by the inability for the
profession to convince both the Seanad and Dail of the undesirability of the Bill
potentially giving the lAASA the ability to sidestep the disciplinary process of the
profession. This was first argued most notably by ICAI in its submission to the
Tanaiste in relation to the Bill, in which it maintained that:
"... the power of the Supervisory Authority to investigate members of
the professional bodies should be limited to cases of significant public
interest” (ICAI Submission on the Companies (Auditing and
Accounting) Bill, 2003).
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Secondly, this argument was later pressed through the political conduit during the
Seanad debates, with Minister McDowell stating that:
‘'It [Section 8 of the Bill] gives extremely wide-ranging powers to the
authority to prescribe what should be the accountancy bodies'
regulatory and disciplinary procedure” (Seanad. Committee Stage).
Minister McDowell warned that this would have a profound effect of the nature of
the state’s regulatory relationship with the profession, and warned that:

"If the basic self-regulation principle is being maintained, there
should, at least, be some linkage back to the internal disciplinary
procedures of the accountancy bodies” (Seanad. Committee Stage).
The third conduit of inlluence for the profession was a series of press releases during
the progression of the [3ill through the houses of the Oireachtas. In this conduit of
inlluence, the profession again focussed on the disciplinary authority that the Bill
would grant the lAASA, and the potential of this to interfere with the professions'
own operations. fAr example, in a press release, ICAl stated its concerns that:

"... affording the supervisory authority the power to annul decisions of
our disciplinary bodies will undermine the progress we have made in
strengthening our internal disciplinary process ” ('Accountants Argue,'
2003).
These arguments were given little credence in both the Seanad and Dail. The
authority recommended by the RGA for the lAASA to involve itself in disciplinary
action in matters of public interest remained intact in the final legislation.

The only significant amendment to the Bill that the accountancy professions’
lobbying affected related to the composition limits for the lAASA’s board of
directors. The Bill originally specified a limit of two qualified accountants out of a
total board of twelve. The profession lobbied to change this, with ICAI in particular
arguing in a press release published in the Irish Times:
“We do not believe that establishing a ceiling of just two (of 12)
accountants/auditors on the authority will allow us make an effective
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contribution to the new supervisory model" ('Accountants Argue,'
2003).
The Bill was eventually altered to allow an lAASA board of direetors with a
maximum of four accountants out of a revised total of fourteen. The possibility of a
change to the limits was hinted at early in the Seanad debates. Minister of State,
Ahern, accepted the eoncerns of the profession at the second stage of the Seanad
debate, and stated that he would:

"... give consideration to increasing the ceiling set in relation to the
number oj directors who can be members ofprescribed accountancy
bodies " (Seanad. Second Stage).
However, the accountancy bodies were unconvinced that "the majority membership
of the authority should be of non-accountants" and lobbied to have the
"representation increased to 40 per cent" arguing that this would be "more in line
with other jurisdictions" ('Accountants Argue,' 2003). fhis argument was rejected,
but the Bill was eventually altered to allow an lAASA board of directors with a
maximum of four accountants out of a revised total of fourteen. The early acceptance
and suggestion that this aspect of the Bill was open to discussion offers little to
suggest that its later amendment was the result of any significant accounting
profession influence.

On the contrary, the evidence of the few concessions offered by the State to the
profession during the Oireachtas debates reveals the decreased political power of the
accountancy profession at this time.

10.2.5 Fraud/Scaridal and Public Opinion Influence
The high degree of direct influence that fraud, particularly high profile instances of
fraud, has exerted throughout the history of the evolution of accounting regulation
has been argued comprehensively in chapter 9. It is clear on the surface that
instances of fraud influenced the Companies Bill 2003. The basis of the Bill was the
report of the RGA which was itself commissioned as a result of Irish based scandals.
These domestic based scandals included the discovery in the I990's of an organised
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tax avoidance scheme in Ireland, and instances of high profile Irish companies
committing accounting fraud to make it appear that their financial performance was
better than it actually was. In the period between the publishing of the RGA Report
and the Companies Bill 2003, further instances of accounting fraud were revealed in
America. As a result. Senator Marc Macsharry argues that the origins of the 2003
Bill are "rooted in the public and political response which followed each of these
events” (Seanad. Second Stage). To understand this influence, it is important to
understand the questions that it produced, and the doubt that it sowed in both the
public and political spheres.

Firstly, the political antecedent of the Bill, as stated by Minister Hogan, was the
reports of "various tribunals" investigating scandals which indicated that there were:

"... deficiencies in law, which allowed certain practices to develop
which were not in the interests of shareholders or taxpayers" (Dail.
Second Stage).
From a government perspective, Coveney (2012) stales that;

"In Company Law, m>hen you get a big scandal... you need to respond
to it to make sure you minimise the chances of it happening again"
The Bill raised the "age old question" of whether the accountancy profession can
represent its members and maintain high ethical standards (Daly, 2003). The then
assistant director of IBEC, Marie Daly (2003) states that:

"It's a vexed question, and it usually only takes a crisis of some sort to
resurrect it. The dotcom bubble has given us that crisis, and in its
wake a series of corporate accounting scandals starting with Enron
and WorldCom"
The regularity and magnitude of these scandals created a situation in whieh corporate
governance became "very much a hot topic” at that time (Senator MacSharry,
Seanad. Second Stage). Minister Ahern argued that the larger scandals on the
international stage, such as the collapse of Enron 'focused attention in jurisdictions
worldwide on these subjects” (Seanad. Second Stage). Senator MacSharry stated that
"how businesses are run is something in which community and investors alike are
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taking renewed interest" (Seanad. Second Stage). Likewise, the public response to
the scandals was a changing of public opinion against the almost total self-regulatory
arrangements that were in place. This was highlighted by Senator Coghlan, who
argued that:

"The involvement of accountants in a number of scandals throughout
the 1990s and the inability of the professional bodies to demonstrate
to the public that they could regulate their members in an open and
effective w’ay made some change inevitable ” (Seanad. Second Stage).
Daly (2003) argues that these domestic scandals in addition with the high profile
nature of the collapse of Enron created a situation whereby the confidence of the
public in the reliability of company accounts "had been dented and... [needed]
repair, here as well as internationally".

As a result of the polarised public opinion in the wake of these scandals, Senator
Coghlan contended that the self-regulatory form was politically impossible to
maintain in the current climate of public distrust, stating that it: "creates a
perception of chaps regulating chaps” (Seanad. Second Stage). Senator Coghlan
expressed this suspicion insightfully, stating that:
it is easy for the public to believe that when a profession is faced with a
choice between the members' interest and the public interest, the members'
interest will always win out ” (Seanad. Second Stage).
The extent and commonality of the accounting related scandals created an
environment of public mistrust and suspicion of the accounting professions loyalties.

10.2.6 International Developments' Influence

The influence of international developments on the progression of the Irish Bill,
particularly the regulatory changes occurring in Britain and America at that time, is
difficult to judge. The report of the Review Group on Auditing certainly provided
context to its recommendations by citing comparable international developments.
However, the extent to which these developments impacted the recommendations of
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the RGA Report and subsequent Bill is unclear. As Chapter 9 revealed, Ireland has
traditionally followed the lead of other countries, particularly Britain, in legislating.
However, this is not universally true. Coveney (2012) contends that:

"Someiimes we're trailhlazers, and other times we look at best
practices elsewhere and then, you know, tailor that solution".

Minister Ahern alluded to the ‘trailblazer’ character of the RGA Report in his
contribution to the Seanad debate, stating that its recommendations, particularly
regarding the supervisory authority, were: "novel and pioneering and... not in vogue
elsewhere at the time ” (Seanad. Second Stage). likewise. Senator Coghlan stated
that within the context of the subsequent revelations of fraud in Enron and
WorldCom the RGA Report was "far-seeing" (Seanad. Second Stage). Yet, much of
the regulations recommended by the RGA Report and later proposed by the Bill in
relation to the auditing profession were, as Senator Coghlan states, an attempt to
bring Irish regulation "into line with best practice internationally" rather than
pioneering.

However, determining which best characterises the Irish approach to the Irish
legislative action in 2003 is complicated by the three year delay between the final
report of the RGA and the Bill being presented first in the Seanad. The Irish Bill had
the distinction of having been based entirely on the work of the RGA Report, which
was published prior to the revelations of serious fraud at companies such as Enron
and WorldCom that prompted regulatory change in Britain and America. As such, in
contrast to the American and British Bill’s of 2002 and 2004 respectively, the
composition of the Irish Bill was not influenced directly by these events. The
intentions of legislators towards the report’s recommendations may have changed in
the intervening period, perhaps driven by the passing of the Sarbanes/Oxley Act in
America in 2002 and the proposals in Britain that lead to the British Companies Act
of 2004.
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The regulatory change in America in particular may have provided a pressure to
conform, as Daly (2003) argued in an article published in the Sunday Business Post
while the Irish Bill was still being considered in the Dail:

"Europe is now under pressure to follow suit with similar measures,
and indeed unless it does, the US is likely to insist next April that
European audit firms operating in America comply with the
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation
Senator O’Toole had earlier suggested this pressure in reference to the regulatory
measures adopted by the Sarbanes/Oxley Act, stating that:

"Within ten years no fund manager or stockbroker anywhere in the
world will invest a schilling of anybody's money in an economy
which is not clearly compliant, clear of corruption and in which we
cannot have full trust and confidence" (Seanad. Second Stage).
While not stating it overtly, the Senator’s comments reveal the concerns of the Irish
state at this time, and awareness that the Bill could not be considered in a political
and economic vacuum.

From a broader perspective, the International regulatory context at the time of the
Companies Bill 2003 may have played an even greater role in affecting change in
Ireland. At the time of the Bill’s introduction, the role of the Irish state in regulatory
affairs was changing, as outlined by a government white paper on regulation, from
"being a service provider to a service regulator” (Regulating Better, 2004). The
regulatory state concept that originated in America, as discussed in chapters 5-7, was
an indirect, yet significant international influence on the Companies Bill 2003. The
Bill’s focus on a supervisory authority, the characteristic institution of the regulatory
state, is highly suggestive of this influence.
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10.3 Conclusion
This chapter identified and critieally assessed the factors that influenced the
regulatory ehange in Ireland of the Companies Bill, 2003. The faetors identified
include the capture of the public interest symbol, the economic and political
contexts, the evolving relationship between the state and the accounting profession,
and the influence of financial scandals and international regulatory developments.
The ehapter revealed the politieal dynamics of public interest, with its definition
being determined by whoever captures it - in this case, the state. The ehapter then
revealed the specifie economic concern of repairing international confidenee in the
Irish economy, and the influence this had on the regulatory changes. The political
context and the evolving relationship between the state and the profession was
discussed, which revealed how the weakened lobbying position of the profession and
its inability to lobby publicly inlluenccd the degree of the regulatory change. The
chapter then identified the significant influence that public scandals wielded in the
driving change. Finally, the influence of international developments was discussed,
and suggested that broad international developments in addition to specific
developments, such as the Sarbanes/Oxley Act, played a part in influencing recent
Irish developments.
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CHAPTER 11

Conclusions of this Research

11.1 Introduction
Since the turn of the century, the Irish regulatory regime for accounting has moved
from one which consisted largely of private sector regulation to one where public
sector regulation has become increasingly important. The objective of this study is to
trace the influences which determined the eourse of that change. This research fulfils
the call from Carnegie and Napier (2002) for an exploration of comparative
international history in Irish accounting research. This study built on the research of
Cahill (1999) and O’Regan (2010) in providing a eomprehensive study of the recent
regulatory developments in Ireland within the context of a comparative study of
historical developments in accounting in Ireland, the UK, and America. The
legislation establishing the Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory Authority
(lAASA), the Companies (Auditing and Accounting) Act 2003, was selected to
provide focus, and its development was studied in detail. This study focussed
specifically on the progression of the Bill that produced the Act. The methodology of
collecting information to fulfils the research objective are a combination of a
comparative analysis of historical data, an analysis of the development of a single
piece of legislation using Dail and Seanad debates and a semi-structured interview
with a government minister. This chapter lays out the answers to the research
question, describes the limitations of this study, suggests possible related areas of
future research t and provides the conclusions of this research.

11.2 Research Questions Answered

The objective of this study is to trace the influences which have determined the
course of recent changes in accounting and auditing regulation in Ireland. To achieve
this, the researcher posed two questions. The answers to these questions are
presented below. The influences on the Irish regulatory regime identified in the
answers to these questions provide a framework that could be used by other
researchers studying future developments in Irish accounting regulation.
170

1 1.2.1 How have inter national deveiopnients, particularly in the UK and
America; influenced the development of the Irish accounting and auditing
regulatory regime?

Two principal factors were considered in examining the development of the Irish
accounting and audit regulatory regime. Firstly, the close proximity of Ireland to the
United Kingdom has meant that developments in the UK have always had a
significant impact in Ireland. In addition, the reliance of the Irish economy in recent
years on foreign direct investment (FDI) from America has resulted in American
developments having an increasing influence on Ireland. The second factor is the
relatively small size of the Irish economy, and consequently the business
community. This facilitates special interest groups in exercising a disproportionate
influence through increased opportunities for concerted action. As a result of these
factors, this study took both a historical and a political perspective.

fhe historical approach of this study provided context for the analysis of recent
developments in accounting regulation through a comparison with developments in
the UK and America. Regulation is based on two competing philosophies: public
interest and economic individualism. These philosophies have significant political
dimensions and provided the framework for understanding the political perspective
that influenced the regulatory change in accounting. I'his study used a historical
comparative framework that postulates that policy making is affected by the unique
social, political and economic characteristics of the country to answer this question.
The historical development of accounting regulation in Ireland, Britain, and America
was affected by each nation’s unique characteristics. As a consequence of the
differences in the political context, influence of fraud, and the State/profession
dynamic in Ireland, Britain and America, the regulatory approach to accounting in
these nations was fundamentally dissimilar for most of this history. This study
identified three regulatory eras common to each of the three countries studied, whose
unique context provided another layer of influence over the regulatory regime.
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n.2.1.1

Victorian Reform/Progressive Pro; 1814-1922

This period heralded a move away from the extreme laissez-faire that had
characterised the preceding period in Britain and America. Within the political
context, this era is marked by a growing acceptance among educated individuals that
the state has a role to play in promoting the public interest.

The history of

accounting regulation has its origins in Britain during this era. The first accounting
regulation was introduced in Britain in 1844 in response to reports of widespread
fraud. However, similar accounts of business fraud in America during this era did
not affect the introduction of regulation in the U.S. despite the broadly comparable
reform movements in both nations. This study determined that unique aspects of the
American political context restrained attempts to regulate the accounting profession.
Essentially, an inherent degree of mistrust of government power, uniquely across the
political spectrum, inlluenced the laissez-faire leanings of the American people.

In contrast, the discomfort in Britain at this time for government involvement in
private affairs stemmed from the laissez-faire beliefs of the legislature and not the
citizenry. This distinction meant that in periods of significant revelations of fraud,
public pressure to prevent its reoccurrence gave the legislature little choice but to
intervene. However, even these interventions were constrained by the persistent
uneasiness of legislators, with much of the accounting regulation passed in Britain
during this era lacking authority to enforce significant change.

11.2.1.2

Post Great Depression Era; 1929-1970

The Great Depression, which started in America but had a similar impact on
Britain's economy, provided the impetus to significant regulatory change in Britain
and America. In the decades after this economic crash, greater attempts were made
in both nations to create a balanced regulatory regime for accounting and auditing in
an attempt to stabilise the highly variable back and forth nature of developments in
accounting regulation up to this point. The effects of the Great Depression in the
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U.S. had damaged public confidence in completely free markets. As a result, this
period marked the beginning in America of a popular acceptance of the need for at
least some government oversight of how private businesses were operated.

Irish regulatory efforts have historically been even more subdued compared to the
British and American e.xperience. The regulatory developments in Britain and
America in the decades after the Great Depression were in contrast with the lack of
seemingly any will by Irish legislators to advance the accounting regulation adopted
by the recently independent Irish state. Two primary influences limited the
regulatory developments in Ireland during this era. Firstly, the Irish legislature had
little experience in legislating in the decades after cessation from the British Empire.
Its limited experience was heavily influenced by the British legislature and thus
reflected the British perspective on regulation. Secondly, the Irish accounting
profession maintained a reciprocal relationship with its British counterpart, and their
combined influence kept the inexperienced Irish legislature overly reliant on the
expertise of the profession compared to the British and American situation.

11.2.1.3

Regulatory State Fra; 1970-prcscnt

The regulatory state concept that first arose in America in the aftermath of the Great
Depression gained widespread acceptance internationally in this period. This era was
characterised by the British and American government increasingly participating in
the regulation of many areas of importance to the economy. The drivers of this
increasing role of the state included the advent of globalisation and the growing
complexity of business. These factors necessitated a greater expertise in the
regulatory activities of countries. As a result, the supervisor authority form was
widely adopted, with its emphasis on combining the advantages of self regulation
with the safety net of supervising the private actors.
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The emerging strategic role of accounting during this era placed greater importance
on the regulation of the profession. However, the growing complexity of accounting
necessitated a reliance on the profession to self-regulate with the state providing a
supervisory function and applying pressure to the profession to improve its own
regulation in situations of accounting fraud by threatening to withdraw the delegated
self-regulatory form. These developments were broadly comparable in Britain and
America, influenced by increasing attempts to standardise accounting regulation
internationally during this era.

In the Irish situation, much of this era witnessed a high degree of regulatory inertia
from the state, with the greatest influences on accounting developments coming from
the accounting profession in setting standards, and external pressure in the form of
legally enforced Directives from what is now the European Union. The Irish state
began to show the first significant signs of moving away from the influence of
Britain during this era, particularly evidenced by the state’s refusal to implement the
EU Seventh Directive after British implementation. Globalisation, entry into the
European Community, and the growing confidence of Irish legislators affected this
change. Evidence of the increasing independence of the Irish state was provided by
the regulatory developments at the beginning of the new Millennium.
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1 1.2.2 What factors influenced the development of the Irish Companies’
Act 2fl02 and hovv^

A convergence of several factors influenced the development of the Irish Companies
Act 2003. The influences identified in this study were: public interest symbol,
economic context, political context, accounting lobby, fraud/scandal and public
opinion, and international developments.

n.2.2.1

Public Interest Symbol

fhe role of the public interest symbol in this development was twofold: it provided a
catalyst for change and a shield by the state actors who were in favour of increasing
regulation. I’his was particularly revealed by how requests for a definition of the
state’s interpretation of public interest as it was used in the Bill were simply
dismissed by state actors favourable to the Bill during its consideration in the
Seanad. The public interest became synonymous in the public view with the
regulatory change proposed by the Bill, and the accounting profession’s attempts to
recapture the symbol failed.

11.2.2.2

Economic Context

The need to tighten the regulatory regime for accounting and auditing was further
pressed by the economic concerns of the Irish government. There was a widely held
belief among the key figures in the legislature that it would become difficult for
Ireland to attract future foreign direct investment in light of the weaknesses exposed
in the regulatory regime by several financial scandals. These economic concerns
served to convince Irish legislators of the need to make a political statement via the
introduction of strong regulation that would reaffirm trust in the Irish economy. This
economic context of Ireland’s reliance on foreign direct investment was a relatively
recent development. The significance of this investment to the Irish economy at the
time resulted in an influence that was incomparable with previous eras in Ireland.
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11.2.2.3

Political Context

The high profile nature of the accounting scandals that preceded the regulatory
initiatives in Ireland at the beginning of the new millennium were the direct catalysts
of that change. They signalled to the public that the current regulatory regime was
not working. Moreover, they put the spotlight on the significant degree of self
regulation that the accounting profession had at that time and served to turn public
opinion against the profession. This gave the Irish state significant political capital to
challenge the claims of the accountancy bodies that the form of self-regulation
practiced by the profession since the foundation of the state was appropriate.

11.2.2.4

Accounting Lobby

The weakened lobbying capacity of the accounting profession at this time in
comparison with the Irish government made it untenable for the profession to
directly argue against the proposed regulatory changes. As a result, opposition to the
regulatory change was politically timid, allowing the state to be bolder in its
ambitions to tighten the regulatory regime. The profession chose to target specific
aspects of the Bill for criticism, while publicly accepting the overall purpose of the
Bill. The fact that this strategy failed further suggests the weakened lobbying
position of the accounting profession at this time.

11.2.2.5

Fraud/Scandal and Public Opinion

The revelations of significant tax fraud in Ireland, and accounting scandals involving
internationally high profile Irish companies in the I990's played a central role in
inlluencing the developments that led to the passing into law of the Companies
(Auditing and Accounting) Act 2003. These events affected this change both directly
and indirectly. Firstly, the scandals turned public opinion against the accounting
profession, and raised significant questions regarding the appropriateness of the
regulatory arrangements at that time for accounting. Secondly, the international
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profile of the aeeounting seandals in large Irish companies in the 1990’s, such as
Waterford Crystal, caused the government of the time serious concern regarding the
possible impact it might have on the state’s ability to continue to attract Foreign
Direct Investment. Determined to mitigate the damage to Ireland’s international
reputation, the government initiated a comprehensive review of the regulatory
regime with the Review Group on Auditing (RGA). All of the key recommendations
of the RGA’s final report were accepted and, with the support of the public opinion,
the government brought the Bill successfully into law.

11 2 2.6
.

.

International Developments

Although the content of the Companies Bill 2003 originated from within the state,
international developments in accounting regulation at this time, particularly the
passing of the Sarbanes/Oxley Act in America, provided urgency to Irish legislators
to follow through. Significantly, many of these factors had wielded little inlluence in
affecting regulatory change in previous periods of Ireland’s history, and this suggests
an evolution in the overall Irish context. Furthermore, while Ireland remained
relatively unaffected by the regulatory developments internationally in the preceding
decades, the changing economic dynamics of globalisation and its importance to the
Irish economy meant that developments in Britain and America became influential
factors in Irish regulatory efforts.

11.3

Future Re.search

This broad historical research study, while narrowing the existing gap in the
literature, has limitations. In fulfilment of the requirements for a Masters in Business
(Research), this dissertation was the first major piece of academic research
undertaken by the researcher. Along with experience, the practicalities of access to
relevant sources and time were other limiting factors for the researcher. Instead of
examining the entire process that led to the enactment of the Companies Bill 2003,
the study focused primarily on the progression of the Bill through the houses of the
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Oireachtas. The access constraints made it impossible to include interviews with
direct participants in the development of the aforementioned Bill.

The scope constraints of writing a research masters limited the choice of in-depth
theoretical study into the factors that affected the regulatory change brought forth by
the Companies Bill 2003. Future research could involve a detailed study of the
influence of the media in driving the regulatory change in accounting in Ireland.
Combined with a more extensive use of interviews with relevant individuals, this
would provide a worthy research subject.

11.4 Conclusion

Existing literature calls for an exploration of comparative international history in
Irish accounting research. I'his study answers this calling, by analysing the historical
development of accounting regulation in Ireland, Britain, and America, and
identifying the unique influence on the development of accounting regulation in
Ireland. In addition, this study builds on the work of Cahill (1999) and O’Regan
(2010) by tracing the influences that resulted in the significant recent changes to the
Irish regulatory regime for accounting

This study reveals the broad level of influences that affect the development of
regulatory regimes. It achieves this by analysing the recent developments in the Irish
regulatory regime for accounting within two frameworks: a comprehensive
theoretical framework of regulation and the competing philosophies of public
interest and economic individualism that underpin it; and a comparative historical
study of the development of accounting regulation.

The main outcome of this research is the identification of factors that have
influenced the course of the recent developments in Irish accounting regulation.
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within the context of the uniquely Irish factors revealed by the comparative study
that have historical constrained its development. I'his provides a framework to assess
future developments in the Irish regulatory regime. This research fulfilled the
research objective and provides an interesting basis for others wishing to research
this area.
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